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 Abstract 
 
 
 
This study is concerned with the circulation, composition and character of 
the core political executive elite in post-colonial Nigeria over successive po-
litical regimes and with changing sources and levels of government revenue. 
The true riddle is perhaps not the instability of the post-colonial govern-
ments, as manifest in the frequent regime breakdowns accompanied by rap-
id turnover of the political executive elite. Rather, the larger puzzle lies in 
the composition and interactivity of the political executive elite since Nige-
ria’s independence in 1960. The incessantly troubled manner in which po-
litical leadership has changed raises serious doubts about societal influence 
on elite circulation, composition and character, and by extension, on the 
political system. This leads to the main question of this research, which is 
twofold: What social background and styles of interaction have character-
ized the circulation and composition of the core political executive elite in 
Nigeria? Have core political executive elite patterns limited the scope of the 
political system through the succession of different governments with shifts 
and influxes of economic resources in the post-colonial period?  
The main objective of the study is to analyse the historical and dynamic 
composition of the core political executive elite by looking at the periodic 
circulation (flow) of elite members from specific social and interaction 
backgrounds. The study argues that despite structural changes (in terms of 
political regime and economic resources) and an explicit policy to draw 
members of the political executive from various social backgrounds, the 
preferences of the government elite have been largely divorced from societal 
demands, such as political liberties and civil rights. The political executive 
elite have relied on the support of a political class which operates through 
informal and elusive networks linked to political parties and state power. 
Thus, instead of typical national social structures, Nigeria’s political execu-
tive elite has depended on the political class for support; and both have re-
lied on state resources for survival. 
 Abstract xv 
 
The current study contests the unique relationship proposed by Marxist 
theory between economic power and political power. Yet even more so, it 
refutes liberal-pluralist assumptions. Autonomous social groupings and a 
neutral state do not appear to be a valid basis of elite composition and char-
acter in influential political offices in post-colonial Nigeria. The analysis 
draws on critical elite theories which focus on common social background 
and network arrangements through which a power elite group operates and 
persists in upper echelon positions. Critical elite theorists argue that political 
offices may be transformed from a base for serving society to a bastion to 
secure the special interests of the elite. They further contend that the com-
mon social background which permits elite persons to intermingle produces 
group coherence and stimulates the use of large and important social institu-
tions to achieve special interests.  
Unlike the triumvirate composition of the power elite model, this study 
traces five groups of elite in Nigeria: the socio-cultural, traditional, military, 
economic and political. Each is linked to the operation of social networks, 
political parties and state institutions. Based on this outlook, the study uses 
social background data collected and classified from running records since 
colonial times to analyse the circulation, composition and character of the 
elite in political executive offices in Nigeria. Longitudinal analysis and net-
work approaches are employed to deepen understanding about the charac-
teristic composition of the political executive elite as political regimes and 
economic resources changed over time. The study reveals certain paradoxes 
and continuities in the composition of the core elite. Common social back-
ground, selective informal networks integrating political class supporters, 
recurrent appearances and socially dysfunctional attitudes characterize elite 
circulation, composition and continuity in political executive offices.  
More importantly, structural changes, such as new regimes and substan-
tial influxes of government revenue, have not been managed in such a way 
as to produce significant positive outcomes except nominally on elite circu-
lation and composition. In fact, typical attitudes (rent-seeking, patronage, 
coercion, corruption, ethnic manipulation and ‘godfather’ politics) are a 
continuing feature of elite composition in political executive offices. Both 
civilian and military rulers have over time trampled on political liberties and 
civil rights. Not only have the preferences of the Nigerian political executive 
elite diverged from societal interests, but elite attitudes and practises have 
restricted political liberties and civil rights, while contributing to retard the 
growth of the political system. In all, elite special interests associated with 
the use of selective social background and interactive network devices have 
marginalized important social groups from decisive political processes.  
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Co-optation of likeminded persons into political offices has reinforced the 
social similarity of the core national executive elite. But it has also damp-
ened social awareness, which seems to contradict Marxist propositions 
about the activation of such awareness for radical social change. In a more 
intriguing manner, the observed pattern of elite flows in political executive 
offices contradicts the liberal-pluralist assumption of power diffusion. At 
first, the diverse social backgrounds observed in political offices of the 
country seem in agreement with the idea of cross-cutting power inclusion 
proposed by the liberal pluralists. But a closer look at the composition and 
character of the political executive elite reveals a cohesive group of carefully 
selected persons from a common social background and network of politi-
cal class members. Thus, a paradox marks the relationship between the cir-
culation and characteristic composition of the core political elite, resulting in 
impeded social participation and political development. This paradox im-
plies not only elite continuities in political power and roles but also the 
weakening of the very institutions that are supposed to support political sys-
tem development. This anomaly calls for coherent political action against 
the flaws in the political system in such ways that revitalize its potentially 
most dynamic inputs – the people’s demands. 
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De politieke elite van Nigeria:  
Paradoxen en constante factoren, 1960-2007 
 Samenvatting 
 
 
 
Dit onderzoek gaat over de roulatie, samenstelling en aard van de politieke 
regeringselite in postkoloniaal Nigeria tijdens opeenvolgende politieke regi-
mes, waarbij de bronnen en de hoogte van de overheidsinkomsten wissel-
den. De instabiliteit van de postkoloniale regeringen, die blijkt uit de veel-
vuldige regimewisselingen die gepaard gaan met een snelle vervanging van 
de politieke regerende elite, is misschien niet zo raadselachtig. De samenstel-
ling en interactie van de politieke regerende elite sinds de onafhankelijkheid 
van Nigeria in 1960 vormt een groter raadsel. De steeds problematische 
wisselingen van het politiek leiderschap trekken de maatschappelijke invloed 
op de roulatie, samenstelling en aard van de elite, en daaruit voortvloeiend, 
op het politieke systeem, ernstig in twijfel. Hieruit volgt de belangrijkste on-
derzoeksvraag: Hoe was de roulerende politieke regeringselite in Nigeria 
samengesteld wat betreft sociale achtergrond en interactiestijlen, en heeft dit 
de reikwijdte van het politieke systeem beperkt door een opeenvolging van 
verschillende regeringen met verschuivingen in de influx van economische 
middelen in de postkoloniale periode?  
Het hoofddoel van het onderzoek is de analyse van de historische en dy-
namische samenstelling van de politieke regeringselite door te kijken naar de 
periodieke roulatie (flow) van leden van de elite met een specifieke sociale 
achtergrond en een bepaald netwerk. In het onderzoek wordt betoogd dat 
ondanks structurele veranderingen (wat betreft politiek regime en economi-
sche middelen) en het principe dat leden van de politieke top een verschil-
lende sociale achtergrond moeten hebben, de voorkeuren van de politieke 
elite afwijken van wat de bevolking wil, zoals politieke vrijheden en burger-
rechten. De politieke regeringselite rekent op de steun van een politieke 
klasse die functioneert op basis van informele en ongrijpbare netwerken die 
banden hebben met politieke partijen en overheidsmacht. Dit betekent dat 
de politieke regeringselite van Nigeria afhankelijk is van de steun van de po-
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litieke klasse, en niet van de kenmerkende nationale sociale structuren. De 
politieke regeringselite en politieke klasse zijn beide voor hun voortbestaan 
afhankelijk van overheidsmiddelen.  
In dit onderzoek wordt de Marxistische theorie dat er een unieke relatie 
is tussen economische en politieke macht in twijfel getrokken. Tegelijkertijd 
worden liberaal-pluralistische aannames weerlegd. Een autonome sociale 
achtergrond en neutraliteit van de staat zoals voorgesteld door liberaal-
pluralisten lijken niet de basis te zijn voor de samenstelling en aard van de 
elite die invloedrijke politieke posities bekleedt in postkoloniaal Nigeria. Het 
onderzoek maakt gebruik van kritische elitetheorieën die stellen dat een 
machtselite functioneert en zich handhaaft in de bovenste echelons door 
een gemeenschappelijke sociale achtergrond en netwerkverbanden. Aanhan-
gers van de kritische elitetheorie stellen dat politieke posities soms verwor-
den van een plaats om de maatschappij te dienen tot een bastion voor het 
veiligstellen van de specifieke belangen van de elite. Zij betogen verder dat 
de gemeenschappelijke sociale achtergrond die de onderlinge omgang ver-
gemakkelijkt zorgt voor samenhang binnen de groep en bevordert dat men 
grote en belangrijke sociale instellingen gebruikt om specifieke belangen te 
behartigen.  
Dit onderzoek gaat niet uit van het model van de machtselite als triumvi-
raat, maar van de veronderstelling dat in Nigeria de activiteiten van veel ver-
schillende elitegroepen (sociaal-culturele, traditionele, militaire, economische 
en politieke) verbonden zijn met de werking van sociale netwerken, politieke 
partijen en staatsinstellingen. Vanuit deze optiek haalt het onderzoek gege-
vens over de sociale achtergrond van de elite uit archiefstukken die terug-
gaan tot in de koloniale tijd om de roulatie, samenstelling en aard van de 
politieke regeringselite in Nigeria te analyseren. Longitudinale analyse en 
netwerkbenaderingen verschaffen een dieper inzicht in de kenmerkende 
samenstelling van de politieke regeringselite door de jaren heen onder wisse-
lende politieke regimes en economische middelen. Uit het onderzoek blijken 
bepaalde paradoxen en constante factoren in de samenstelling van de poli-
tieke top. Een gemeenschappelijke sociale achtergrond, selectieve informele 
netwerken waarvan aanhangers van de politieke klasse deel uitmaken, terug-
kerende politici en sociaal disfunctionele attitudes kenmerken de roulatie, 
samenstelling en continuïteit van de elite in politieke regeringsfuncties.  
Nog belangrijker is het feit dat structurele veranderingen, zoals nieuwe 
regimes en een substantiële stroom overheidsinkomsten, niet hebben geleid 
tot significant positieve resultaten, behalve theoretisch op het vlak van de 
roulatie en samenstelling van de elite. In feite zijn typische attitudes (rent-
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seeking, patronage, dwang, corruptie, etnische manipulatie en ‘maffia’-
politiek) steeds kenmerkend voor de samenstelling van de elite in politieke 
regeringsfuncties. Zowel de civiele als militaire autoriteiten hebben in de 
loop der tijd politieke vrijheden en burgerrechten met voeten getreden. De 
voorkeuren van de Nigeriaanse politieke regeringselite wijken niet alleen af 
van maatschappelijke belangen, maar de praktijken die kenmerkend zijn 
voor de attitudes van de elite hebben politieke vrijheden en burgerrechten 
aanzienlijk beperkt, terwijl ze de groei van het politieke systeem hebben ver-
traagd. De specifieke belangen van de elite in combinatie met het selecteren 
op sociale achtergrond en netwerkverbanden hebben ervoor gezorgd dat 
belangrijke sociale groepen gemarginaliseerd worden bij beslissende politie-
ke processen.  
Bovendien heeft de co-optatie van gelijkgestemden in politieke functies 
de sociale vergelijkbaarheid van de nationale regeringselite versterkt. Het 
heeft het sociale bewustzijn echter verminderd, wat in tegenspraak lijkt te 
zijn met Marxistische opvattingen over de activering van een dergelijk be-
wustzijn voor radicale sociale verandering. Het is nog intrigerender dat het 
geobserveerde fluctuerende patroon van de elite in politieke regeringsfunc-
ties ingaat tegen de liberaal-pluralistische aannames over de verspreiding van 
macht. Op het eerste gezicht zijn de schijnbare verschillen in sociale achter-
grond in overeenstemming met het liberaal- pluralistische idee van macht bij 
een dwarsdoorsnede van de bevolking. Maar bij nadere beschouwing is de 
politieke regeringselite een hechte groep van zorgvuldig geselecteerde per-
sonen met een gemeenschappelijke sociale achtergrond en een gemeen-
schappelijk netwerk van leden van de politieke klasse. Er is dus een para-
doxale relatie tussen de roulatie van de politieke elite en de kenmerkende 
samenstelling van deze groep, die de sociale participatie en politieke ontwik-
keling in de weg staat. Deze paradox brengt niet alleen een continuering van 
de elite in politieke machtsposities en rollen met zich mee, maar verzwakt 
ook de instellingen die het politieke systeem zouden moeten ondersteunen. 
Dit vraagt om eenduidige politieke actie tegen de tekortkomingen van het 
politieke systeem waardoor de inbreng die potentieel het meest dynamisch is 
– de eisen van het volk – weer aan kracht wint. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 The Main Issue 
This thesis is concerned with the circulation, composition and character 
of the core political executive elite at the national level of government in 
post-colonial Nigeria. It analyses the composition and character of the 
core political executive elite and looks at its members’ circulation in po-
litical offices as political regimes and economic resources changed over 
time in the post-colonial period. Since independence from British colo-
nial rule was peacefully negotiated and finally achieved in 1960, Nigeria 
has relentlessly sought a sustainable political order to replace the colonial 
one. However, the Nigerian polity has experienced erratic changes in 
government regime and in economic resources. The country has been 
marked by long, successive periods of military dictatorship interspersed 
with short-lived intervals of democratic rule, often preceded or followed 
by election turmoil. Nigeria’s experiences of regime change are thus rem-
iniscent of a badly regulated pendulum that over-swings towards dictato-
rial acts on one flank while under-swinging to democratic trials on the 
other.  
The twisty shifts of Nigeria’s post-colonial regimes have also been as-
sociated with puzzling changes at the topmost level of the core political 
executive elite. This study defines this core elite group as those Nigerians 
who have ascended to occupy policy supervisory positions at the execu-
tive (cabinet or junta) level of national government through the various 
regime changes in the post-colonial period. Though the period since 
1999 has witnessed the longest sustained survival of a political regime, 
turbulence and violence have nonetheless accompanied past and recent 
elite power and role successions. The issue here is not just the historical 
lack of consensus on shifts in regimes or the high incidence of violent 
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conflict over elite succession in key government positions at the national 
level. Rather, the major theme of this study is the characteristic pattern 
of the social composition and character of the elite that has ascended to 
and retained political power within the national executive government.  
Despite the fact that the civilian regime has been uninterrupted since 
1999, elite successions, particularly within the topmost executive gov-
ernment offices, have been marked by intrigues, violent dispositions and 
use of force spreading through general elections. Party primaries are re-
ported to be the outcome of manipulation and co-optation by powerful 
Nigerian personalities mostly linked to the office of the chief political 
executive. The worrisome way that Umaru Yar’Adua succeeded Oluse-
gun Obasanjo in the presidency after the 2007 general elections persists 
unabated. That is, political crises have continued to mitigate constitu-
tional processes of political succession. When Yar`Adua became ill and 
unable to continue in office (between 2008 and 2009), there was much 
controversy and opposition to the ascension of his vice president as act-
ing president. Goodluck Jonathan is a minority ethnic group member 
from the troubled Niger Delta zone. He was practically ‘handpicked’ by 
Obasanjo, i.e. through the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) primaries, 
as vice-presidential candidate to Yar’Adua. It is worth recalling that the 
PDP primaries were visibly overshadowed by the personality and posi-
tion of Obasanjo as incumbent president. Despite the growing number 
of political parties in the country since 1999, the PDP has won all of the 
presidential elections. The crisis that marked Jonathan’s ascent to the 
office of the president lingers on to this day, i.e. after Yar’Adua’s inca-
pacity and following from Jonathan’s victory in the 2011 presidential 
election. Since the current succession crisis began in 2008 in the federal 
capital of Abuja, Nigerian society has been seriously upset by violence, 
including bloody terrorist attacks in 2010 and 2011. The acute crises 
around political successions since colonial rule in Nigeria have continued 
to raise unanswered questions about the composition and pattern of the 
Nigerian political executive elite.  
‘Composition’ is here understood as the outcome of circulation in 
upper echelon political executive offices under specific regimes. ‘Circu-
larity’ thus denotes a periodic change in the participation of the different 
elite types or categories (e.g. age, sex, professional and communal attrib-
utes) in government positions of political executive power and roles. In 
turn, ‘pattern’ entails the regularities observed in elite turnover, i.e. the 
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composite nature of the core political elite as the effect of participation 
in political executive offices over time and space. The qualitative circula-
tion of political elites in top government positions is at least theoretically 
considered an important aspect of the social and political order needed 
for stability and development. Society in post-colonial Nigeria has nur-
tured high expectations of a responsive and responsible political elite 
composition. This expectation conveys a unique meaning. The historical 
and dynamic pattern of political elite circulation (based on who partici-
pates or is excluded) in policymaking processes is of great significance to 
the promotion of political order and political legitimacy. Nigerians also 
express a continued desire to overcome the colonial legacy syndrome 
(bequeathed problems from colonial rule). Therefore, the modus oper-
andi or simply the processes and outcomes of political participation re-
main of great concern.  
The Nigerian political elite display a curious attitude towards social 
order, especially the establishment of the formal political institutions 
needed to support state actions. Since the colonial period, the Nigerian 
political elite ostensibly implemented various structural changes. Apart 
from the different transitions to liberal democratic constitutions, the Ni-
gerian political elite have been trying out the consociational model of de-
mocratic governance. For example, the 1979 constitution institutional-
ized the ‘Federal Character’ principle designed inter alia to promote the 
equitable distribution of political offices, particularly at the national ex-
ecutive government level, through the appointment of ministers that re-
flect national character. If ethnic hierarchy (pyramidal ethnic majority-
minority power relations) has been a social obstacle to political participa-
tion in Nigeria, the ‘Federal Character’ principle and its related informal 
zoning formulae were supposed to engender elite cooperation and com-
promise, based on the liberal-pluralist values of openness and inclusive-
ness. These latter elements, however, reflect not just a quantitative meas-
ure of representation but also the quality of social interest representation 
(Verba 2003).  
The concern of this study is not merely to document changes over 
time in elite composition but also to explain the quality of change through 
the circulation or recirculation of the elite in political power and roles. 
The significance of elite circulation for the wider ‘representativeness’ of 
the political system is also examined. Thus, this study’s concerns include 
the extent to which quantitative changes in authority structures are 
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meaningful and go beyond elite replacement, as in change-of-the-guard 
or cabinet reshuffles, which can be characterized as purely nominal 
changes in political executive composition. If physical replacements in 
the power composition of the elite mostly produce dynamics without 
fundamental shifts in the attitude and behaviour of political actors to-
wards political objects, qualitative changes become unlikely.  
The lack of qualitative changes in political elite circulation can reduce 
the prospects for a stable social and political order. Contrary to conven-
tional (liberal-pluralist) theory’s expectation of change based on repre-
sentative class dynamics, there can be elite recirculation without mean-
ingful political change (i.e. in a ‘democratic’ or ‘representative’ direction). 
In post-colonial and oil-rich Nigeria, the nature of social forces as they 
developed historically, and still mobilize and influence political dynamics, 
could provide important clues about who’s who, how and why in the politi-
cal system. In all, the current study raises doubt about the coherence of 
the composition and character of the core political executive elite with 
socially pervasive needs and demands. It also questions the renewal of 
the authority structure as regimes and resource-use patterns have 
changed in the post-colony. Therefore, the study queries the extent to 
which the composition and character of the political elite, through peri-
odic circulation within the national executive government, agrees with 
the historical and dynamic processes and outcomes of political power-
sharing (i.e. dispersal) and renewals since colonial rule.  
To consider some of these issues, this study focuses on the historical 
and dynamic composition of the core political executive elite. Attention 
is especially directed to the specific characteristics, forms and preferences 
shared by the Nigerian political elite as political regime and economic 
resources changed through the post-colonial period, i.e. over the course 
of several decades. The study seeks understanding about the formation 
processes and character assumed by the core political executive elite. 
Such understanding pervades the extent to which elite values and inter-
ests (i.e. ‘preferences’) correspond to the dominant social and economic 
order. The study is thus interested in the degree to which Nigeria’s po-
litical elites share a certain distinctive background and familiar political 
preferences as important structural changes occurred in the post-colonial 
period. 
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1.2 Basic Conceptual and Theoretical Issues  
1.2.1 Polarization Between Marxist and Liberal Assumptions  
Social science and political science differ in their perspectives on how the 
elite forms and circulates in government. The respective theories reveal a 
great deal about the background and characteristics of the elite vis-à-vis 
political office-holding. However, they use different concepts and termi-
nologies, ranging from Marxist-oriented approaches that analyse ‘class 
conflict’ to the ‘individualistic liberal’ or ‘political modernization’ schools 
of thought. Elite theories can thus be said to straddle two opposites: 
Marxist and liberalist. Marxist and neo-Marxist theories are inclined to 
conceive power as being considerably concentrated within the elite, or 
dominant economic class, which is in turn internally cohesive, thus tend-
ing to truncate social change mostly through state power (Poulantzas 
1969, Gramsci 1971, Olsen and Marger 1993).  
Yet Marxist and neo-Marxist theoretical conceptions of elite founda-
tions and relationships with the state have their weaknesses. Marxist the-
ory considers structural changes to be influenced through the elevation 
of class consciousness and radical changes in the power structure (see 
Crompton 1998, Welsh 1979). In other words, the theory tends to be 
deterministic in terms of how political elites arise from economic and 
resource-based structures of relationships, while it ignores the role of 
ethnic identities and appeals to ‘organic’ notions of democratic politics 
(Mann 2005: 69). For liberal pluralists, political leadership exercises its 
agency in the short term, and this corresponds to structured rules and 
roles enshrined in democratic laws and institutions (Levinsky and Ways 
2006). Put differently, liberal pluralists consider the internalization of 
governing norms to be the basis for attenuating the long-term needs of 
strong leadership, i.e. through a concentrated and centralized authority 
structure.  
Liberal-pluralism hinges on the belief that power is relatively ‘com-
petitively’ distributed; so it is dispersed not only within the elite but also 
among society members in such a way that circulation over time can lead 
to real transformation in elite composition (Dahl 1977, Diamond et al. 
1977, Olsen and Marger 1993). Structural changes, in the form of a more 
open political regime and market-oriented resource use, are expected by 
the pluralists to enhance political elite circulation (Lipset 1967, Dahl 
1971, 1989 and 1999, Diamond et al. 1988, Diamond 1983, 1993a, 
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1993b, 1997, 2004 and 2008, Diamond and Morlino 2004). Hence, the 
shift from a centrally dominated to a pluralistic social order is believed to 
create a political structure that ‘automatically distributes political re-
sources and political skills to a vast variety of individuals, groups and or-
ganizations’ (Dahl 1971: 77).  
Since the 1980s, neo-pluralists have recognized the enlarged and ex-
cessive structure of the state and reiterated the need for increased liter-
acy, education and communication so as to decentralize political skills 
and produce a stable political order (Manley 1983, Dahl 1989, 1999). As 
Hannan and Carrol argued, the ‘decentralization of political skills pre-
sumably creates conditions for effective opposition to coercion and for 
the creation of special-interest movements’ (1981: 20). More importantly, 
the stability of the pluralistic order is said to derive from social enlight-
enment, which enhances the accommodation of a new elite ‘representing 
social strata with varying goals and interests’ by the old elites ‘sharing 
similar perspectives’ (Dahl 1971: 37). Consequently, the character (qual-
ity) and composition (inclusiveness) of the political elite are expected to 
change (through political regime and economic resource changes) from a 
closed and unaccountable disposition to greater openness, cooperation 
and sense of responsibility. Education is therefore considered to be the 
basis for changing elite attitudes and behaviour towards a stable social 
order. 
Some scholarly works which have investigated Nigerian elites and 
those in other observed African countries have adopted Weberian ra-
tional approaches to elite formation and attitudes. These authors have 
favoured a focus on formal education as the basis for elite transforma-
tion and consolidation (Smythe and Smythe 1966, see also Lloyd et al. 
1960). The common view at independence was that the erosion of tradi-
tional values that were based mostly on ethnicity and inheritance would 
support the creation of a national political leadership (Nnoli 1978, 
Ayoade 1986, Crowder 1987). Early researchers could not foresee the 
continuing significance after independence of ethnic politics, rent-
seeking, patronage, corruption with ‘godfather’-based political interac-
tions and state capture. That is, modernization theory, based on liberal 
democratic concepts of ‘political development’, circumscribed their anal-
ysis to such typical aspects as political personality and personalization of 
power.  
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 For example, the view of the supremacy of rational principles en-
abled Smythe and Smythe (1960), writing on the Nigerian elite shortly 
after independence, to conclude that Nigeria represented an example of 
the triumph of educational knowledge and self-made leaders. At the 
time, it seemed that meritocracy would win out over aristocracy and that 
inheritance, birthright and personalization of power would gradually be 
eroded, giving rise to a new national political order that was expected to 
follow more democratic ‘rules of the game’. That is, a national order 
bounded by respect for human rights – political, social and economic. 
Particularly, attention is often focused on the political order in which the 
elite composition is characterized by respect for political rights and civil 
liberties. However, the constant tensions over power succession and its 
persistence without significant social change in post-colonial Nigeria 
challenge the strict application of liberal concepts and presumptions, es-
pecially regarding leadership turnover that decentralizes rather than cen-
tralizes state power. In the Nigerian polity, powerful social and informal 
forces seem to persist that act in support of political power concentra-
tion. The present study represents a serious effort to ‘update’ the only 
existing study of the political elite of Nigeria, which was the Smythe and 
Smythe original study of 1960. 
1.2.2 Typical Constraints on Elite Circulation and Composition  
Since Nigerian political independence, structural changes have appeared 
as an open response to the colonial legacy of inherited and undesired 
political and economic structures. The emergent and succeeding political 
elite groups of Nigeria have sought to divert the power structure away 
from colonially inherited structures by multiplying or creating new insti-
tutions. In theory, pluralists would recommend the creation or strength-
ening of existing institutions for political development purposes (Dahl 
1971, Diamond et al 1988, see Fukuyama 2004, Smith 2008). However, 
the vexing issue is how and why elite successions have continually 
threatened the orderly turnover of political leadership and meaningful 
representation of social interests. A plausible answer may derive from the 
Marxist deterministic view about the role of economic factors or the lib-
eral-pluralist perspective on power dispersal based on autonomous group 
actions and state neutrality. However, in a society where elite leaders ap-
pear not only to persist in political power but to demonstrate ineptitude 
8 CHAPTER 1 
 
in attending to social demands through state power, the strict application 
of Marxist and liberal approaches may not provide the expected answers.  
Hence, resorting to the cumulative social background, interests and 
practices of the elite can provide clues as to the variety of constraints on 
the effective occupancy of political offices in a heterogeneous social con-
text such as Nigeria. Factors constraining the circulation and composi-
tion of a supposedly functional elite group and, by extension, an elite-
driven political system can range from two extremes. At one end of the 
spectrum are historically embedded values and interests (symbolic and 
material) that individuals or groups share and pursue through state pow-
er (Cohen 1972, Chazan 1993, Ake 1995, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006 
and 2008); at the other end are differences in social structure (Weber 
1968) with persistent patterns of social network that entail informal sys-
tems of political relationships (Mills 1956/2000, Einsentadt and Roniger 
1984, Bratton and de Walle 1997). Political socialization that is expected 
to reproduce coherent elite attitudes and behaviour towards political ob-
jects, i.e. through formal institutions and interactions (Abrahamson and 
Inglehart 1995), can in certain contexts derive from informal networks 
that reproduce power and roles in decisive political executive offices. 
Informal social networks can support the recurrence instead of circula-
tion of the political executive elite and, by extension, constitute more of 
a strain than strength for the operation and growth of the political sys-
tem.  
The liberal pluralists’ belief that structural changes function to dis-
perse political power and roles responsibly amongst important social 
groups can be misleading, particularly for understanding the differences 
that persist in certain contexts such as Nigeria. That is, despite structural 
differentiation, elite power and roles can endure by recurring and extend-
ing through time and space without producing meaningful social change. 
Marxists rely on structural changes for radically overturning the elite-
dominated economic and political order. Notwithstanding, formal politi-
cal institutions may be penetrated by informal power with outcomes dif-
ferent from Marxist and pluralist expectations.  
To start with, structural changes can translate not just to governance 
reforms that reorder rules for elite admission and dismissal from active 
service through open regime change (Dahl 1971, Bratton and de Walle 
1997). Structural changes also imply the discovery and application of 
new sources of productive resources for expanding social opportunities 
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and elite circulation. In some cases, the role of structure especially in 
(re)moulding elite character and composition can be seriously con-
strained by extra-structural factors. In post-colonial Nigeria, there has 
been a coincidence between the economy’s mainstay, i.e. natural re-
sources, which is the government’s major source of revenue, and central-
ized state control over this resource. Parallel to the state-centred control 
of major economic resources in Nigeria, political rights and liberties have 
historically and currently been a frequent feature of the federal constitu-
tion. This paradoxical setting in the Nigerian polity has seemed to persist 
alongside a peculiar interplay between informal and formal institutions at 
the political level of state-society relations.  
Analysis based on state-centred perspectives mostly point to natural 
resources as a curse and as a bane of political elite responsibility (see 
Ross 1997, Karl 2008). In particular, oil proceeds are said to produce a 
rentier state, corruption and patronage with power centralization that 
reproduces a powerful elite indifferent to democratic change (Wantche-
kon and Lam 2004, Wantchekon 2004, Obi 2005). This outlook omits 
the interactivity between social and material sources of political power 
that existed before Nigeria’s oil revolution in the early 1970s. A more 
thorough viewpoint would look back to the pre-oil era and include the 
way the narrow interests of the elite then shaped the political power 
structure, especially at the political executive level and amid structural 
changes.  
Marxist theory states that the ownership of the means of economic 
production at the private level of social relations shapes accessibility and 
control of the state. However, in Nigeria a variety of contradictory fac-
tors and mechanisms (e.g. common background and interests operating 
through informal networks) seems to be at play. In other words, struc-
tural changes can be reconditioned to serve paradoxical roles. Firstly, 
overt institutional changes can facilitate more the convergence than the 
dispersal of interest representation through, e.g. weak and dysfunctional 
political rights and liberties. Secondly, typical elite practices (rent-seeking, 
corruption, patronage exchanges and ‘godfather’ politics) with shared 
elite interests secured under weak state institutions can constrain political 
participation. The outcomes of political elite circulation, composition 
and character can thus be different from that expected by either pluralist 
or Marxist theorists. In other words, there can be certain dynamics pro-
voked through institutional proliferation without significant social 
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changes that imply serious constraints on inclusive and productive elite 
circulation and composition.  
1.2.3 Search for an Alternative Theory 
This study is not solely concerned with discrediting both or either of the 
rival Marxist and liberal-pluralist ideas. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate 
their historical and dynamic weaknesses in the Nigerian context. In par-
ticular, it draws on the social background of the elite and the major in-
teractive mechanisms of elite circulation in political executive offices in 
spite of changes in the country’s political and economic structures. In 
theory and practice, this investigation requires a critical view that permits 
identification of the principal obstacles to social change which continu-
ally challenge the acclaimed liberal-pluralist premises about elite circula-
tion in political offices. The puzzle usually posed by both liberal-pluralist 
and elite analysts is whether in times of necessity the incumbent political 
elite seek a renewal of beliefs through changes in the power structure 
(Welsh 1979, Prewitt and Stone 1993, Parry 1969 and 1969/2006).  
The polarized depiction of theories of the elite, i.e. between that of 
the Marxist and pluralist approaches to elite characteristic (see Miliband 
1969, Wetherly 2009), fails to acknowledge the growing scrutiny of the 
attitudes and behaviour of the elite towards state power and authority 
(Mills 1956/2000, Woods 1998, Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). Whilst 
this tradition is not entirely Marxist-oriented, it has provided us with 
some of the more persuasive analyses of the political power of elites in 
so-called ‘modern’ society (Floyd Hunter 1951, Wright Mills 1956/2000, 
Michael Mann 1986/1992 and 2005, Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). Re-
flecting on Michels’ classic elitist ‘inevitability’ thesis, Dunleavy and 
O’Leary (1987) reiterated that in their view, ‘though social mobility and 
elite circulation might increase, government must remain oligarchic’ (p. 
138). Perhaps the key issue that theory needs to explain is how oligar-
chies emerge and change, in terms not only of quantity but also quality 
based on elite circulation, composition and character, and through the 
occupancy of top government positions of leadership, i.e. political lead-
ership.  
If the realism of the classic elitists (Mosca 1939, Pareto 1935 and 
1968/1991 and Michels 1968) is strictly followed, the issue is not just a 
rigid, impermeable and indifferent elite structure in any type of organiza-
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tion, including the state, but the impossibility of alternative routes to 
change. Such pessimism may be induced as being historically correct not 
only in line with a retrospective look at the West European experiences 
that inspired such inflexible political thought but also in view of recent 
African contexts, including Nigeria. However, caution is needed in dis-
cussing past experiences due to the problem of unique path-dependence. 
Human agency is believed to operate in all social contexts based on par-
ticular institutional choices and organizational capacities for achieving 
determined goals (Mann 1986/1992, 2005).  
The search for an alternative theory does not necessarily mean the en-
thusiastic acceptance of liberal thought with the high premium it places 
on the social dispersal of political power and equilibrium in society. 
Though the idea of power dispersal among autonomous groups emerged 
as a pragmatic political formula designed to enhance the social equilib-
rium, it is not without serious limitations. Firstly, the presence of autono-
mous groups is required to operationalize competition, and values must 
converge in such a way as to generate consensus (Mann 1982). In socie-
ties that are more ethnically divisive than homogeneous, autonomy and 
common values may appear far-fetched. Secondly, economic and politi-
cal autonomy of individuals and groups is a necessary prerequisite for 
participation in and enhancement of the social order.  
Disorder can manifest when social interactions, especially at elite lev-
els, generate attitudes and outcomes that differ from social expectations. 
As Ake (1975) tersely noted, disorder is associated with an acute failure 
to fulfil roles by actors in interaction. For instance, if political elite circu-
lation entails interaction between occupants of and aspirants to influen-
tial government offices, then circulation contributes crucially to the so-
cial order. Because what is political relates to state activities and to those 
who make influential decisions through state power (ibid.), the circula-
tion, composition and character of the political elite can be associated 
with the authoritative control over the distribution of social, economic 
and political resources in society. Hence, if resources are distributed 
highly unequally, social order can be impaired.  
The classic elitists (Mosca, Pareto and Michels) perceived the dangers 
of relying on the social division of labour that enables certain individuals 
or groups to rise above the ordinary and perpetually dominate others. 
However, the classic elitists lost hope of the possibility for real social 
change after investigating the rigid structure of rules and rulers that dom-
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inate modern societies, even under democratic rule. This historical ob-
servation, directly linked to the experiences at the time of their writing, 
appears to have blocked the vision of progress based on the open possi-
bilities of change. For example, they did not foresee the momentum of 
organized social groups and movements towards change (Burton and 
Higley 1987, Scott 2007).  
Based on historical experiences, the road to social change, particularly 
political development through increased social participation, can be re-
sisted by powerful groups who benefit from the old order. However, the 
same historical experiences instruct the determination and capacity of 
change agents to overturn social barriers and establish a social order that 
benefits more than a few individuals or groups. What is important, par-
ticularly for the position assumed in this study, is the identification and 
analysis of the major constraining factors to change in the political con-
text of Nigeria. Such identification follows from critical analysis of elite 
political power and roles based on common social background and inter-
ests. However, as social background and interests cannot separately pro-
vide the dynamics for elite activities at the state level, it becomes neces-
sary to identify the real social device that supports political executive 
office-holding outside, or in conjunction with, the formal means of state-
society interactions.  
1.2.4 The Main Argument  
The main argument of the current study is that the composition and 
character of the Nigerian political elite that historically and currently hold 
national executive offices derive from a political class that usurps politi-
cal power and diverts development away from the people. It is an elite 
political class that has ascended to power from diverse resources, but 
relies more on state power and institutions for survival than on the feed-
back from the Nigerian social structures whose diverse members clam-
our for elite responsiveness and responsibility. The Nigerian political 
class operates within convenient and exclusive networks that support a 
core political executive composition that itself is predatory and discon-
nected from society. Common background, recurrent appearances and 
vested interests are linked to typical elite practices such as patronage ex-
changes and corruption to enhance continuity in political offices and 
roles. Informal and patronage-based networks and corrupt practices coa-
lesce with the proliferation of bungling (inept) institutions to provide the 
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dynamics for securing influential political executive positions. Cumula-
tive practices and interests over time underlie the attitudes and behaviour 
of the Nigerian core political executive elite towards the political system. 
That is, elite special interests and political office recurrences operate in 
tandem to set back significant social change, such as protection of politi-
cal liberties and civil rights. Thus, continuity prevails instead of renewal 
in the composition and character of the political executive elite, despite 
the myriad changes in political regime and economic resources since in-
dependence in Nigeria. Ultimately, institutional bungling has constricted 
the protection of political rights and liberties with far-reaching negative 
effects on the capacity of the political system to effectively function.  
1.3 Problem Analysis, Justification and Relevance of the 
Study  
1.3.1 Problem Analysis  
The ‘Richardson Constitution’ of 1946 represented a turning point in the 
foundation of the modern autonomous state of Nigeria. This constitu-
tional reform provided an impetus for significant political change by lib-
erating entrance into political office for Nigerians. Despite its tutelage 
setting, the 1950s witnessed British decolonization measures, the pioneer 
formation of full-fledged indigenous federal ministers with a prime min-
ister nominated by the second half of the decade (1957). A zenith was 
reached in 1960 with the formal declaration of political independence. 
When independent Nigeria endorsed the Westminster parliamentary sys-
tem of democracy, none conceived it as the anathema that it turned out 
to be upon its collapse in 1966.  
The Nigerian polity has since decolonization (1946–60) experienced 
rapid, slow, calculated, miscalculated, reversed, autocratic and democratic 
changes in government system. Throughout these changes, expectations 
were continually rekindled that the next set of exalted political executive 
office-holders, regardless of birth and interest, would live up to the peo-
ples’ desire for a political system and state structure that caters minimally 
for their needs. A problem thus has been the relative coherence of the 
post-colonial authority structure and social order. This latter, based on 
Ake’s (1975) insight, is understood as the expected levels of relationship 
between social and political actors in constant interaction.  
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1.3.2 Justification 
This study was motivated by the dearth of dynamic historical accounts of 
the cumulative set-up of the core political executive elite in Nigeria as 
regimes and resources changed over the post-colonial period. The study 
focuses on the composition and character of the core political elite, lo-
cated within the executive branch and between the various centres of 
state authority. These latter include the legislature, judiciary and bureauc-
racy as well as the military. The current study considers the political ex-
ecutive elite as intertwined with the political system and the way this sys-
tem operates. Hence, the research was motivated by the need to clarify 
the nature of the elite composition within the policy supervisory sphere 
of state power and, broadly, its implications for Nigeria’s political re-
gimes since colonial rule.  
The core political executive elite were chosen as the object of study 
because it is the only power that since the post-colonial period has sur-
vived in the policymaking role. Other powers have either become func-
tionally weak or grown extinct. ‘Core political executive elite’ is a desig-
nation for the key formal and most visible participants in the decision-
making processes of the Nigerian government. The main political posi-
tions and occupancies analysed in this study include since political inde-
pendence: the prime minister, the president (fused or not with the head 
of state, head of government and commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces), the vice president, ministers with a portfolio and military junta 
members. This group of the political executive elite represents the only 
occupants of the government power structure with exclusive though not 
necessarily absolute power to declare a state of emergency and with con-
trol over the treasury and armed forces of Nigeria in ways that, some-
times, have demeaned other powers. Moreover, in Nigeria, democratic 
authority seems to be delegative rather than representative, i.e. exercised 
more through the executive than the legislature (Bratton and Logan 
2006). This reinforces the incentive to inquire and learn about the cumu-
lative composition and power features of the political executive elite that 
by-and-large affect the political system.  
Since political independence in 1960, regimes in Nigeria have been 
analysed as some variant along the spectrum from democratic to authori-
tarian. Indeed, political regimes can tend towards either side or stagnate 
somewhere in-between. The current study is longitudinal in nature and 
involves the interplay between multiple factors, many of which are often 
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sidelined by normatively loaded conventional theories and methodolo-
gies. It is therefore historic, dynamic and heuristic (deeply probing and 
revealing). It aims to divulge the position of the Nigerian political system 
based on the historical and dynamic composition and characteristic par-
ticipation of the political elite responsible for making and supervising 
pervasive policy decisions at the national executive government level.  
Studies of elites from the classic views (Pareto 1939, Mosca 1968, Mi-
chels 1993, 1968), through the liberal-pluralist versions (Dahl 1971, 1999 
and 2003, Diamond et al. 1988), to the more critical power elite and 
power structure approaches (Hunter 1953, Mills 1956/2000, Domhoff 
1987, Robinson and Acemologlu 2006) have variably emphasized the 
existence of relationships between the composition and conduct of po-
litical elites towards the political system. However, most of these studies 
have focused on the experiences of advanced countries. No such study 
has examined how the participation of the political elite has contributed 
to shape the political system in Nigeria.  
The current study is not motivated by a desire to identify the democ-
ratic road not taken or by fascination with the inevitability of democracy 
as if it represents a natural course of history. Rather, the study is driven 
by the wish to understand the typical background and characteristic role 
assumed by the political elite in national government executive power 
since the post-colonial period, i.e. as political regimes and economic re-
sources have changed. The political elite of Nigeria is often faulted for 
ineffective government policies; but it is less well understood in terms of 
the powers and roles it assumed over the development of the polity since 
colonial rule. Importantly, the quest for explanations has often and quite 
exhaustively been confined to external factors, such as colonial legacies 
or post-colonial interventions.  
Without implying that external variables are unimportant, the current 
research is motivated by a modest objective: to produce empirical evi-
dence and learn about the real status of the political elite at the national 
executive level as political regimes and economic resources varied over 
time in Nigeria. This modesty is not a product of a lack of imagination 
and relevance in a context where political instability appears to favour 
elite manoeuvring and interests. Indeed, the current attempt to explicate 
the role of internal factors in shaping national development is not just a 
routine undertaking aimed to confirm the validity of negative external 
forces. After all, Nigeria has long been globally portrayed as one of the 
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few countries of late capitalist development with a relatively large poten-
tial to overcome the ‘lateness syndrome’ (Evans 1976). 1  
Post-colonial literature is dispersed and disorganized on the role of 
the elite in Nigerian political offices. While the Weberian rational ap-
proach focuses on education as the change agent of elite composition, 
the neo-patrimonial model emphasizes the interface between informal 
and formal power converted for the benefit of the ruling elites. Smythe 
and Smythe’s (1960) work is based on the Weberian approach and can be 
singled out because it uniquely focused on the Nigerian elite and the role 
of education in the expected transformation of the elite power structure. 
These authors, however, limited their investigation to interviews and ar-
chival records, and their analysis omitted consideration of the interplay 
between social factors outside of education and access to state power 
and roles.  
The Smythe and Smythe (1960) work is nonetheless important be-
cause it is the only serious research into the budding elite of Nigeria. 
However, its need for updating contributes to justify the subject of the 
current research, which is the Nigerian elite operating at the government 
level since colonial rule. Other literature has drawn on the neo-
patrimonial model in cross-national research (see e.g. Bratton and de 
Walle 1997) and on the nature of the elite in specific African countries, 
including Nigeria. Though their findings reveal important features of 
elite interactions with state power, such as personal rules and rulers, the 
studies lack in-depth analysis based, e.g. on single-case and focused study 
of the elite in a particular form and setting.  
There are other accounts that point to a steady rise of, for instance, 
ethnic politics and patronage exchanges. These factors are said to coa-
lesce or harmonize with modernization or structural changes rather than 
disappearing under the influence of the latter forces (Whitetaker, Jr., 
1977, Ayoade 1986). Ethnic politics and patronage exchanges can be 
viewed merely as specific dimensions of the use of social background by 
the political elite to ascend to political executive offices. In Nigeria, in-
cumbent governing elites have typically used interactive mechanisms, 
such as informal networks, for the ‘suppression of opposition leaders’ 
since the country’s first civilian government from 1960 to 1966 (Nwabu-
eze 1973: 131–137). These are essential dynamics that suggest the exer-
cise of politics in Nigeria beyond ethnic boundaries.  
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1.3.3 Relevance  
This study contributes to the debate about the validity of liberal theory in 
the Nigerian political context. Moreover, the deeper insights that it 
hopes to offer about the composition and character of Nigeria’s political 
elite could add substance to the literature on opportunities and con-
straints for social development through political activities. After the revi-
sionist’s critique that followed the setbacks in the liberal version of mod-
ernization, i.e. as applied in Nigeria, the ‘Federal Character’ principle 
became the most visible internal policy measure to emerge from the var-
ious structural reforms since political independence. The ‘Federal Char-
acter’ principle was intended as an affirmative action policy based on eq-
uity values and on the recommendations put forward by the proponents 
of consociational democracy. This model of democracy was developed 
to permit elite cooperation or settlement through cross-cutting social 
inclusion and concessions of local autonomy.  
Cross-cutting inclusion and political concessions of autonomy are de-
signed to empower socially marginalized groups in plural ethnic societies. 
In these latter, competitive democracy can produce an elite leadership 
composition linked to majority ethnic groups and marginalization of mi-
nority group members from political processes (see Lijphart 1959, 
1968/1975). However, the very consociation policy measures that, in the 
early 1980s, became institutionalized in Nigeria have been seriously criti-
cized. In the face of continued social crisis mostly attributed to the so-
called ‘ethnic’ conflict, critiques point out fault lines in the operatives of 
the ‘Federal Character’ principle. For example, achievement is consid-
ered as mostly sacrificed to the benefit of ascription and to the detriment 
of expected outcomes (Amuwo et al. 1998/2003).  
The current study considers the relevance of structural factors, mainly 
economic conditions, as emphasized not just by liberal adepts inclined to 
underline the role of economic development prerequisites but also by 
Marxist literature, which stresses the unique role of economic factors in 
determining economic elite orientations towards state power. This study 
departs from the critical elite theories to analyse and reveal not just the 
occupancies of political executive offices, but also the different social 
groups and backgrounds from which the political elite hail. Based on 
empirical evidence about the composition of the national executive elite, 
this research contributes to bridge some of the knowledge gaps about 
the demeanour of Nigeria’s political elite, who shape political action 
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through their circulation in particular elite functions. The study observes 
the historical distribution and composition of the political elite in various 
core executive offices. It therefore has the potential to recommend cor-
rective policy actions. These latter can be usefully directed towards pro-
moting a more socially acceptable power structure and political system, 
at least one based on responsible participation of the political executive 
elite. 
1.4 Research Questions  
The main research question is what historical and dynamic social back-
ground and interactive mechanisms have characterized the circulation 
and composition of the core political executive elite, while limiting the 
scope of the political system, as political regimes and economic resources 
changed over time in post-colonial Nigeria. The enquiry is supported by 
a set of interrelated queries. These start from changes in the country’s 
political and economic structures and extend through to the social back-
ground, characteristic participation and explanation for the continuity of 
the elite in political executive offices as political regimes and economic 
resources changed since political independence in 1960.  
Four sub-questions guide the search for answers to the main ques-
tion: 
• What transformations have taken place in Nigeria’s political system 
since the nation’s political independence?  
• What are the social backgrounds of the elite participants in core 
political executive offices since colonial rule?  
• Is there a pattern in elite circulation (i.e. participation) and in the 
occupancy of political executive offices that by extension has con-
strained the political system since colonial rule?  
• How has the composition of the core political executive elite been 
linked with continuities in political offices as political regimes and 
economic resources changed over time?  
The main objective is to analyse the historical and dynamic composi-
tion of the core political executive elite through the periodic circulation 
(flow) of elite members from specific social and interactive backgrounds. 
Military dictatorship has marked about two-thirds of the little more than 
half century of post-colonial experience in Nigeria. Yet there seems to be 
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an enthusiasm on the part of some Nigerian politicians and political sci-
entists to interpret the country’s situation as emerging democracy. This 
idea of budding democracy requires understanding based not only on the 
quantity of elections or overt leadership turnover, but also on the par-
ticipation and character of the political elite in political executive offices.  
There are two important aspects in the objective: the changeability of 
the composition and character of the core political executive elite and its 
extended effects on the political system. The analytical reference to the 
political regime neither implies a central focus nor the effect of an ex-
haustive analysis of political systems. Two significant temporal dimen-
sions of the political system and its relevance are referred to in this study. 
One is the transformations that are expected, particularly in the compo-
sition and character of the political executive elite, as the political system 
changed over time in Nigeria. This dimension explores alterations in the 
structure and quality of the political executive elite as the rules governing 
elite composition and conduct evolved. The second dimension is the ex-
tended outcome on the political system’s development of the elite’s atti-
tudes and behaviour (conduct and practices) towards political office-
holding in the national executive government.  
There is no definite approach to the predilection to confuse political 
systems with political regimes (Moore, Jr., 1966, Dahl 1971, 1995, Alva-
rez et al. 1996, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, Kopstein and Lichbach 
2005). The precise conceptualization of the diverse political systems or 
political regimes produced by history and human imagination has 
prompted political theorists to settle for a continuum ranging from non-
democracies (authoritarian regimes and dictatorship) to democracies. 
Dahl considers political systems to be the boundaries (governance rules) 
that limit opportunities for participation in government processes. The 
political regimes that restrict the chances of participation in political pro-
cesses to relatively few adult members of society are authoritarian or dic-
tatorial in nature. Hence, those regimes that open such opportunities to a 
greater variety of authorized adult members of society can be considered 
democratic (Dahl 1995).  
Political regimes do not simply limit the scope for social participation 
in political processes; they also stipulate the rules and resources for the 
political game (Fishman 1990, Hyden 1995, Bratton and de Walle 1997). 
Hyden (1992) is emphatic that ‘regimes are not political actors’, however, 
they are associated with specific leaders (pp. 1–26). Political regimes de-
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termine not only access but also the sources and resources that actors 
employ to acquire political positions and the interactions between those 
who are in power and those who are not (O’Donnel et al. 1986: 73, 
Fishman 1990: 428). Political regimes thus imply the rules (formal and 
informal) that limit political power accessibility and modes of relation-
ships (interactions) between actors located at different levels of social 
power and in different roles (Munck 1996, Bratton and de Walle 1997).  
In reality, no political system is pure, so nuanced combinations are 
possible. The contentious issue centres on the extent and the conditions 
through which the political system over time tends towards one or the 
other side of the spectrum characterized, respectively, by contestation or 
ascription, exclusion or inclusion. The exact structure that political re-
gimes or systems tend towards in any particular social setting remains 
obscure in the literature. Hence, there is little consensus about blended 
regimes, referred to imprecisely as hybrid regimes or regime hybridity. 
‘Hybrid regime’ is thus an amorphous concept that simply describes a 
type in which ‘partial regimes within the political regime are democratic, 
while others are non-democratic, though not necessarily authoritarian’ 
(Zinecker 2009: 302–331).  
This study is not concerned with the variety of political regimes or the 
exact forms assumed in post-colonial Nigeria. Rather, it examines the 
structure of opportunity and constraints presented under different politi-
cal regimes and actors. The analysis is initially focused on the rules and 
resources that define the political game. Thereafter, the focus shifts to 
social composition and characteristics, in terms of the quantity (num-
bers) and quality (types and attitudes) of political executive elites that, by 
extension, affect the scope of the political system. In essence, the pur-
pose of incorporating structural changes in the study is to recognize the 
periodic changes in political regime and economic resources that since 
colonial rule were expected to alter and coherently stir elite conduct to-
wards political objects (e.g. authority and responsibility).  
The approach taken is theoretically and analytically realistic, making it 
suitable for understanding the Nigerian case. The approach derives from 
critical elite theories of social change plus the shared preferences of po-
litical leaders reflecting their socio-cultural, economic and political back-
ground. Unlike dominant classic elite theories with an elite superiority or 
dominance thesis, the critical elite versions are more pliable, i.e. they ad-
mit adjustments towards the socialization of the power structure. For 
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example, its proponents do not consider positive social change under the 
elite to be impossible, but they are alert to the importance of elite trans-
formation through the renewal of ideas and interests amid changing cir-
cumstances (Prewitt and Stone 1993). The critical elite approach thus 
appears to provide a more pliant theoretical basis than the rigid classic 
elitist thesis of an inescapable aristocratic order whose dominant attrib-
utes at all times implies a blockade of the prospect of social change.  
Concern about the typical formation and continuity pattern of the 
Nigerian political executive elite offices under circumstances of flux in 
the Nigerian polity leads this study to assume a critically theoretical and 
methodological stance. The study builds on periodic and longitudinal 
analysis of political elite background. Most pertinently, it uses a political 
sociology approach concerned with elite interactivities to analyse the 
composition through the circulation and character of the elite types that 
have ascended to and retained political executive offices at the national 
government level since political independence. Elite continuity in power 
and roles is therefore explainable through social background and net-
work characteristics tied to cumulative values and interests instead of to 
preferences traceable to society at large.  
1.5 Structure of the Study  
This study is structured in seven chapters including this introduction as 
the first chapter. The second chapter presents the theoretical framework. 
It draws mainly from the critical elite theories that portray the relation-
ship between political elite circulation, common social background and 
socially embedded interests that limit the political system.  
The third chapter deals with methodology and provides details about 
the sources of data, strategies for data collection and analysis method-
ologies. It describes the adequacy and use of social background and lon-
gitudinal design to classify and analyse archival data. The chapter also 
highlights the use of social network analysis for understanding elite inter-
actions (intermingling and interchanges) and mutual support enhancing 
continuity in political power and roles. 
The fourth chapter initiates the empirical analysis with a historical ac-
count of the Nigerian political system through various periods and phas-
es since independence. The chronology reveals the historical and dy-
namic changes in political regimes and economic resources, which could 
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be expected to transform elite conduct into a strengthening of the politi-
cal system.  
The fifth chapter analyses the participation of the Nigerian elite in 
core political executive offices based on social background. The sixth 
chapter presents a deeper examination of the composition and character 
of the political executive along the lines of political party organizations 
and social networks. It involves the analysis of certain observable social 
practices of the core political executive elite that have emboldened their 
continuity in political power and roles while considerably affecting the 
political system.  
The seventh and final chapter offers conclusions about the circula-
tion, composition and character of the core political executive elite as 
political regime and resources have changed over time and space in Ni-
geria. 
Note 
 
1 Lateness syndrome refers to the difficulties of delayed entrance to capitalist 
development. 
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2 
The Core Political Executive Elite: 
Framework for Understanding the 
Nigerian Case 
 
 
2.1 Core Political Executive Elite Images and Scope in 
Nigeria  
2.1.1 Competing Views about the Nature of the Elite  
This study views the ‘core political executive elite’ as a historically persis-
tent uppermost segment of the larger social and political elite hierarchy 
of the Nigerian polity. There are various perspectives on the elite as a 
broad and influential social component. Many scholarly positions imply a 
polarization between Marxist economic class determinism with its view 
regarding the concentration of political power and pluralist assumptions 
of power dispersal under a neutral state. However, a certain consensus 
appears in the respective literatures that the elite constitute a tiny and 
organized portion of society with valued and varied superior resources 
(Pareto 1968, Mills 1956/2000, Keller 1963/1991, Etzioni-Halevy 1993, 
Dahl 1971, Dogan 2003). This view of small and influential elite with a 
varied resource base says nothing about the way power is exercised and 
in whose interests in a particular context, such as Nigeria.  
Generally, elite studies can be categorized as either Marxist or non-
Marxist. While economic factors, especially ownership of the means of 
production, delimit the social class that, according to a Marxist vision, 
can ascend to political power to serve the interests of that social class, 
non-economic elements characterize non-Marxist views. One of the 
non-Marxist perspectives is ‘critical elite theory’, which considers com-
mon background and interests as representing the basis for elite access 
to and retention of political power and roles. As the current study exam-
ines the Nigerian core political executive elite, a productive starting point 
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is the prevalence of likeminded actors from common backgrounds who 
deploy network schemes for accessing state resources to their own bene-
fit (and that of their political class supporters) at high social costs.  
However, to further clarify the choice for a particular conceptual and 
analytical framework, the Marxist and non-Marxist positions require ad-
ditional insights. First, the political elite of post-colonial Nigeria must be 
situated in terms of its outlook towards changing circumstances, espe-
cially the political system. Second, the political executive elite must be 
derived as a special elite subset with distinctive attributes, i.e. as a set of 
political actors with certain characteristics in society. Because of its more 
prevalent adoption, even in Nigeria, the next section starts with liberal 
pluralism, which is one of the non-Marxist perspectives.  
2.1.2 The Liberal-Pluralist Version  
The liberal-pluralist approach to elite participation in political offices 
draws much of its strength from Dahl’s studies and especially Keller’s 
(1963/1991) strategic or functional elite approach. In Beyond the Ruling 
Class, Keller (ibid.) distinguished the strategic elite as a historically and 
socially significant ‘hierarchy’ that performs the ‘key’ or ‘most important’ 
functions with pervasive effects within society (pp. 54–60). Higley and 
Burton (2006) extended this outlook to the political elite, described as 
‘tiny groups of strategic position-holders with the organized capacity to 
affect political outcomes regularly and substantially’ (p. 5).  
The adjective ‘tiny’ for qualifying elite composition in strategic social 
spheres such as government or the state is a generally acknowledged 
starting point based on the relatively small size of the elite. Distinct from 
character, ‘tiny’ represents a quantitative dimension in elite characteriza-
tion. That is, independent of the political regime type, the political elite is 
considered to be a minority vis-à-vis the entire population (Pareto 
1968/1991, Parry 1969/2006, Dahl 1976, Keller 1963/1991, Dogan and 
Higley 2006) or simply relative to the majority. Dogan and Higley (2006) 
referred to the tiny size of the elite as so ‘infinitesimal’ as to ‘perhaps’ 
imply ‘one person per thousand of the adult population’ (p. 1). The small 
size of the elite in relation to the larger population leads to one of the 
most historically and dynamically celebrated elite definitions, that is, as 
an organized minority ruling over a disorganized majority (Pareto 
1968/1991, Mosca 1939). Applied to the Nigerian context, it is conven-
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ient to distinguish a relatively small number of political executive office-
holders who have ascended to and retained political power since colonial 
rule.  
Despite the minuscule size of the elite relative to that of society, plu-
ralists consider social interest representation, i.e. through political party 
leadership and orientation, to provide the answer to social demands. Dif-
ferent from other political elite subgroups such as legislatures and judges, 
the political executive elite are considered as exercising typical social 
roles and influences (Lane 1997, Aberbach et al. 1981). Lane (1997) re-
fers to ‘decision-making roles’ and ‘political leadership qualities’ as a dis-
tinctive attribute of the political elite (p. 859). More specifically, fulfilling 
public demands especially through policy supervision and distribution is 
considered the usual responsibility of political executives.  
In open systems, particularly in democratic regimes, the political ex-
ecutive elite is said to embody ‘elected or politically nominated members 
of the cabinet’ (a president, vice presidents, ministers, etc.) whose offices 
correspond with state-delegated power ‘to make policy decisions, broker 
interests and articulate ideas’ (Aberbach et al. 1981: 4–15, see also Turner 
1997: 317). Usually, the executive branch is composed of a ‘select body 
of decision makers’, which Heywood calls ‘the epithet of executive 
membership’ responsible for policy supervision (Heywood 2002: 335). In 
addition to occupying cabinet positions, political executives meet for-
mally and regularly to take decisions or be consulted by the chief execu-
tive, who chairs all meetings (ibid.).  
By virtue of their formal positions and role import, political execu-
tives are historically and constitutionally indispensable to the functioning 
of the polity. The indispensability of the group reposes on policymaking, 
considered the ‘life wire’ of government (Heywood 2002). According to 
the liberal-pluralist view, the composition and character of the political 
elite should reflect an inclusive and representative social background 
(Dahl 1971, Diamond et al. 1988, Welzel and Inglehart 2008). Impor-
tantly, both parliamentary and presidential systems assign public ac-
countability to the political executive function, though in the former sys-
tem responsibility accords accountability first to the parliament (Lins 
1997, Heywood 2002, Hellwig and Samuels 2007). The roles of the po-
litical executive might in some cases be contingent on context develop-
ment and leadership panache. Apart from presiding over the cabinet and 
policy decisions, the chief executive might personally accumulate various 
26 CHAPTER 2 
 
roles, whose extension and intensity depend not only on the political or 
governance regime but also on leadership style, social expectations and 
support (Dahl 1995).  
Another key element in characterizing a core political executive elite 
group is the broader social context. Looking at the attributes and func-
tions of the strategic elite, Keller (1963/1991) affirmed that the elite co-
exists with ‘modern industrial societies’ and so derives not from a single 
class but from differentiated social classes (p. 54). This position mostly 
recognizes the role of professional classes (e.g. the legal, academic, mili-
tary, techno-bureaucratic and other professional categories), which in 
open political systems and industrial societies either compete for state 
power or seek to influence political power-holders. However, Weber 
(1978) warned that in so-called ‘industrial societies’ class and status sym-
bols may coalesce with one’s origin, role and the influence of political 
actors to determine one’s ‘life chances’ (Weber 1978: 302–307). A Webe-
rian critique recalls that school diplomas and profession can fuse with 
ethnic and religious characteristics to form the status symbols for mo-
nopolizing political power and roles (Murphy 1988).  
Translated to the Nigerian context, the coalescence of professional at-
tributes with ethnic background – or what one analyst calls ‘ethnic mor-
phology’ (Scaritt 2008: 118–121) – likely forms the basis for elite ascen-
sion to and retention of political offices with varied outcomes for the 
political system at large. While the political system comports such larger 
dimensions as formal and informal rules guiding social and especially 
political attitudes and behaviour, most pertinently, it also informs the 
specific sources and resources for political power-holding. Changes in 
political systems are usually analysed as the effects of socialization, i.e. 
citizens’ attitudes and behaviour towards political participation (Inglehart 
and Abrahamson 1995, Verba 2003). Liberal research often neglects the 
important role of the elite in shaping the political system, especially in 
heterogeneous contexts with a weakly formed civil society.  
Haynes (2005) observed that the liberal position does not refer to 
‘how specific actors such as leaders view politics’, but rather to the peo-
ple’s views of the political system as a whole (p. 181–185). He noted that 
the post-1960 and post-1970 periods witnessed the critique of the direct 
focus of political culture studies on the public’s perception of the politi-
cal system while leaders and governing institutions slacken in their per-
formances (ibid.). Hence, elite political background is important, but 
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most important is the interactive mechanisms through which the elite 
differently manage issues of civil society participation that affect the po-
litical system. Put differently, elite background may appear heterogene-
ous in any society, but the elite can develop mechanisms for acting cohe-
sively towards political objects.  
For example, Keller (1963/1991) approached the political elite’s 
background that informs its composite character as ‘heterogeneous’ and 
its role as ‘strategic’ (Chapter 2). Applied to political power, especially at 
the executive government level, this means that the social background of 
the elite power-holders should be composed of different and representa-
tive professional and interest group leaders who access political offices 
through competitive means, i.e. based on open political and democratic 
systems of representation. Holme (2008) reiterated Keller’s study as the 
main component of the ‘functional elite’ theories, which emphasize elite 
differentiation, competition and a changed characteristic social origin 
which relies on achievement instead of inheritance. That is, openness 
and competitiveness with political debate – amongst competing profes-
sional and interest group agents – supposedly constitutes the means for 
reaching consensus about relevant social issues. Keller’s (1963/1991) 
critique of the social origin of the strategic elite as less related to an ‘all-
round excellence’ and ‘overall superiority’ (p. 32) thus provides the com-
parative yardstick for learning, through empirical investigation, about the 
functionality of elite composition, especially at the decisive national ex-
ecutive level. 
However, even when members of the elite have different social back-
grounds, elite composition does not inform the scope of its responsive-
ness and responsibility vis-à-vis public preferences. That is, ‘social origin’ 
is crucial for understanding elite composition in political offices but as it 
is ‘no infallible guide to [political] elite-ship’; ‘accountability’ becomes an 
‘essential condition to be fulfilled’ (Rothwell et al. 1973: 22). Political ac-
countability in liberal-pluralistic orders especially in democratic systems 
of government underscores elite responsibility in terms of the connect-
edness of political power and roles with social preferences. As an institu-
tionalized process that demands coherent elite attitudes towards the po-
litical system, responsibility implies elite leaders’ continual respect for 
‘previously established consent’ vis-à-vis society (Schmitter 2004: 48).  
For example, the political elite’s respect for such social preferences as 
political rights and liberties plus the avoidance of corrupt practices are 
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fundamental to social development and stability of a political system 
(Hyden 2004, Diamond and Morlino 2004, Welzel and Inglehart 2008). 
An alternative way to gain insight into accountability by elite office-
holders is to assume its counter position, i.e. the elusiveness of elite 
holders of political offices. The degree to which the elite elude account-
ability through such erosive practices as corruption and patronage is an 
indication of the importance attached to it by elite leaders in relation to 
society demands.  
The liberal-pluralist view about the nature of the political elite as-
sumes an open political system with institutional guarantees of political 
rights and civil liberties through which the elite compete for the most 
important political offices (Dahl 1971, Diamond et al. 1988). That is, 
shared institutional values of ‘liberty’ and ‘constitutional respect’ for civil 
and political rights in the elite-masses nexus are considered fundamental 
to regime stability (Zuckerman 1977: 339, see also Diamond 1997). 
Moreover, the political elite ascendants to public office, such as political 
executives, are assumed to be naturally heterogeneously composed in 
ways that permit debate, compromise and protection of public prefer-
ences instead of selective private ones (Keller 1963/1991). The current 
study argues that the liberal pluralist view conveyed in Dahl’s (1971) 
concept of public preferences reflecting ‘the political ordering of values 
and interests’ (pp. 17–32), or simply institutionalized social choices, does 
not significantly apply to the Nigerian context.  
In other words, the historical and dynamic composition of the Nige-
rian political executive elite is unlikely to be coherent with the strategic 
elite composition and character. The contention is that elite circulation in 
the highest political executive offices of Nigeria is deficient of competi-
tiveness, inclusiveness and responsible political practices. In turn, this 
deficiency leads to weak fulfilment of public preferences, contrasting 
considerably with the liberal-pluralist assumption of periodic renewals in 
political offices. Also, the prevalence of common elite background with 
narrow interests, perpetuated through informal networks for retaining 
political office positions and converting formal institutional roles to par-
ticular uses, represents a paradoxical image and empirical scope of liberal 
pluralism. Similarly, Marxist assumptions about the determinacy of eco-
nomic power are little founded in Nigeria. The next section exposes the 
inadequacy of the linear Marxist (assumes a direct association between 
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economic and political power) power structure for examining the atti-
tudes of the Nigerian elite towards political objects. 
2.1.3 Marxist Foundation Unfounded in Nigeria 
The Marxist economic class foundation provides an insufficient basis for 
elucidating the Nigerian case of elite attitudes towards political executive 
office-holding. Marx and Engels (1847/1848) argued in the Communist 
Manifesto that ‘the executive of the modern state’ is but ‘a committee for 
managing the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’ (p. 4). Marx (1982) re-
ferred to the ‘dominant or ruling class’ type both ‘economically and po-
litically’ to denote the social class directly tied to the ownership of the 
means of production and to state control (p. 4). In German Ideology 
(1845–46), Marx and Engels (1970) describe the state as the entity 
through which ‘the individuals of a ruling class assert their common in-
terests’ (p. 80).  
Neo-Marxists attempted to re-qualify the original Marxist postulations 
with arguments about the incorporation of cultural (intellectual) and 
military (security) elites in the political power circles in ways that enhance 
the relative autonomy of the state structure. Doggedly, however, neo-
Marxists remained tied to the idea of a direct relationship between eco-
nomic factors and political power (see Poulantzas 1969, Gramsci 1971). 
The logic of the capitalist state as recognized by certain neo-Marxists is 
that ‘property is private’ and so ‘political power is prohibited from orga-
nizing production according to its own political criteria’ (Offe and Ronge 
1982: 250). If state power is separate from ownership and control of the 
means of production, then Dupuy’s (1991) deduction makes sense, that 
is, ‘state revenue depends on privately generated profits’ (p. 79). The lack 
of an outright link between the operatives of the Nigerian post-colonial 
state and dependency on taxation from ‘privately generated profits’, as 
counter-posed by Dupuy (ibid.) appears to undermine the Marxist linear 
power assumptions.  
In Nigeria, state agents located in key political executive offices seem 
increasingly interested in rent-seeking, i.e. accruing state resources that 
are diverted away for personal uses. Rents so defined differ from the re-
liance of state functions on direct taxation and constitute a source of au-
tonomy of the political class (Wantchekon and Lam 2004, Zinecker 
2009). Rents can thus be considered a major elite lure, preceded only by 
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political power for safeguarding a continuous flow. In particular, the 
prospect of social revolution as an alternative to elite circulation in po-
litical power is in Marxism fraught by the incapacity of the working class 
to fully mobilize against the capitalist-oriented state (Crompton 
1998).This incapacity can vary in time and place but in practice no work-
ing class acts have appeared to significantly and consistently threaten or 
overturn the capitalist system.  
In post-colonial Nigeria, a vicious cycle of political power relations 
seems to exist that seriously limits the prospects of social revolution. 
Moreover, the literature on the Nigerian polity presents many persuasive 
arguments and evidence suggesting the invalidity of Marxist economic 
determinism (Nnoli 1978 and 1995, Madunagu 1982, Omodia 2010).1 
The next section introduces classic elitist propositions about elite com-
position and character, which are believed to be dependent on superior, 
organized and varied social backgrounds converging to curtail circula-
tion. In essence, the section takes the first steps towards delimiting a 
workable elite concept and framework.  
2.1.4 Classic Elitist Superior Background and its Relevance  
Knowledge, psychology and organization form the basis of the classic 
elitist argument about the unassailable appearance, cohesion and conti-
nuity of the political elite in political office (Pareto 1968, Mosca 1939, 
1969, Michels 1968 and 1993). Elite ascension to political power and 
their continuity in office are said to originate from the ownership of val-
ued and varied resources in society. Pareto’s (1968/1991) ‘exclusive’ elite 
qualities for ascending to political power include ‘education’, ‘intelli-
gence’, ‘shrewdness’ and ‘union’ or organizational capacity (pp. 72–81). 
In Pareto’s Mind and Society (1935), rule by a relatively small number, 
described as the ‘governing class’, suggests an oligarchic composition of 
rulers whose decisions prevail despite ‘universal suffrage’ (Pareto 1935: 
2,183). In turn, Mosca (1939) stressed elite organization and the role of 
psychological factors in fostering elite dominance and mass acquies-
cence.  
Similarly, Michels’ (1993) ‘iron law of oligarchy’ model depicts a verti-
cal flow and control of information by the elite that tends towards social 
differentiation in any organization, such as the state and political parties. 
Michels’ (ibid.) comment that ‘elite groups and the rank and file mem-
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bers’ have ‘increasingly diverged in their social background, income, in-
terests and capabilities’ (pp. 111–124) mirrors the historical and cultural 
disconnect in the elite-masses nexus in post-colonial Nigeria. Michels has 
been portrayed as the most disillusioned about the prospects of democ-
ratic systems, which he considered fraught by tightly patterned oligarchic 
power. Olsen and Marger (1993) recall Michels’ view as discrediting the 
pluralistic potential for dispersing political power between social groups 
in society.  
The classic elitist characterization of the political elite is of particular 
significance, at least, analytically, in the Nigerian context. Unlike the 
Marxist allusion to the elite class as ‘a passing phase in human history’, 
Kelly documented the historical relevance of the classic elitists’ ‘insis-
tence that the elite are an inevitable feature of complex societies’ (Keller 
1963/1991: 13). The argument that Nigerian political executives rely on 
state resources for magnifying their power and role translates to the clas-
sic elitists’ claim about inequity in the distribution of social power and 
political control. Also, the classic elitists’ idea that varied and valued re-
sources facilitate elite organization and psychological control over society 
is applicable in Nigeria. Unlike the West European and North American 
historical experiences which are informed by social homogeneity through 
class divisions, the Nigerian context suggests differences in social stratifi-
cation beyond class cleavages. In Nigeria, strongly nested traditional and 
modern elite networks appear to underscore the ascent and retention of 
individuals or groups in political office. 
2.1.5 Power Elite and Power Structure Perspectives in Nigeria  
Mills’ (1956/2000) Power Elite provides key insights into the recurrent 
nature of contemporary political elite characteristic makeup. Earlier elite-
centred studies too, such as Hunter’s (1953) Community Power Struc-
ture, viewed the elite as composed of those ‘able to enforce their deci-
sions by persuasion, intimidation, coercion, and, if necessary force’ 
(Hunter 1953: 24). This literature underscores not just the local roots of 
national political power but also the convergence of interests through 
political office-holding. Nigeria’s multiethnic society represents a source 
of ascent to and retention of political executive power that may be found 
to diverge significantly from the preferences of more homogeneous 
(communal) societies. However, Mills’ (1956/2000) power elite model is 
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most revealing about the ‘major national power’ believed to reside in the 
‘political, economic and military domains’ (p. 6).  
That is, a triumvirate power structure is assumed to be behind most 
of the decisions made within today’s enlarged and centralized state bu-
reaucracies, which are unequalled in human history. Mills’ assertions de-
serve full transcription to enable further understanding of their relevance 
in the Nigerian context and especially to this study’s line of argument. 
The point of departure is that the power elite’s superior position in deci-
sion making affects the lives of ordinary people:  
Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the 
fact that they do occupy such pivotal position: their failure to act, their 
failure to make such decisions is in itself an act that is often of greater con-
sequence than the decisions they do make. For they are in command of 
the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society (…) They oc-
cupy the strategic command posts of the social structure, in which are now 
centered the effective means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity 
they enjoy (Mills 1956/2000: 1–2).  
The cardinal lesson from Mills’ assertions is that it is not for nothing 
that the members of the power elite occupy command institutions and 
organizations. In other words, the power elite defend those interests that 
imply power, affluence and prestige. The defence of these interests and 
the means employed in such defence guarantee the power elite’s contin-
ual retention of control in society.  
However, one objectionable dimension of the power elite theory as 
applied to US society (i.e. compared to the Nigerian case) is its emphasis 
on the provenance of the ruling elite from the upper class stratum of the 
society. According to Domhoff (2005), the prevalent elite theory ‘puts 
far less emphasis on classes or class conflict than is necessary to under-
stand power in the United States’ (online). In Nigeria, the political class 
represents the source of selective recruitment of members of the na-
tional executive who depend on state resources rather than the typical 
Nigerian social structures for their survival. In other words, the power 
elite structure in Nigeria depends on state resources instead of feedback 
from society to realize their political class aspirations. The state, as an 
organization, can thus be singled out as the means for accumulating po-
litical power and wealth mostly to the benefit of the power elite mem-
bers.  
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 Interestingly, as Mills (1956/2000) stated in a way that is particularly 
applicable to Nigeria, the ‘unity’ of the power elite rests not only on ‘the 
development and coincidences of interests among economic, political 
and military organizations’ but also on ‘the similarity of origins and out-
look, and the social and personal intermingling of the top circles from 
each of these dominant hierarchies’ (p. 292). That is, aside from the di-
rect influence of class attributes, common background can stem from 
ethnic, regional and religious groups, in addition to political party forma-
tions that can be controlled by individuals linked with both informal 
networks and formal state institutions.  
Domhoff’s description of the ‘power elite’ as a network-operated or-
ganization also makes particular sense in the Nigerian context. Yet, the 
idea of network-operated schemes applied to Nigeria is not necessarily 
that of an ‘institutionally based group that works to maintain the basic 
social structure from which the upper class greatly benefits’, as claimed 
by Domhoff and Dye (1987: 190). The idea can be more productively 
applied as an integrative network system for articulating traditional, mili-
tary, bureaucratic, economic and political power that mostly benefits the 
political class usurpers of state resources instead of the social classes. In 
sum, while the idea of a common social background and network mech-
anism to enhance elite intermingling dynamics can be applied to the Ni-
gerian context, the circumscription of the power structure (i.e. its com-
position and character) at the executive level to uniquely Marxist class 
explanations of political power is at odds with the Nigerian context. 
Moreover, based on the typical social context of Nigeria, the Nigerian 
power structure cannot be considered as limited to triumvirate power 
elite, as defined by Mills (1956/2000). The following sections look at the 
network system in more detail, as it applies to the Nigerian context.  
2.2 Elite Networks, Organizations and Institutional Support  
2.2.1 Social Network  
The social background of the political executive elite is relevant but not 
sufficient for understanding the nature of the ties of the Nigerian post-
colonial elite with state power and executive roles. Social networks are 
described as exchange alliances amongst ‘a set of actors’ to whom ‘val-
ued resources are distributed’ through ‘a set of historically developed and 
utilized exchange opportunities called exchange relations’ and ‘a set of 
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network connections linking exchange relations into a single network’ 
(Cook et al. 1983: 277). According to Serrat (2009: 1), ‘social network 
analysis seeks to understand networks and their participants’ based on 
the role of ‘actors and the relationships between them in a specific social 
context’. 
The crucial point about the Nigerian case is that exchanges, mutual 
benefits and exclusion are viewed as indispensable in the emergence and 
development of social networks. The functioning of network schemes 
has practically underpinned elite circulation, composition and character 
in Nigerian political executive offices since the end of the colonial era. 
As Christopolous (2008) warned, not only do ‘networks provide the con-
text within which [political] actors thrive’, they also constitute a device 
‘employed to mitigate’ the risks borne by ‘political entrepreneurs’ (pp. 
757–778). In the Nigerian case, this implies that the relationship between 
likeminded actors sharing similar contact arrangements can be consid-
ered exclusive if the benefits that are expected for the broader society 
accrue mostly to network members, while costs are socially shared and 
social responsibility is continually overruled.  
Mills (1956/2000) described elite networks as a cohesive informal ‘set 
of overlapping crowds and intricately connected cliques’ through which 
power and roles are retained (p. 11). The Nigerian political elite can be 
considered to substitute for and persist with a ‘typical’ level of legitimacy, 
i.e. based on a widely embracing but selective network of elite individuals 
or groups. However, current elite network analysis appears to assume a 
less pyramidal pattern and to portray elite networks as more pervasive 
and irresponsible. Wedel’s (2009) critical outlook on elite networks 
seems more current and incisive, as it emphasizes the role of ‘flex nets’ 
(or informal flexible networks) that accommodate a set of ‘shadow elite’ 
described as ‘as elusive as they are ubiquitous’ (p. 20): 
Rather than climbing Mills’ pyramid of the political, military, and business 
establishment, members of flex nets wield influence by forging coinci-
dences of interest among an array of roles across organizations, whose 
boundaries and purposes often blend (ibid.). 
The elusiveness of the Nigerian elite network that supports political 
executive office-holding can imply the avoidance of accountability and 
the furtherance of self-interests at variance with social demands. In other 
words, the national power structure could reveal the convergence of the 
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‘network of institutions, organizations and roles exercised by individuals’ 
from the broader society (Domhoff and Dye 1987: 9) but who interact 
aloof the society.  
 The elite format deducible from cross-cutting organizational roles in 
the society reinforces Serrat’s contention that power no longer reposes 
‘exclusively in the state, institutions and corporations but in the networks 
that structure society’ (Serrat 2009: 1; see also Wedel 2009, Rothkoff 
2009). Nevertheless, it contradicts the mechanistic view of society in 
which the formal state structure is an all time intelligent entity, exercising 
control over society supposedly for social good. As Kennis and Schnei-
der (1991) noted, network analysis portrays ‘a decentralized view of soci-
ety’ through informal lenses and interpersonal relations (pp. 26–27). In 
other words, and as will be shown in the next subsection, organizations 
and institutions directly linked to the society can play crucial roles in elite 
networks, access to and retention of state power.  
2.2.2 Organizations and Institutional Support  
In Nigeria, social networks can be observed as drawing their existence 
from typically complex and bureaucratically articulated organizations 
spread across the multiethnic and multicultural groups within society. 
That is, context specificity plays a major role in delimiting the social dy-
namics of elite participation in political offices. Based on ‘national politi-
cal elite research’, Knoke (1993) proposed the use of social network 
analysis to ‘uncover the various cleavages and coalitions’ among groups 
and actors (pp. 23–45). Social networks, in the Nigerian case, depict the 
interpersonal or intergroup interactions across selective social, cultural 
and political divisions. Importantly, social network organizers can be as-
sumed as capitalizing on social cleavages and party coalitions to defend 
vested interests through the Nigerian state.  
Networks, as Michels (1968) noted, are used in elite analysis for secur-
ing the oligarch’s haven through the co-optation of opposition members. 
Organizations considered by Michels as crucial for realizing social inter-
actions aimed at retaining political power are political parties. Coupars-
son and Cleg (2006) reiterated that Michels’ Political Parties represents 
‘one of the most interesting examples of intricately tied dynamics of oli-
garchy and democracy’ (pp. 327–328). It follows that networks use or-
ganizational resources that accrue not only from formal institutions but 
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also from informal structures to strengthen a particular group’s hold on 
power and roles. If the Nigerian case suggests the existence of the politi-
cal elite’s aloofness, any meaningful analysis of changes in office-holders 
(circulation) or the lack thereof in the political executive elite structure 
requires consideration of the role of informal institutions under the aegis 
of social networks.  
Organizations such as political parties, the military and ethnically or 
network organized groups seeking political power in contexts such as 
Nigeria are respectively disciplined by formal and informal norms and 
values. The new institutional view about formal and informal power that 
analytically underlies the framework of elite actors from common back-
grounds and network arrangements rests on the use of institutions to 
constrain social attitudes and behaviour for particular purposes (North 
1991, Mann 1992, Mortel 2003). The relevant point is made by Lourdes 
(2002), according to whom institutional values can be ‘circumvented or 
manipulated by certain individuals or groups of actors’ (pp. 91, 104).  
Circumvention and manipulation can imply that important social in-
stitutions and organizations can be converted by powerful elite groups to 
serve certain interests such as maintaining political power and its trap-
pings:  
[T]he elite is not simply those who have the most; they could not have the 
most if not for their positions in the great institutions. For such institu-
tions are the necessary bases of power, of wealth and of prestige and at the 
same time, the chief means of exercising power, of acquiring wealth, and 
cashing in the higher claims for prestige (Mills 1956/2000: 9).  
The Nigerian experience seems to offer various examples of institu-
tional interventions by influential political actors who capitalize, say, on 
changing circumstances and extant institutional resources, to access and 
extend office power in exclusion of other aspirants. The next section 
looks at the meaning of elite circulation and how social background and 
network devices facilitate exclusive access to political executive offices.  
2.3 Political Elite Circulation and the Nigerian Dimension  
Generally, the circulation of the elite in political systems is determined by 
a process through which ‘new’ persons or groups from broader society 
are admitted into governmental offices for dealing with policy issues (Pa-
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reto 1939, Zuckerman 1977, see also Dahl 1971, 1989, 1999, 2003, Lane 
1995). Though this concept lacks clues about the social basis of elite as-
cent to the national executive power structure, it is useful for identifying 
the type and extent of renewals, at least, nominally, of elite members 
who ascend to political offices from the larger society.  
Keller (1963/1991) qualified ‘elite circulation’ as ‘the process whereby 
individuals or groups gain access to or lose their hold on elite positions’ 
(p. 228). Translated to political executive office-holding, elite circulation 
in a particular power sphere implies access to and exit from political of-
fices through processes of recruitment. In open political systems, elite 
circulation occurs through the institutionalization of recruitment policies 
that spell out entrance conditions while making office tenure last no 
longer than desirable. Elite circulation in political offices thus encom-
passes not just changes in the recruitment pattern of the elite to high 
government positions but also the political and institutional tenure of 
office positions. Keller’s approach to elite circulation reflects the pluralist 
view of political office renewal through periodic free and fair elections. 
Political power renewal is then assumed to be associated with political 
stability through the renewal of persons and ideas that mostly support 
the political system. 
However, the current study is interested in those factors that impede 
the expected elite circulation in political executive offices of Nigeria. De-
spite emphasizing biological and physical limits to political elite continu-
ity in power, the classic elitists were pessimistic about the prospects of 
significant changes in elite composition in an open political system, espe-
cially those based on democratic regimes (Mosca 1939, Pareto 
1968/1991, Michels 1991). Pareto (1968) pointed out the functional dis-
tance between the elite and non-elite and discredited the notion of col-
lective changes in the pattern of the elite in government positions. Elite 
circulation was considered only on an individual and selective basis ra-
ther than through social participation (ibid.). Initially, Mosca (1939) had 
asserted the possibility of collective circulation due to each group’s need 
to maintain social status. He visualized elite circulation in political power 
through a sub-elite type linked directly to society. Sub-elite nodes were 
said to serve not only for socialization with the non-elite below but also 
for recruiting persons from lower strata of society (ibid.).  
Sub-elite types in Nigeria are embodied by ‘godfather’ financial pa-
trons that operate informally, though sometimes under the tacit approval 
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of top executive government agents (Albert 2006). Sub-elite roles can 
also be played by traditional rulers who maintain direct links with both 
grassroots and top-level executive elite circles, especially within the na-
tional executive (Vaughan 1995, 2005). The important issue about sub-
elite roles in Nigeria is how their interests are channelled through ex-
change relations into the national network that informally constrains elite 
circulation in political executive offices. For the purpose of this study, 
the sub-elites embody, for example, the influential traditional rulers who 
cannot seek or hold formal political office but who can use their infor-
mal position to link office-seeking with office-holding in the central gov-
ernment. Because their power is mostly informal, sub-elites are referred 
to as ‘informal elites’ in this study. ‘Sub-elites’ do not circulate directly in 
political executive office, but as holders of informal powers they are in-
strumental to the operatives of the wider network based on their direct 
contact with grassroots members. Because traditional elites act under 
varied contexts as agents with the capacity to influence elite circulation, 
to support government actions and to legitimate continuity in formal 
political executive office, they are part of the non-governing elite as de-
fined by Pareto (1968). 
Thus, informal elites are both participants and contact nodes in the 
complex network that cuts across different social boundaries. They serve 
to link likeminded actors and to recruit persons who avoid changes in 
circumstances to inherit political offices at the national executive level. 
Recalling the classic elitist reasoning, Prewitt and Stone (1973) described 
the retention of advantages by the ruling class as follows:  
The ruling class then retains its advantages despite the advances of democ-
ratic thinking. The rulers continue to siphon off an undue amount of the 
social surplus for personal benefits; they continue to make laws which re-
flect their own world views and which serve their special interests; and 
they continue to control the selection of the persons who will inherit their 
positions (Prewitt and Stone 1973: 24).  
In other words, informal elites constitute an influential contact group 
through which control over the selection of the inheritors of formal po-
litical power and roles may be exercised in the Nigerian case. The gloom-
iest of the classic elite thinkers was Michels, who introduced the ‘iron 
law of oligarchy’ precept as an inevitable factor militating against social 
change through elite recirculation (Michels 1968: 342–356). But does the 
iron law of oligarchy hold for Nigeria?  
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The image of vested interests, social irresponsibility and birthright de-
termining political office-holding is likely an accurate reflection of the 
historical and current Nigerian experience. Similarly, the generational 
changes that liberal pluralists believe to renew elite circulation (Inglehart 
and Abrahamson 1995) may not apply if office experiences, patronage 
and corruption are deployed to support office longevity, as the case of 
Nigeria suggests. The prevalence of symbolic elite practices (rent-
seeking, patronage, corruption, political persecution and ‘godfather’ poli-
tics) weakens the real essence (power and role renewals) of elite circula-
tion in political executive offices. Such practices can imply ‘power repro-
duction’ described by Chabal (1992/1994) as ‘power transmission within 
the same ruling elite from one generation to the next’ in ways that un-
dermine ‘formal constitutional rules’ for shifting power from ‘one set of 
rulers to any other potential set of rulers’ (p. 248).  
Pareto (1968) denounced the timeless and degenerative nature of po-
litical elite power when succeeding elites derive from the same corrupt 
background characterized by unaccountable behaviour. In other words, 
the ‘lack of elite circulation’ that qualifies ‘insufficiency of change’ in the 
power structure (Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1995: 616) can be traced to flawed 
structural changes and vested interests that support political office lon-
gevity and social aloofness. In the Nigerian case, elite continuity in politi-
cal executive power and roles is quite likely derived from the prolifera-
tion of inept institutions which offer little scope for the social changes 
expected, e.g. effective guarantees of rights to freedom and equality. If a 
lack of the expected social circulation is empirically verified, the charac-
teristic composition of the political executive elite of Nigeria can be seen 
as accommodating a political class whose members depend on state re-
sources for survival rather than on strategic public actions that match 
with societal demands and support. 
On balance, the idea that the power structure requires transformation 
through circulation of a qualitatively more representative elite (fresh 
blood with workable ideas and functional institutions) than through 
quantitative circulation (repeated appearances under weak institutions) is 
optimistically highlighted by the critical elitists Hunter (1953), Mills 
(1956/2000) and Domhoff and Dye (1987). Moreover, Michels’ writings 
are not all products of pessimism. Lipset suggests in his introduction to 
Michels’ Political Parties that each time oligarchic obstacles are uncov-
ered through research, democracy gains firmer ground (Lipset 1968: 15–
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39, see also Michels 1968: 364–371). The cumulative lesson for Nigeria is 
that belief in the pluralistic order of elite circulation in key political of-
fices can be translated into reality if the forces, mostly linked to oligar-
chic disposition, that inhibit its realization are neutralized to workable 
levels.  
2.4 Delimiting the Nigerian Elite Network  
2.4.1 The Traditional Institutional Elite 
Historically, traditional authority structures enjoyed elite privileges and 
prestige while exercising a measure of authority over their respective 
subjects (Vaughan 1995 and 2005, see also Chazan 1986, Coleman 1994). 
Privileged status confers power by permitting the elite access to valued 
things denied to most members of society. Mills (1956/2000) shows that 
status symbols or ‘prestige’ (…) ‘buttresses power, turning it into author-
ity, and protecting it from social challenge’ (p. 89). As traditional rulers 
were deprived of their colonially endowed authority during decoloniza-
tion (Sklar 1963, Crowder 1970, Mandani 2005), the emergent and suc-
ceeding post-colonial elites gradually assumed chieftaincy titles aimed at 
reinforcing their informal and formal powers (Vaughan 2005, Adjaiye 
and Mishawa 2006).  
Firstly, a direct link is likely to exist between the extrication of the co-
lonially endowed traditional authority, access to chieftaincy titles by the 
post-colonial elite and the dynamics assumed by the elite in ascension to 
and retention of political executive offices. The roles of power-brokers 
and network arrangers that traditional rulers informally assumed (or were 
bestowed) in the post-colony can be said to reinforce the network objec-
tives of the political class (Vaughan 1995, 2005). In addition, from the 
so-christened ‘Kaduna Mafia’ of the 1980s, which is believed to be a po-
litical executive power and role allotting network (Forrest 1993: 56–57, 
Osaghae 1998: 25), to the dynamics of ‘godfather’ politics since the 
1990s (Albert 2005: 79–105), traditional identities (ethnicity, regional ori-
gin and religious affiliations) represent a major platform for engendering 
political executive appointments and patronage exchanges through net-
works.  
Secondly, the hierarchic structure of ethno-regional and religious af-
filiations in Nigeria seems to promote a pecking order of traditional elite 
leadership that supports the wider elite network as it converges at the 
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national level of executive government. True to social network forma-
tions, the Nigerian elite network for sustaining political executive power 
is not leaderless. Networks require adaptive orientations towards shared 
goals that are often provided by consistent leadership. Unity of purpose 
is crucial in elite alliances (Burton and Higley 1998). Hence, network 
leaders function to ensure the coherence and objectivity of their mem-
bership. The dilution of the intra-elite power tussles that often plague 
leadership successions at the elite level of politics in Nigeria (see Mah-
mudat 2010), requires the mediatory powers of regional leadership. The 
northern region, Dudley (1982) suggested, is where power has resided 
since colonial rule.  
Apart from perpetuating ‘narrow interests’, traditional rulers of north-
ern Nigeria seem to be associated with political ‘alliances’ and indications 
of special ethno-regional affiliates for ‘appointments’ to ‘leading’ political 
executive offices (Vaughan 2005: 125, see also Suberu 1997: 401–425). 
Elite appointments might thus be linked to elite selectivity rather than 
competitiveness and inclusiveness if similar individuals or groups with 
vested interests appear regularly in political executive offices over time 
and space. An outcome of selective elite appointments could be a preva-
lence of ascription and power inequalities that inhibit the achievement of 
the liberal-pluralist ideal of cross-cutting social inclusion based on educa-
tion and competition.  
 Religion also plays a role in fostering traditional rulers’ participation 
in the network that sustains political executive power-holding. Laitan 
(1982) observed that the fervent discussion over the inclusion of Sharia 
in Nigeria’s 1979 constitution indicates northern Muslims’ indisposition 
towards a secular state. More relevant to the current study, the attempt 
to politicize religion in Nigeria by including Sharia codes in the national 
constitution has not appeared to promote political responsibility, particu-
larly in terms of the elite-masses relationship. As one analyst suggested, 
there seems to be a disconnection between the rigid applications of Sha-
ria principles to Muslim commoners (locally known as talakawa) for 
maintaining mass acquiescence, and the permissive attitudes of the rich 
and powerful political elite towards the socially repudiated corruption 
(Paden 2008). Religious cohesion and ethno-regional solidity thus con-
tribute to reinforce northern political leadership and interest in the na-
tional network that supports continuity in political executive offices.  
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Traditional institutions in post-colonial Nigeria affect the circulation, 
composition and character of the political executive elite in other re-
spects as well through their participation in elite networks. Age and gen-
der relations tend to be linked to the patriarchal system which has en-
dured through changes in political regimes and size of government 
revenue. Elite theorists identify ageing, invalidity and death as functions 
of time that either separately or jointly constrains political office-holding 
(Mosca 1939, Pareto 1968, Keller 1963/1991). In particular, the trio is 
generally expected to control office-holding through natural restrictions 
on life-long office tenures. Time is a physically and mentally limiting fac-
tor to office-holding, ‘diminishing the influence on the political ability to 
continue in office’ (Biennen and de Walle 1989: 19–43). That is, the pas-
sage of time impedes the physical and mental ability of a political execu-
tive to continue indefinitely in office. However, and based on the neo-
patrimonial model, time in office also provides opportunities for ex-
changes between patrons (state agents) and clients (selected society 
members) seeking state contracts and political appointments (Bratton 
and de Walle 1997). Such exchanges seem to occur mostly at the presi-
dential and ministerial level of office-holding, where decisive executive 
power (in terms of policy supervision and resource distribution) resides.  
As the patriarchal system of Nigeria leans heavily on such traditional 
authority as that which inspired Weber’s patrimonial model, ageing in 
office-holding has advantages as well for the neo-patrimonial elite leader. 
Such leaders capitalize on their office experience to strengthen selective 
support through patronage distribution. Similarly, the patriarchal system 
of Nigeria inter alia seems to pay only ‘glossy’ (lip-service) attention to 
women’s participation in politics. Consequently, women’s voice is likely 
to remain tied to men’s power and all of the problems of representation 
associated with political practices in Nigeria. The use of first lady figures 
and elitist acclaimed positions in the presidency (i.e. embodied by the 
president and vice president) can also be viewed as linked to the control 
of the direct participation of women in political processes through pro-
jects patronized by the presidency and controlled by the first lady’s of-
fice.  
On balance, traditional institutions in Nigeria represent certain politi-
cally valued identities such as ethnicity, region and religion. These identi-
ties are constructed (Smith 2008) and harnessed by the political class. In 
other words, they are transformed into political support for those who 
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seek and hold political executive office. The traditional rulers of Nigeria 
are part of a political class that backs the political executive office-
holders. Traditional authorities naturally legitimate the patriarchal system 
through which the power structure of age and gender operates, to the 
chagrin of the youth and women participants in political processes. The 
traditional rulers are a contact group whose activities straddle the politi-
cal class, the political executive and the Nigerian masses. Despite their 
formal ineligibility for elective and appointive political offices, traditional 
rulers exercise considerable influence over political attitudes and behav-
iours. Following classic elite theory, the elite are either governing or non-
governing with the latter divided amongst those who do and those who 
do not influence the former (see Mosca 1939, Pareto 1968/1991). Thus, 
the traditional rulers of Nigeria are amongst the influential non-
governing elite.  
2.4.2 The Socio-Cultural Elite  
Education and profession are socio-cultural resources harnessed by the 
political class to create the elite network of Nigeria. They serve mainly 
for the bureaucratic organization of political power. Since Weber (1968) 
spoke of the combined persistence of social class and status symbols in 
less industrialized societies – in contrast to the Marxist linear view of po-
litical power based on economic resources – political power rationaliza-
tion has taken various shapes and been associated with varied outcomes 
in specific contexts. Mills’ Power Elite provides a clearer view of bureau-
cratic conversions based on Weber’s insight about the advance of the 
bureaucracy in industrial societies. Weber postulated as follows: 
Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally domination through 
knowledge. (…). But in addition to this, bureaucratic organizations, or the 
holders of power who make use of them, have the tendency to increase 
their power still further by the knowledge growing out of experience in the 
service. For they acquire through the conduct of office a special knowl-
edge of facts and have available a store of documentary material available 
to them (Weber 1968: 225).  
In other words, the bureaucratization of political power is signifi-
cantly connected to the expansion of the latter, as well as with the suste-
nance of power over time and its use as an instrument of mass domina-
tion.  
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According to Mills (1956/2000), the bureaucracies of today’s states, 
economic corporations and military establishments are enlarged and 
serve as means of power never before equalled in human history. 
Though Mills focused on the triumvirate elite structure in industrialized 
societies, the likely lesson for Nigeria is that holders of executive power 
deploy bureaucratic power to rationalize their objectives by concentrat-
ing and centralizing authority despite regime changes. Michels 
(1968/1991) believed the elite capacity to rationalize political power and 
roles was derived from possession of ‘superior knowledge’ which affords 
elite leaders ‘an almost insurmountable advantage over members who try 
to change policies’ (p. 16). The consequence, or what Michels calls ‘the 
price of increased bureaucracy’ is ‘concentration of power at the top and 
the lessening of influence by rank and file members’ (ibid.).  
Following liberal thinking, education supposedly enhances elite so-
cialization and the formation of consistent attitudes towards open politi-
cal systems. However, longer and extended schooling mostly obtained 
abroad (especially in Western countries) offers not only skills but also a 
common socializing ground for members of the elite who may be eligible 
to access political executive offices. Bassey (2009) links ‘western educa-
tion’ and ‘higher education’ inter alia to ‘cultural elite status in Africa’ 
including Nigeria. According to Bassey (ibid.: 31), the ‘advent of colonial 
rule and Christian missionary activities’ often initiated political changes. 
In post-colonial Nigeria, a fundamental aspect of the elite network is the 
systematic conversion of formal education through bureaucratic rational-
ity to stabilize the selective circulation of individuals or groups in politi-
cal executive offices. Thus, it could be suggested that while formal edu-
cation enhanced the discontinuity of colonial rule, it paradoxically has 
reinforced the continuity of the elite in political executive power and au-
thority in the post-colonial period. 
2.4.3 The Economic Elite  
The economic elite are generally expected to exercise powerful and dy-
namic roles in industrialized and industrializing societies. Nonetheless, 
caution is called for in overestimating the strategic importance of the 
economic elite. According to Keller (1963/1991), ‘the existence of an all-
powerful economic ruling class is no longer valid (p. 83). This position is 
also held by Mills (1956/2000), who rejected the idea that ‘the political 
apparatus is merely an extension of the corporate world or that it has 
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been taken over by the representatives of the corporate rich’ as postu-
lated by Marxists (p. 170). The reason for the shift away from a superior 
role for economic power is not just the tendency of industrializing socie-
ties towards heterogeneity. The shift hinges on Weber’s (1968) assertion 
that the distribution of honour in a society does not solely depend on 
economic power but also and perhaps more importantly on status sym-
bols.  
This implies the possibility that informal power can permeate both 
economic and political institutions for the furtherance of self-interest. 
Indeed, informally based network interactions between the economic 
and political elites have received analytical and critical attention, espe-
cially regarding manipulation of political institutions by the elite. Acemo-
glu and Robinson (2008) alluded to the use of de facto power, derived 
from the collusions of the political elite with economic powers, e.g. 
through corruption and patronage, to offset de jure power of democratic 
institutions even when institutional rights of liberty are amply granted. 
Despite structural changes aimed at providing political and civil liberties, 
the political elite may collude with the economic elite to maintain or fur-
ther stifle economic institutions (ibid.). Acemoglu and Robinson (ibid.) 
state their claim in unambiguous terms:  
A change in political institutions that modifies the distribution of de jure 
power need not lead to a change in equilibrium economic institutions if it 
is associated with offsetting change in the distribution of de facto political 
power (e.g. in the form of bribery, the capture of political parties, or use of 
paramilitaries (p. 268).  
It is important to add that corruption, personalization of access to po-
litical offices and coercion is inimical to accountability. Hence, account-
ability as a democratic process is derailed under corrupt and coercive 
elite leaders. In Nigeria, network-based interactions are probably used as 
a platform for diverting answerability away from its formal axis, which is 
the people’s preference. According to Jenkins (2007), this diversion im-
plies a shift of answerability from de jure accountability to de facto ac-
countability, which enjoins public office-holders to respond to interests 
outside those formally recognized in the constitution (ibid.). Therefore, 
disclosing the collusion of elite power with economic interests through 
corruption and patronage can provide additional insight into the direc-
tion of the political executive elite responsibility in terms of the social 
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group(s) to which the political executive responds through time and 
space.  
2.4.4 The Military Elite  
Military participation in politics is an important institutional component 
of the quintuple Nigerian political elite alliance that controls the federal 
government. The contradiction between the usual role of the military as 
territorial guards and its sudden transformation into a ‘vanguard’ of po-
litical power, as in Nigeria, provides a useful historical and analytical 
guide for this study. Heywood spoke of the atypical role of the military 
in civilian government considered as “(…) guarantors of domestic order 
and interest group” rather than “alternative to civilian rule within the 
executive machinery” (Heywood 2002: 379–384). This liberal discourse is 
perhaps more applicable elsewhere than in Nigeria. In the United States, 
where Mills (1956/2000) focused his research about the power elite, di-
rect participation of the military in politics is proscribed. But the contrary 
seems likely in Nigeria. That is, the military is not only actively engaged 
in Nigerian politics, but it can be assumed to act as a source of continuity 
in political executive power and positions.  
The transformation of the role of the military in Nigeria paradoxically 
implies its centrality as a network node, either as a powerful initiator of 
continuity and office longevity or as a reinforcing agent of ‘power repro-
duction’ over time and space. Military political actors in Nigeria seem to 
share a similar traditional and socio-cultural background with the tradi-
tional rulers and bureaucrats in a way that is likely to translate into an 
interlocking of power and roles. ‘Interlocking’ in critical elite analysis im-
plies an interchange of positions before or during office-holding, i.e. 
amongst people of ‘similar origins’ who permanently ‘maintain a network 
of informal connections’ (Mills 1956/2000: 11–12, see also Dye 1978, 
Kurtz II 1987). In Nigeria, interlocking appears to play a crucial role in 
the accumulation and retention of political power and positions, espe-
cially within the national executive government. It is thus relevant for 
understanding elite attitudes towards power-holding.  
Both military and civilian elites seem to accumulate influential, parallel 
or convergent social roles – a military or civilian elite individual who 
holds chieftaincy titles also shares in executive offices that permit, fol-
lowing a Nigerian observer, the ‘authoritative allocation of state re-
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sources’ (Omodia 2009: 36). In that context, regime changes can provide 
a milieu not only for analysing the composition and character of the po-
litical elite according to regime and office standards but also for observ-
ing the type of elite (military or civilian) that tends to circulate in execu-
tive offices as political regimes and resources change over time. In 
particular, a regime change to military rule usually implies inclusion (not 
necessarily inclusiveness in terms of a realistic social interest representa-
tion) of more military personnel than civilian politicians in supervisory 
roles (i.e. those political executive offices that are charged with policy 
control). However, civilian politicians are needed in an attempt to bridge 
the social gaps that a closed military style of governance may engender.  
The argument that civilian politicians are co-opted to bolster military 
politics rather than to enhance social participation and development 
makes sense for the Nigerian case. Because authoritarian political sys-
tems and actors are aversive to opposition (Dudley 1982), contrary to 
liberal systems, the admission of civilian politicians is probably a façade 
aimed at legitimating social control rather than promoting social partici-
pation. Hence, the fusionist (military-civilian blend) manifestation of elite 
composition that the Nigerian polity suggests since colonial rule and 
over regime types can be said to project an important elitist pact for fos-
tering special interests while at the same time maintaining mass acquies-
cence.  
2.4.5 The Political Elite  
The political elite occupy the apex of the elite hierarchy. This is not sim-
ply due to their capacity to form combinations with other elite types 
(Keller 1963/1991) in the political power structure, but also because of 
their role as initiators and supervisors of policies with pervasive social 
outcomes (Lane 1997). The fact that the political elite stratum integrates 
various segments has special implications for power structuring, based 
on functional differentiation. Liberal thinking holds that the political elite 
power structure should reflect a variety of skills (e.g. legal, entrepreneu-
rial, bureaucratic) and permit participation and ‘effective opposition to 
coercion’ (Hannan and Carrol 1981: 20). The political elite, therefore, 
constitute a basis for analysing the characteristics of the core political 
executive elite, as political executive elites are all political elites though 
not all political elites are political executives.  
48 CHAPTER 2 
 
To understand elite circulation in executive positions requires insights 
into the elite’s social origin and network linkages. If liberal postulations 
are accepted about the tendency of open political regimes towards power 
dispersal and elite responsibility, the political elite configuration will be 
expected to produce elite competition and social inclusiveness across 
different professional and social class backgrounds (Dahl 1971, Dia-
mond et al. 1988). Competition and inclusiveness are thus expected to 
operate under the organization and channelling of social interests 
through political parties and leaderships. Przeworski (1991) associates 
the selection of candidates for political offices under the ‘political liberty’ 
precept with ‘the free choice of leaders by citizens in an open election 
contested by political parties from all shades of life’ (p. 11).  
Political parties are therefore an important political institution for or-
ganizing political power and channelling public interests. This study ar-
gues that political institutions, such as political parties, may be weakened 
by special elite interests in the Nigerian polity. Political parties are sub-
jected to the same state control as the major national economic re-
sources. Political parties are being transformed into what Michels (1968) 
calls ‘fighting parties’ (pp. 78–79). These latter use quasi-military patterns 
of tactical procedures to dominate the opponent so as to curtail the de-
mocratic spirit found in its ‘primitive and genuine form’ (ibid.) for ad-
vancing the people’s interests.  
The current study considers the core political executive elite of Nige-
ria as emerging from different social backgrounds. However, its deriva-
tion from various social backgrounds does not automatically imply an 
extensive and deep sense of social representation and responsibility. It 
does mean that the political elite can transform unexpectedly upon as-
cending to political executive power by appropriating state resources and 
denying accountability to the very foundation of political power found in 
open systems – the people. Instead of a political executive elite composi-
tion that is answerable to the people (from whom political power sup-
posedly emanates), answerability by the former reposes on a political 
class that depends on state resources for its survival.  
To understand the parasitic character of a political class that has as-
cended to political power and depends on state resources for survival, an 
analytical reference can be made to an agorist view:  
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By the ‘political class’, it is meant those who draw their livelihood not 
from the Market but from the State. The political class is the parasitic class 
that acquires its livelihood via the ‘political means’ – through ‘confiscation, 
taxation, and other forms of coercion’. Their victims are the rest of us – 
the productive class – those who make their living through peaceful and 
honest means of any sort, such as a worker or an entrepreneur (Sprangler 
2006: online).  
Yet, the idea of a parasitic political class is not the reserve of agorists. 
Diamond (1993a) too referred to a political class that is dependent on 
state resources. This contribution on the nature of the political class con-
trasts with the Marxist outlook on inequality as derived from economic 
factors. Instead of the usual direct link to state power through a domi-
nant economic class, state resources stand clear as the ultimate source of 
political power and elite control over society. In certain contexts such as 
Nigeria social stratification or social differences or simply social inequal-
ity is not necessarily the product of differences in the direct ownership of 
productive resources, i.e. in the private realm. Rather, inequality can be 
seen as the outcome of the centralized control exercised by the elite mi-
nority over state resources and institutions – political, economic and so-
cial. As Sprangler (2006) concluded, Marxists ‘misidentified’ the oppres-
sor class as economic instead of political, that is, the ‘political class’ 
(online).  
2.5 Summary of Theory and Analytical Framework  
The theoretical discussions so far have shown the variety and unique 
strengths of elite theories and their application in the Nigerian context. 
Marxist and liberal theories polarize about elite composition and charac-
ter in political offices. However, little applicability to Nigeria is found in 
either the Marxist assumption of economic class determinism of power 
concentration or the liberal idea of power dispersal based on an autono-
mous social and neutral state background. As argued here, the circula-
tion, composition and character of the Nigerian core political executive 
elite derive from their common social background and shared special 
interests, harnessed to informal networks and supported by the political 
class usurpers of state resources.  
This study’s analysis draws from the critical elite theories, which pro-
vide far-reaching insight based on a set of ideas that associates the circu-
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lation, composition and character of the elite to their social background 
and intents towards political offices. The current research thus examines 
the common social background and networks through which a power 
elite group operates and persists in hierarchic elite positions. Critical elite 
theorists describe the conversion of office positions into tools for secur-
ing the special interests of the elite. The basic contention is that common 
social background permits the intermingling of elite persons, group co-
herence and the use of large and important social institutions to achieve 
special interests.  
Yet, unlike the triumvirate elite composition of the power elite model, 
in Nigeria the activities of many different elite groups (socio-cultural, 
traditional, military, economic and political) are assumed to be linked to 
the operation of informal (flex) social networks, political parties and state 
institutions. The likely outcome is convergence in decisive social posi-
tions, such as political executive offices, of similar individuals with 
shared interests. By acting in defence of certain interests through state 
resources, elite individuals assume the role of political actors. But they 
use their familiar social background and their peculiar networks to en-
sure continuity in political offices. The securing of self-interests also im-
plies the selective sharing of typical attitudes such as patronage ex-
changes, corruption, ethnic favouritism and ‘godfather’ politics, which 
contribute to retard the political system. 
Note 
 
1 In the first two decades of post-colonial experiences in Nigeria, Marxist schol-
ars tried to link the nation’s recrudescent social crises with economic factors. 
The original version of Nnoli’s (1978) book used Marxist theory to link social 
conflict with unequal distribution of economic resources. Yet, in the 1995 re-
edition, the Marxist orientation had disappeared. Also, Madunagu (1982) la-
mented the weak social roots of Marxism as it failed to stir radical changes in 
Nigeria. Omodia (2010) was even more critical of the invalidity of Marxist theo-
ries. 
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3 Methodological Considerations 
 
 
3.1 Data Sources  
Archival sources and written records supply the major data for this 
study. Written sources offer certain advantages over other strategies, like 
the use of nominee lists (reputation approach) and participant roles in 
policy processes (decisional approach). Johnson and Reynolds (2006) 
justify the use of ‘written records’ by political scientists ‘when the politi-
cal phenomena that interest them cannot be measured through personal 
interviews, with questionnaires or by direct observation’ (p. 206). This 
certainly applies to this study’s examination of the occupancy history of 
Nigerians in high political offices, as nationals began to assume executive 
functions there after the decolonization period (1951–1960), though at 
first under the tutelage of British colonial rule and rulers. At least three 
other reasons justify this study’s use of written sources as well.  
Firstly, this study spans over five decades. During such an extended 
timeframe relevant political events and key participants become less visi-
ble and accessible to the present generation. This weakens the relevance 
of interviews, as illness, memory lapses and death militate against verbal 
data sources. This is particularly true for information regarding elite rep-
utation, which calls on both the physical and moral capacities of those 
who hold valid information about reputable persons and are willing to 
share this in probing interviews. 
Secondly, this study is not uniquely concerned with policy decisions, 
their outcomes and impacts across society. Rather, it deals mainly with 
the circulation and character of the policy supervisory elite that has as-
cended to key political executive offices from a particular social back-
ground. It would be much more difficult to learn who participated in 
specific policy decisions than to ascertain who occupied policymaking 
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positions with pervasive social outcomes and which, at the national ex-
ecutive level, contributed to shape the political regime. This shortfall is 
particularly evident in deeply troubled societies such as Nigeria, with its 
institutional flux and flaws. Moreover, records about decision-making 
participants may not be as reliable as lists of prime ministers, presidents, 
vice presidents, ministers and junta members traced to their different 
backgrounds, interests and support in everyday Nigerian politics. Hence, 
the official list of political decision makers provides the departure point 
for this study’s various steps towards identifying and classifying the dif-
ferent background information required for the analysis of elite circula-
tion, composition and character at the political executive level.  
Thirdly, research about political elite circulation, composition and 
character in multicultural and weakly institutionalized societies would 
likely be less productive if interviews were employed to tease out the 
main information. Arslan (2006) explained that elites are usually consid-
ered ‘unwilling and elusive, weary about betraying mutual trust, breaking 
the seal or implicating self’ (pp. 2–5). It then follows that interviews and 
observations that date back to the decolonization period would be prac-
tically impossible to realize.  
Over the post-colonial period in Nigeria, record keeping has under-
gone continual changes in terms of its organized form for consistent 
consultation. However, the technical limitations of record keeping ex-
perienced in Nigeria do not imply the total absence of organized records 
that serve the purpose of this study. Running records such as yearbooks 
and who’s who compilations are considered useful for tracing ‘the origin 
and relationships among people in various positions of power and influ-
ence and to contrast different types of elite groups’ (Johnson and Rey-
nold 2005: 217). Running records exist under the aegis of the Nigerian 
Federal Ministry of Information, and are traceable to various national 
archives, national libraries and some of the country’s oldest university 
libraries located in different regions and cities. Access to available re-
cords is made difficult but not impossible by inadequate handling and 
incompleteness (i.e. unavailability and disparate locations). This required 
the researcher to travel between distant regions to fill pertinent data 
gaps. 
The choice to use running records as the major source of data for this 
study stems from its particular advantages over episodic records. Epi-
sodic record sources entail dispersed and unorganized documents, par-
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ticularly by private individuals. Johnson and Reynold (2005) describe 
these sources as deriving from the ‘more causal, personal and accidental 
manner’ of ‘diaries, memoirs, manuscripts, correspondence, autobiogra-
phies and biographical sketches and other biographical materials’ that 
serve the researcher of ‘particular subject matter’ (pp. 207–208). Because 
of the impromptu nature of episodic records they could not offer the 
large samples and numerical measures required for the analyses in this 
study.  
The data compilations and classifications used here derive from vari-
ous editions of the Nigerian Yearbook and Who’s Who in Nigeria. These 
sources gave rise to a sample comprising 1,782 Nigerian elite members 
who at different periods since 1951 ascended to political executive of-
fices such as that of prime minister, president, minister and junta mem-
bers. Nonetheless, episodic record sources, especially those in the quali-
tative form of quotations from autobiographies and biographies, were 
referred to where possible and convenient to reinforce data from the 
running records in the course of the analysis. Data secured through epi-
sodic accounts require more time and cost to classify than the relatively 
more structured running records. That is, time and cost disadvantages 
were less in running records derived from ongoing and systematic record 
keeping such as the yearbooks and who’s who, which constitute the ma-
jor sources of data for this study.  
3.2 Data Collection 
Six political executive offices at the national government level guided the 
listing of names and the collection of data. They are the first Nigerian (1) 
prime minister and (2) governor general as head of state and commander 
in chief of the armed forces (3) presidents that also answer to the title of 
head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces, (4) vice pres-
idents, (5) ministers and (6) junta members. These individuals or groups 
form the unit of analysis and the central focus of data collection. In all, 
1,782 office positions and occupancies were identified and listed accord-
ing to their yearly membership in the core political executive elite from 
1951 to 2007. Data collection involved two phases as shown in Figure 
3.1. The first phase involved the preliminary fieldwork accomplished in 
two months (from mid-July through September 2005). During this first 
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phase, important contacts were established with knowledgeable persons 
and informants about data locations and accessibility.  
The location of national archives in Nigeria follows the regional pat-
terns established after decolonization. As a result, the first phase served 
to locate and access national archives, older university libraries, record-
keeping foundations and government organizations in the various re-
gions of the country. Extra-institutional contacts were established with 
retired public servants such as professors, academic registrars and mili-
tary officers as reliable informants about the location of relevant public 
records. Similarly, federal government institutions and agencies, such as 
the presidency and directorate for archives and national libraries linked 
to the Federal Ministry of Information were earmarked as sources of da-
ta collection. Figure 3.1 shows the complete circle of data collection as it 
unfolded. Valuable information was retrieved from newspapers, the In-
ternet and books about the social background and interests shared by the 
Nigerian political executive elite. 
Figure 3.1 
Stages of Data Collection  
 
 
Most important at the initial stage (July through September 2005) and 
in the process of data collection were visits to academic institutions such 
1ST PHASE 
July–September 
(2005) 
2ND PHASE 
January–October 
(2006) 
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February–April 
(2007) 
Preliminary Fieldwork Main Fieldwork Fieldwork Extension  
Initial Contacts  
 Location  Identification  Registration 
 
 
 
Social Background
 Who´s Who   Biographies  Autobiographies  Government gazette 
and constitution  
 
Social Background 
and Networks  
 Books, magazines 
and newspapers   Internet   International 
documents 
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as Ahmadu Bello University (Zaria, north), Abuja University (Abuja, fed-
eral capital), the University of Ibadan (Ibadan, west) and the University 
of Lagos (Lagos, west coast). Preliminary visits were made in late July 
and August 2005 to national libraries and national archives located in the 
cities of Lagos, Abuja, Kaduna and Ibadan. In Kaduna and on a visit to 
the national archives situated at Ahmadu Bello Way, information was 
obtained about the valuable library and archival services offered by Are-
wa House in the same city. Arewa House is a foundation house with a 
fairly organized library and archive established from the records of the 
defunct (colonial) northern region government. Its record keeping ex-
tends to the post-colonial period in such a way as to confer running re-
cord status to the organization. Similarly, visits were made to publishing 
companies where the researcher held consultations with newspaper and 
magazine editors, some of whom compile Who’s Who in Nigeria. For 
the names and list of sources see the reference section. 
The first phase also afforded opportunities to conduct informal inter-
views with professors about how and why fellow intellectuals were being 
recruited into ministerial positions. During the visits to the political sci-
ence departments at Ahmadu Bello University Zaria (north) in August 
2005 and the University of Ibadan (south-west) in early September 2005, 
informal (unregistered) conversations with professors were quite reveal-
ing. The working conditions of intellectuals at Nigerian universities were 
described as devoid of real incentives. This deficiency was considered a 
major motivation for lecturers and professors to pursue financial gain 
outside of educational institutions and in ways that perhaps contribute to 
institutional weaknesses in Nigeria. 
In the second phase of the fieldwork, these institutions served the ob-
jective of data collection, as they are major centres of learning and re-
positories of documentation in Nigeria. The second phase of the field-
work which lasted eight months (January to October 2006) focused on 
the consolidation and initial registration and classification of data. The 
knowledge previously gained about data locations facilitated effective 
collection of biographical and social background data between and with-
in the key regions. The new federal capital at Abuja became central for 
reviving contacts and collecting additional data, while the nearby city of 
Kaduna offered accessible facilities for compilations and systematic reg-
istration. Apart from consolidating data collection and registration, this 
second phase was revealing about the feasibilities of the initial plan.  
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3.3 Data Classification  
The theoretical framework of this study calls for data classification be-
yond the limited scope of class hierarchies to analyse the composite na-
ture of the Nigerian political executive elite. Scholarly critique of class 
stratification considers the class analysis of social phenomena based on 
national-level sample surveys of occupational background as inadequate. 
Cromptom (1998) referred to studies about social stratification oriented 
towards national programmes in industrial societies as emphasizing ‘or-
der rather than conflict’ (p. 77). The national programme studies were 
quoted as lacking ‘the relational schemes’ aimed at capturing ‘the under-
lying divisions and conflicts associated with class in capitalist industrial 
societies’ (ibid.). In Nigeria, there have been attempts to apply data based 
on class relationships to political elite behaviour in liberal-oriented re-
search (Smythe and Smythe 1963) and Marxist-oriented studies (Nnoli 
1978, Imoagene 1989). However, they fall short of encompassing the 
wider social structure (class and status symbols), e.g. including profes-
sional class and ethnic categories. The latter in particular might expose 
the constructed nature of ethnicity by the political elite who seek or hold 
key political offices. 
A circumscribed class analysis is difficult because social phenomena 
in complex social contexts (such as Nigeria) can hardly be attributed to a 
single causal link derived from educational or occupational data. Such a 
narrow data base (i.e. restricted to a particular source of information) 
invariably leads to anticipated outcomes instead of realistic conclusions. 
While occupational data can show the distribution of political offices 
based on schooling or training experiences and achievement criteria, 
such distributions omit status attributes originating from ethnic, religious 
and regional origins – though these likely demonstrate the infusion and 
sometimes profusion (i.e. excesses) of criteria of ascription in office-
holding. Studies that deliberately or systematically omit status symbols 
such as ethnic identity will be deprived of valuable information about 
commonalities in elite background, interest clusters and feedback.  
Unlike liberal conventions, critical viewpoints from new institutional-
ism reinforce ‘political structure and institutions’ as subject to manipula-
tion by socio-cultural aspects (ethnicity, language and culture) and social 
class factors (professional or material distribution) in ways that make 
‘class differences translate into political differences with great reliability 
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across time and culture’ (March and Olson 1984: 734–735). For example, 
political institutions especially political parties and their respective leader-
ship orientations can be observed in Nigeria as permeated by patronage 
exchanges and corrupt practices with destabilizing effects on the political 
system as a whole. According to Stepan (2001), ‘institutional stability and 
legitimacy can depend less on group interactive autonomy based on oc-
cupational interests than situations of social cleavage or crisis where de-
spite cross-pressures, some pressures assume greater salience in terms of 
the stakes involved than others’ (p. 45).1  
The multiethnic and socially differentiated Nigerian context can pro-
vide data about the circulation, composition and character of key politi-
cal executive leaders based on ethno-regional origin, religion, formal ed-
ucation, profession and political party affiliation. The combined effect of 
such data distribution could reveal social similarities and differences that 
indicate the varied levels and origins of the social pressures exercised on 
the power structure, especially at the political executive level. Similarly, 
data about political appointments prior to and after general elections 
might validate the relationship between patronage dealings and elite atti-
tudes towards continuity in political executive offices.  
Students of neo-patrimonialism view patronage exchanges as operat-
ing primarily through informal institutions such as the presidency, pa-
tron-client relations (clientelism) and state resource distribution (Jackson 
and Roseberg 1994, Bratton and de Walle 1997). A causal relationship 
can thus be established between, on the one hand, rent-seeking, patron-
age distribution and corruption and, on the other hand, selection and 
nomination of similar individuals or groups to occupy elite political ex-
ecutive positions to defend the interests of the political class. That is, a 
common socio-cultural, economic, military, economic and political back-
ground and interests could secure continuity and the organizational ca-
pacity to encapsulate mass tension over different periods and in various 
circumstances.  
 The data taxonomy adopted in this study both includes and ex-
tends beyond social class characteristics motivated by division of labour 
(into categories such as lawyers, business persons, intellectuals, military 
personnel and politicians). That is, data classification integrates aspects 
of ‘age, sex, ethnicity, religion, region, skills, strength and the like’ that 
reflect the complex, heterogeneous background of the elite considered as 
hailing from ‘the broader social basis linked to the community’ (Keller 
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1963/1991: 33). However, the inclusive and dispersed nature of data nei-
ther implies the coexistence of a heterogeneous distribution of elite indi-
viduals nor the coherent representation of social demands. Only through 
empirical observation can the actual power structure of the political ex-
ecutive elite be more fully ascertained. 
 To provide a more consistent analysis, data classification follows the 
periodic changes in political regime after decolonization. Table 3.1 shows 
the regime changes with the code label used for analysis purposes. The 
changes start from the decolonization period (numerical order ‘0’) and 
extend to up to Obasanjo’s government (1999–2007). The inclusion of 
the data for the decolonization period is meant only to reveal any lines of 
elite continuity in political executive offices through the Nigerian inde-
pendence period into the post-colonial period. This means that the ma-
jor focus of the empirical analysis is the post-colonial period, when Nige-
rians assumed de jure and de facto positions in directing their own political 
affairs. 
Table 3.1 
Longitudinal Design and Time Order of Regimes  
Numerical 
Order 
Nominal Values Periodic  
Ordering 
 Code Label 
0 Decolonization 1951–1960 0DC: 1951–1960 
1 First Civilian Regime 1960–1966 1CR: 1960–1966 
2 First Military Regime 1966–1979 1MR: 1966–1979 
3 Second Civilian Regime 1979–1983 2CR: 1979–1983 
4 Second Military Regime 1984–1999 2MR: 1984–1999 
5 Third Civilian Regime 1999–2007 3CR: 1999–2007 
Source: Author’s (2010) compilation based on Nigeria’s post-colonial history  
 
3.4 Data Application  
Acclaimed elite researchers such as Mills (1956) and Domhoff (1986) 
applied data obtained from running records in the United States to ana-
lyse the relationship between elite background and participation in im-
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portant political processes at the national level of government. In addi-
tion to social background data, running records constitute an original 
source for listing institutionalized office positions and measuring the 
year-to-year occupancies of political executive offices in post-colonial 
Nigeria.  
Disaggregated social background data from running records can pro-
vide information about elite circulation in political executive offices in 
terms of the proportion of the different elite groups that participate in 
political executive offices under different regime contexts. Worthy of 
note, especially for the Nigerian case, is that certain individuals may re-
peatedly occupy elite political executive offices over time. That is, re-
peated names appear over various years and across periods in which of-
fices may have been recreated or renamed after 1951. Consequently, data 
about nominal and positional recurrences in political offices can high-
light linkages within a complex range of temporally and spatially over-
lapping roles since decolonization in Nigeria. 
Data from running records can be operationalized to ascertain the ex-
tent of political executive membership clustering, for example, through 
ministerial appointments at critical political points that precede and suc-
ceed major elections. Specific data clustering around elections can indi-
cate a concentrated resort to patronage exchanges to boost the executive 
government’s legitimacy and continuity based on the support of similar 
elite individuals and shared interests. In other words, if ministerial ap-
pointments (particularly second-order cabinet positions) are found to be 
enlarged at the proximity of elections, the trading of political influence 
through the distribution of rewards (patronage exchanges) can be in-
ferred as the product of the political elite’s need to bolster selective social 
support for continuity in executive government offices. Moreover, run-
ning records provide information about differences and similarities in 
actors’ political executive backgrounds through time and space. 
This study gainfully applies data sourced from the running records of 
international agencies including Transparency International (TI), Free-
dom House (FH) and Afrobarometer, posted on their respective Internet 
sites. Data prepared by TI centre around their Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) across different countries, including Nigeria. TI data sources 
are useful at least as sensors (‘feelers’) of the attitudes of the Nigerian 
political elite towards office-holding. FH rates different countries (Nige-
ria included) on political rights and liberties. Like the CPI, the indicators 
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of political rights and liberties as provided by FH stem from a rich run-
ning record of the alternating changes from democratic to authoritarian 
regimes along the post-colonial period.  
Thus, the FH data show differences and similarities between governance 
attitudes (e.g. towards open competition and social inclusiveness) and 
governance regimes (such as institutionalized rights to freedom and 
equality). Data sourced from FH can therefore convey the significance of 
political executive elite circulation, composition and character, particu-
larly in response to political regime change and shifts in economic re-
sources in Nigeria. Hence, the FH data will be useful for estimating the 
extent to which changes in political regime and economic resources pro-
vide a fertile context for elite circulation within the national executive 
government.  
Afrobarometer data provide information about social responses to 
political governance shifts and changes in the political system. Indicators 
of such social responses are instrumental for this study to gauge the atti-
tudes of political executive elite office-holders towards political participa-
tion. 
3.5 Data Analysis: Social Background and Networking 
This study’s analysis of data is based mainly on social background and 
network approaches. Longitudinal analysis is used to consider possible 
social relationships by observing relevant historical and dynamic facts 
and by looking back through various periods and events for plausible 
causal factors (Vaus 2007). Social background data can provide insight 
into the characteristic appearances and attitudes of the power elite who 
ascend to political executive offices over time and space. Various studies 
and analysts have shown that historically recorded and traceable social 
origins are meaningfully associated with the types of political elite and 
their manifest character (or attitudes) towards political power and roles 
(Marvick 1961, Parry 1969, Quandt 1969, Rustow 1970, Van Donge and 
Liviga 1987, Olagunju et al. 1993, Ake 1995, Bassey 1999, 2009, Akinri-
nade 2006). In the Nigerian case, social background data permits a retro-
spective analysis of various categories of data (names, portfolios, age, 
sex, profession, and communal and party affiliations) that show a pattern 
of elite participation in political executive offices.  
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The study of elite manifestation in political executive offices based on 
social origin has several advantages. Analyses of social origin are more 
useful than institutional approaches. The latter approaches offices or po-
sitions as stable patterns of expectations (structured roles in the form of 
rights and obligations) that limit the interactions between public office-
holders and society members (Dahl 1995). If political institutions are 
chosen as unique sources of information and they are observed as his-
torically unstable and fragile (as the Nigerian case suggests), elite analysts 
unequivocally believe that they may not provide reliable information 
about elite character and circulation in political executive offices (Rustow 
1970, Olagunju et al. 1993).  
Instead of looking into volatile institutions, better units of analyses 
are individuals and groups as they relate with one another through struc-
tural changes (Rustow 1970). In many contexts, social crises in the form 
of ‘political implosion’, ‘revolution’, ‘regime breakdown’ or ‘war’ lead to 
elite transformation and stable institutions (Dogan and Higley 1998: 3–
28). However, the suggested absence in Nigeria of causal links between 
context changes and elite attitudes makes institutional changes in this 
country a less adequate basis of analysis than social background to un-
derstand the composite character of political executives.  
However, this study’s repositioning of the focus on individuals and 
groups does not preclude the analytical recourse to institutions (formal 
and informal) as possible resources for elite ascent to and retention of 
political power. In both military and civilian regimes, informal power can 
be institutionalized in ways that substitute for formal precepts with 
greater visibility and predictability. That is, informal power can be har-
nessed through formal-institutional powers such as the ‘Federal Charac-
ter’ principle and patronage power, both of which have largely been in-
corporated into and exercised by the presidency. Following the 
constitution of 1979, more informally institutionalized powers were 
granted to the chief political executive, e.g. to appoint and dismiss fed-
eral ministers based on ethno-regional characteristics.  
The Federal Character principle mandates distribution of political ex-
ecutive power and roles based on an adapted version of democratic 
equality which some refer to as ‘consociational democracy’ (Lijphart 
1968/1975, Bolte 2005). Based on the same 1979 constitution, the pre-
rogatives of the presidential institutions were revised to inter alia con-
cede patronage powers to the president or head of state, who could use 
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them extensively or intensively. In all cases, the current study can expose 
the full social relevance of the conceded powers only by exploring their 
real outcomes.  
Also, social background analysis can shed greater light on elite leader-
ship attitudes, which could deepen understanding of the operatives of 
the political system (Edinger and Searing 1967). Firstly, political execu-
tive leaders’ social background and recruitment patterns (e.g. via political 
parties, personal contacts or use of force) enable inferences to be made 
about the political system’s homogeneity, its dominant values and elite-
elite and elite-masses interactions (Norman 1975, Edinger and Searing 
1967, Van Donge 1986). Secondly, elite background data can provide a 
basis for linking political behaviour with manifest and latent political atti-
tudes derived from social and motivational patterns such as group soli-
darity and preferences (Olagunju et al. 1993, Lewis 2008). These linkages 
are believed to be the socialization experiences by which leaders are in-
ducted into political processes at particular (pre-adult and adult) stages of 
life (Edinger and Searing 1967, Searing 1969, Sears and Nicholas 1997, 
Bassey 2009). For instance, generational gaps, membership of the major 
ethnic groups, professional categories and armed forces that derive from 
common schooling experiences or in-service training schemes can be the 
entry points to long tenures in political office.  
Accumulated wealth and ethnic background can also reinforce the re-
production or recycling of particular categories of elite. Sometimes, these 
conditions act from the outside of incumbency leverage, but they ulti-
mately impinge on the democratic system (Chazan 1993, Biennen and de 
Walle 1999, Chabal and Daloz 1999, Akinrinade 2006).2 This means that 
the representative nature of the core political elite – those with authority 
to make decisions whose validity and outcome are expected to transcend 
private interests – can be more vividly portrayed by exploring differences 
and convergences of social background and political preferences.  
The social network approach aims to deepen the analysis of the circu-
lation, composition and character of political executives. Data about so-
cial background reveal the different origins of the political executive elite. 
However, social background data is insufficient for analysing the interac-
tive mechanisms (networks) that activate and secure the cohesiveness 
and support of the political class for the power elite. When activated, 
social background may imply not only the origin and types (military, 
business, bureaucratic, technocratic and political) of the elite occupants 
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of political executive offices, but also the social sources of interactions 
such as networks. The methodological thrust entails the use of data dis-
tribution and analysis (in terms of inclusion and exclusion) to show pat-
terns of interactions, overlaps between different elite categories and 
points of divergence at which one might be excluded from participating 
in political executive processes. Network analysis can thus provide in-
formation about the characteristic composition, connections and com-
munication points that inform elite activities through time and space.  
Social network analysis goes beyond the identification of nodes that 
can represent persons, groups, ideas, events, organizations and institu-
tions that if interlinked and activated through communication produce 
socially influential information (Moore et al. 2002, Serrat 2009). As 
Moore et al. (2002) reiterated from various sources of elite studies, ‘Re-
search on elites has demonstrated the importance of informal communi-
cation networks as key mechanisms joining elites in diverse positions’, 
especially in ‘organizations’ (p. 728). Dogan and Higley (1998) departed 
from the analysis of informal background relations and a taxonomy of 
‘cabinet stability/instability’ to show ‘elite networks’ as producing varied 
traits, such as ministerial rotations through political systems with stable 
and unstable governments (p. 11).  
‘[C]oincidences of interests’ among various intercepting elite nodes 
(Wedel 2009: 20), i.e. beyond the triumvirate power elite, can thus be 
revealing. They may provide insight not only into power configurations 
(different elite participation) but also into recurrences (repeated elite par-
ticipation in government) over time. The specific objective is to discover 
the elite type and prevailing conditions that affect the political system. 
Network analysis can reveal the organizations and interests that charac-
terize network activities and relationships through different periods and 
geographic spaces. The implications can be documented beyond the un-
derstanding possible through social background analysis, which merely 
shows associations between institutional positions and supposed social 
constituencies of political office-holders. Through network analysis, so-
cial background acquires deeper social meaning about the direction of 
elite representation or ‘representativeness’ through the interactive time 
and space of a specific set of political office-holders. 
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Notes 
 
1 Stakes here reflect the interests that drive social group demands or pressures 
involving different levels of risk bearing and deployment of power resources  
2 In a recent collection of essays about power legacies in Africa, various authors 
sought to demonstrate the power antecedents and connections of former presi-
dents, especially those that served in the armed forces before ascendance to 
political offices.  
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4 Nigerian Political Systems and Phases since Independence 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines structural changes in the Nigerian polity in the 
form of the various shifts in the political system and changes in eco-
nomic resources in the post-colonial period. The account aims to iden-
tify the trajectories and transformations in constitutional and institutional 
rules for accessing and occupying political offices and for managing the 
polity. The chapter furthermore examines the direct role played by the 
Nigerian leadership in shaping the changes. Hence, it clarifies and con-
tributes to support the study’s argument about structural changes with-
out productive institutional development. That is, instead of the institu-
tional strengthening that was supposed to accompany structural changes, 
Nigeria witnessed a proliferation of political institutions and socially in-
ept governance regimes. Three questions steer the chapter: (1) How have 
the rules and opportunities guiding the political game changed since co-
lonial rule? (2) Have significant shifts in economic resources affected 
government makeup and the style of political management? (3) Have 
changes in the rules of the political game and the available resources 
been meaningful for sustaining an open political system?  
4.2 Brief Retrospect from Colonial Rule  
Colonial rule in Nigeria became fully established in 1914 when Britain 
amalgamated the northern and southern protectorates. Colonialism as a 
political system and set of ideas was based on various constitutions, the 
efficacy of which diminished as their internal and external sources of le-
gitimacy became eroded while ceding the way to a limited political open-
ing. A sequence of events triggered this historic movement: the two 
global conflicts (1914–1919 and 1939–1945), decolonization (1946–
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1960) and various political and social forces playing distinct though inter-
linked roles. The British colonial administrators initiated constitutional 
changes openly aimed at consolidating and liberating the colonial terri-
tory of Nigeria. Historically, at least de jure, amalgamation produced the 
modern state of Nigeria. In practice, however, social integration into a 
nation-state remained thorny even as post-colonial rule emerged and 
took shape (Chabal 1992/1994) from 1960 onwards.  
The nature of the various constitutions that led to political independ-
ence has been dealt with extensively elsewhere (see Mackintosh 1966, 
Ekeh 1975, Dudley 1982, Graf 1988, Kirk-Greene 1997, Falola et al. 
1991/2003, Tamuno 1998/2003). For the purpose of this study, a cur-
sory retrospect will suffice. On 23 October 1913, Lord Lugard was the 
first warlord to introduce and deploy the dual mandate system to enforce 
compliance with the initially muted idea of a united Nigeria (Nicholson 
1966, Falola et al. 1991/2003).1 By 1914, amalgamation was fully con-
solidated. Lugard strategically enforced a unitary system of government. 
Though he left office in 1922, the government so established operated 
until 1946, when the Richardson Constitution introduced federalism 
based on three regions: North, East and West (the tri-regional power 
blocs). The incipient changes that led to decolonization have been de-
scribed as ‘administrative rather than constitutional instruments’ (Kirk-
Greene 1997: 31–33). For example, the embryonic Nigerian Council in 
Order of November 1913 paid lukewarm attention to the elections and 
inclusion of Nigerians in the political system.  
The 1922 Clifford Constitution similarly lacked the relevant social 
forces of integration, and so it did not significantly alter the colonial pat-
tern of power-holding. The constitution merely introduced four elected 
Nigerians into the legislative council. A greater majority (twenty-six) of 
the forty-five components were British officials, while nineteen Nigeri-
ans comprised the unofficial bracket. Of this latter composition, fifteen 
members were handpicked mainly from among traders and traditional 
rulers to represent British commercial interests. The most relevant politi-
cal development of the inter-war period (1919–1939) was the first unof-
ficial inclusion of two Nigerians in the Colonial Executive Council in 
1942 (Mackintosh 1966).2 Despite its inexpressive political nature, the 
inclusion provided the first opportunity for Nigerians to really engage in 
political learning processes.  
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The events before 1946 and the active social forces behind them can 
be viewed as strategically placed beyond colonial constitutional motiva-
tions. That is, the social forces observed derived from the broader Afri-
can historic past in all of its diversity. First, and contrary to the weaken-
ing of the pre-existent African states that is often portrayed by analysts, 
the ‘pre-colonial social entities possessed specific features defined by 
ecological, historical, economic, cultural and symbolic factors’ that sur-
vived over time (Chazan 1986: 148). As far back as the 1920s and the 
1940s African and Nigerian leaders were already being nominated and 
elected into legislative and executive councils. The historic context offers 
insight into the role played by the evolving, punctuated and eventually 
‘transformed’ African socio-economic and political systems. Between the 
fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, the changing nature of trade relations 
between Africans, the Arab world and Europe occupied the central stage 
of international relations.  
The most visible pre-colonial social forces to emerge were traditional 
rulers and traders. They were instrumental in frustrating or legitimating 
contacts with outsiders, particularly Europeans, during the initial years of 
commerce in forest and agricultural products (1472–1562) and in the 
evolving periods of slave trade (1562–1830) and legitimate trade in as-
sorted goods (1830–1900) (Falola et al. 1991/2003). Falola et al. (ibid.) 
recount that tribal chiefs, kings and emirs were lured (mostly with gifts), 
bribed, co-opted or coerced into making commercial and cultural trea-
ties, joining the new elite bandwagon of change and providing support 
for what seemed to be an intractable alien thrust. Hardy traders from the 
declining structures of Africa’s vast empires acted as royal agents to 
kings and later as intermediaries or allies to the external agents, eventu-
ally yielding ground to these agents.3 
When the British government revoked the charter (on 1 January 
1900) of a major British trading company in Nigeria, The Royal Niger 
Trading Company, a shift in social structure and relationships occurred 
that was to have profound impact on the fortunes of the colonial politi-
cal system. An indigenous educated elite emerged either from the expan-
sionary missionary schools and colonially sponsored institutions or 
through self-propelled initiatives mostly abroad. An inextricable link then 
developed between trade and education, with the latter considered a key 
instrument for promoting structural changes. Referring to David Kimble 
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and James Coleman’s earlier works, Post (1970) asserts that the proceeds 
from ‘trade or agriculture’ were pivotal in financing schooling (p. 36).  
Economic surpluses contributed to enhance education and strengthen 
the local elite structure. Apart from the consolidating merchant class, 
highly skilled professional groups such as doctors, lawyers, journalists 
and engineers began to emerge, idealize and construct change (Obi 
2004). Hence, the argument that has been sustained over time is that, 
outside of its initial low-key and restricted spread, colonial education 
sowed the seed for a differentiated elite-masses relationship and antago-
nistic view of external domination. Elite forerunners not only pressed 
colonial rulers for improved political and social positions, they also called 
for colonial retreat. Moreover, tripartite but confrontational power rela-
tions arose between the colonial administrators, the traditional chiefs and 
the local educated elite including the merchant class (see Kilson 1970, 
Crowder 1970). The educated elite became more vocal at the vanguard 
of the national liberation movement. They seized all available means, 
particularly the revolutionary print media, creating inspiring newspapers 
and nascent political parties endorsed by the Clifford Constitution, to air 
their views in favour of political freedom while reproving the use of 
chiefs for colonial purposes.  
Table 4.1 
Constitutional and Transitional Government Composition (1914-1960)  
Official Members Unofficial Members Constitu-
tion 
Governor Year Freq.
* (Yr) 
Ex-off** Nom.*** Total Elect-
ed 
Nom. Total 
Grand 
Total 
Lugard Lugard 1914 --  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Clifford Clifford 1922 08 --- --- 26 04 15 19 45 
Richard-
son 
Richard-
son 
1946 24 13  03 16 04 24 28 44 
Macpher-
son 
Macpher-
son 
1951 05 --- --- 06 --- --- 136 142 
Lyttleton Macpher-
son 
1953 02 03 01 -- -- -- 180 184 
Independ-
ence 
Robertson 1957-60 04-07  -- -- -- 312 -- -- 312 
Source: Compiled by the author from various colonial constitutions 
*Yearly Frequency **Ex-Officio Members *** Nominated Members 
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However, political socialization seems to have reinforced the capabili-
ties of the nascent elite. Gradually, the emergent Nigerian elite impelled 
actions towards social mobilization and integration of the social forces 
that produced new leadership structures and rudimentary pathways for 
state-building. Table 4.1 presents the timing of constitutional changes 
between 1914 and 1960. Although little constitutional change occurred 
before World War II, the far-reaching impacts of the war accelerated the 
pace of successive constitutional changes towards decolonization. Also, 
while the British were busy consolidating their conquered territories and 
later with war campaigns, anti-colonial waves were building up and unit-
ing to overcome colonial domination. 
War fortunes added to the emergence of a new elite structure. War 
veterans returned home to join forces with other elite militants for 
change. Another sub-elite group emerged among colonial clerks and fac-
tory workers. Though they lacked high educational qualifications, their 
conversance with administrative procedures made them insider-
informants and emergent indigenous bureaucrats. The rest of the popu-
lation formed the masses that, aside from episodic revolts, remained 
generally acquiescent and subject to manipulation. It was against this 
backdrop of events – marked by contradictions, agitation, global accords 
and disaccords – that change by political liberation became feasible.  
The period of decolonization (0DC: 1946–1960) had continuing rele-
vance. It not only delimited the nature of the changes to come, but it 
also provided the social and economic background for future regimes. 
Between 1920 and the outbreak of World War II, embryonic trade and 
ethnic unions were formed (Falola et al. 1991/2003: 80–81). At this time, 
the economic geography and colonial divisions of Nigerian society were 
already a juxtaposing force vis-à-vis the social stratification that was con-
sidered historically important for democratic and capitalist development. 
The Richardson Constitution of 1946 became the pivot for a bottom-up 
pattern of representation based on the Native Authority (NA) system 
and regional councils. Its essence was incorporation of all of the prov-
inces in a central legislative body, meaning inclusion of the Northern 
provinces in the larger legislative body.  
From this point onwards, three regions (North, East and West) be-
came the political axes of a lukewarm federal system with Lagos on the 
west coast serving as the seat of the National Assembly (Mackintosh 
1966). The Richardson Constitution was eventually rejected by the emer-
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gent nationalist leaders. No Nigerian stakeholder (not even the budding 
national elite) was consulted, and discretionary powers continued with 
the colonial governor general in Lagos. A broad-based protest was or-
ganized by the first widely acclaimed political party, founded in 1944, the 
National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC), and led by Dr 
Nnamdi Azikiwe who had just returned from overseas studies. Although 
the protest reached the heart of the colonial power in London, it did not 
yield the expected outcome. However, it was a milestone as the first ma-
jor organized opposition which synergized collective values in the emer-
gent state of Nigeria. So, while the Richardson Constitution was inter-
nally discredited, its basic tenets triggered the liberating forces that 
stirred large-scale mobilization and institutional changes.  
The 1951 Macpherson Constitution merely reiterated the past consti-
tutional changes. It endorsed the bicameral legislatures for the North and 
West and a single chamber for the East with legislative power over cer-
tain matters. The central legislature could propose as well as debate, vote 
and veto all bills subject to the governor’s approval. Likewise, a central 
executive council was made responsible for conducting government af-
fairs through the formulation and supervision of policies. It could, for 
whatever reason, hold any bill and was presided over by the governor. 
With this, the early 1950s witnessed the first indigenous formation of the 
federal executive council (the cabinet) under the supervision of the gov-
ernor general.  
The 1953 Lyttleton Constitution came into force in October 1954. It 
formally established the ‘Nigeria federation of three regions composed 
of North, East and West’ (Blitz 1965: 5). Furthermore, this constitution 
raised the national representation from 136 to 184 seats and retained the 
Council of Ministers (which had existed since Macpherson), providing 
for the appointment of council members from the composite of elected 
federal members but not without the advice of regional executives. The 
position of regional governor was also created. Regional governors could 
appoint the regional premier from the leadership of the political party 
with the majority of the seats in the Regional Assembly. Advised by the 
premier, the governor appointed the regional ministers. The constitution 
finally provided for the ‘exclusive’ and ‘concurrent’ lists,4 decentralized 
regionalized revenue formula and measures to secure an independent 
judiciary and civil service.  
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The London Conferences of 1957, 1958 and 1960 were so decisive 
that they culminated in the Independence Constitution and political 
freedom in 1960. However, the issue of minority rights was deferred, 
despite agitation for boundary adjustments that would widen the political 
participation of smaller social groups in Nigeria. The Wellinck Commis-
sion, set up in 1957, advised on this matter, which was concluded with a 
constitutional note that such requests could be reconsidered in future 
where necessary. The interests of these groups were thus literally con-
signed to a constitutional footnote (Osaghae 1998). In practice, the initial 
mishandling of the legitimate demands of minority groups undercut their 
powers and rendered their interests contingent on the tri-regional major-
ity groups.  
Certain Nigerian political analysts attribute the lapses in the tri-
regional framing of decolonization to the British and Nigerian emergent 
elite (Oyinbo 1971, Tamuno et al. 1998/2003). The framework is re-
ported as containing the belief that minority interests would be secured 
through the integrative forces of the ‘majority ethnic leadership’ under 
the ‘federal structure’ (Graf 1988: 38). To some extent, those who con-
ceded independence were short-sighted, and doubts continue to be 
raised about the strength and honesty of purpose of the British in de-
volving caretaker powers to the three majority ethnic groups amongst 
the more than 200 in Nigeria (see Cohen 1972, Joseph 1999).  
The majority ethnic groups’ leaders actually capitalized on the nu-
meric forces of their ethnic groups to dilute the pressures exercised by 
the minority ethnic groups while using the strength of their majority to 
ascend to positions of national power.5 Perhaps, no other analyst depicts 
this historic passage and enduring legacy as well as Nnoli (1995) who 
decried the feeble capacities of the monolithic and tripartite forces of 
change based either on northern might or the majority power trinity of 
the combined northern, western and eastern regional blocs. It is unimag-
inable from the inception of decisive constitutional changes that minor-
ity interests would not be systematically overruled or marginalized with-
out constitutionally entrenched guarantees.  
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4.3 Post-Colonial Political Regimes  
4.3.1 Travails of Parliamentary Democracy (1CR: 1960–1966)  
Despite British tutorship, the decolonization constitutions of Nigeria 
appear to have been broadly set along the liberal state ethos of open 
competition and inclusiveness guaranteed through rights to freedom and 
political equality. A bold attempt to do away with the vestiges of the co-
lonial heritage brought the free choice capacity of the pioneer Nigerian 
leaders into the spotlight. A constitutional reform enacted on 1 October 
1963 proscribed certain portions of the independence constitution, re-
placing them with republican tenets. This change was specifically in-
tended to eliminate the inconsistent and undesired aspects of the British 
legacy and bring government nearer to the people (Dudley 1982).  
The constitution enshrined a mixed presidential-parliamentary system 
of government. This constitutional reform eliminated the office of the 
governor general to accommodate the powers and roles of a president.6 
Aside from ceremonial functions, the president was given the power to 
endorse bills before they become law, and the position’s tenure was ex-
tended to five years. Also, the prime minister was no longer subject to 
the whims and caprices of the monarch or governor general and could 
be removed only with a vote of no confidence by the parliament. The 
Privy Council hierarchy under Her Majesty was also abolished by the re-
publican constitution.7 
The constitutional reform of 1963 also eradicated the Judicial Service 
Commission and conferred the president power to appoint Supreme 
Court judges but not without the advice of the prime minister. Other 
revisions included the following: empowerment of the Supreme Court to 
declare any law unconstitutional if it was found to be inconsistent with 
constitutional precepts; procedures for creating new states, adjusting 
boundaries and amending the constitution; institution of revenue alloca-
tion formula based on need, national interest and balanced development.  
The reforms instituted with the republican constitution offered the 
best opportunity since colonial rule to test the aptitudes and adaptabil-
ities of the national political leaders. The changes placed emphasis on 
political power and role restructuring, adaptation of tasks to environ-
mental changes and leadership response capacity. Such capacity was to 
manifest not only in constitution-making and review exercises, but also 
in the steadfast guidance of societal development vis-à-vis elite actions. 
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Initially, the political elite seemed to manage state affairs considerably 
well, until things began to fall apart. 
To fully appreciate the political inertia that followed the post-
independence parliamentary democratic constitution with its eventual 
debacle, it is necessary to recall the normative nature and implications of 
the federal system as it was (and continues to be) applied in Nigeria. In 
principle, a major aspect of federalism is the equal representation of the 
federated regions to enable harmony by disabling dysfunctional political 
disputes that could arise from sharply skewed power relations or over-
ambitious power struggles (Wheare 1963, Amuwo 1998/2003). Critics 
blame the disruptions in the Nigerian political structure on the unstable 
grounds on which the foundations of federalism were laid after colonial 
rule. The extent to which this is true remains a source of debate and 
analysis to this day (see Amuwo et al. 1998/2003).  
Recall that the groundwork for federalism in Nigeria was laid in 1946 
by the Richardson Constitution, which created three regions (East, 
North and West) with Lagos as the confluence centre. By 1954, federal-
ism had been officially inaugurated. Paradoxically, regional structures 
with large ethnic populations became a major power resource. As more 
than half of the total population was registered in the North, that region 
seized a power advantage over the combined East and West.8 Such pow-
er has been variously applied, but not without opposition. Social up-
heaval and political crises culminated, in the first instance, in the demise 
of the First Republic.  
It has been observed that British decolonization policy devolved po-
litical power to the North by institutionalizing regionalism as the basis of 
power distribution in the National Assembly. Cohen (1972) highlighted 
the incompatible form of this distribution by referring to the weak asso-
ciation between ‘Northern legislative seats in the parliament’ and wom-
en’s disenfranchisement (pp. 246–247). The dynamics of the events 
spanning the 1946 Richardson Constitution to the fall of the First Re-
public show the centrifugal tendencies of political power based on the 
so-called federalism. It also reveals the skewed regional power distribu-
tion in favour of the northern power bloc, with its actors infiltrated in 
the central legislative and executive structure.  
Apparently, numeric strength, as depicted in Table 4.2, played a role 
in the North’s outmatching the other federated powers and slanting the 
balance of power in the central government. Under the Richardson Con-
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stitution, the North as a single bloc was endowed with a bicameral sys-
tem, while the East and West remained unicameral. Also the northern 
representation to the central government was disproportionately in-
creased in relation to and at the expense of the other regions, both indi-
vidually and jointly. Table 4.2 clearly shows this disparity. While northern 
representation rose from 45% in 1946 to 56% in 1960, those of the West 
and East diminished from 30% to 20%, and 25% to 24%, respectively. 
The point is that this numerically asymmetric and paradoxical power re-
lation persisted from the very inception of federalism in 1954 without 
being corrected. 
Table 4.2 
Regional Participation at the Central Legislative Assembly (1946-1960)  
Regional Distribution  
(t = participation, p = population, millions) 
Consti-
tution 
Year Offi-
cial 
Cam-
eroon 
Lagos 
North %(t) %(p) West %(t) %(p) East %(t) %(p) 
Richards  1946 17 03 01 09 45 -- 6 30 -- 5 25 -- 
Macph 1951 06 -- -- 68 50 -- 34 25 -- 34 25 -- 
Lyttleton  1954 01 -- -- 92 52 53 42 24 19 42 24 19 
Independ 1960 -- -- 03 174 56 53 62 20 23 73 23 19 
Source: Compiled by author from the 1946, 1951, 1954 and 1960 constitutions and the 1943 and 1952 censuses  
 
 
The Nigerian polity shows more contradictions, especially regarding 
the regional distribution and application of political development re-
sources. It is curious, for instance, that the northerners are said to be 
more backwards in terms of western education than the southerners 
(East and West), but the region has nonetheless been more politically 
effective, at least, in articulating its preferences under Nigeria’s federal-
ism. Besides the visible population bias, unity, in terms of the capacity to 
agree without excruciating discrepancies, and, most pertinently, an inte-
grative religious faith and unbroken traditional hierarchy with a particular 
interest in leadership, are additional sources of northern power and dom-
inance in the larger framework of the Nigerian polity (see Whitetaker, Jr. 
1970, see also Dudley 1982). It is no less intriguing that the North has 
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since colonial rule held on to executive power and role leadership with-
out significant challenge from the southern majority and minority blocs. 
Similar strains can be observed in the executive power sphere, par-
ticularly through the organization and activities of political parties and 
their leadership. Starting with the first general elections in 1951, an eth-
nic voting pattern emerged. Although a multiparty system was intro-
duced at the end of decolonization, both party membership and voting 
patterns quickly became circumscribed by ethnic, regional and religious 
alignments. Consequently, the results of the 1959 independence elections 
merely confirmed the ethnic pattern of vote-casting that had emerged in 
the first elections. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) won the 1959 
elections with 134 seats.  
The party (NPC) actually adopted the slogan ‘One North, One Peo-
ple’ (Dudley 1982). This motto reflected the restricted party member-
ship, being open only to people of northern Nigerian descent. Outside 
religion, the exclusive membership of the Native Authority (NA) system 
provided the bulk of the party’s formation (Sklar 1963, Dudley 1982). 
Combined with communal values, an internally consistent political struc-
ture provided the basis for homogeneity and hegemony. The period be-
tween 1960 and 1966 was marked by decisive processes and outcomes 
that led to the fall of the First Republic. Unexpected outcomes, however, 
actually stirred subsequent events. The fierce struggle for political power 
and dominance at the regional and national government level plus the 
use of ethnicity and patronage exposed the differences and similarities 
between political actors based on their typical channels of socialization.  
Put differently, access to state power and distribution of resources 
through patronage exchanges (re)emerged in the post-colonial period to 
limit power relations. Opposition parties and their leadership were treat-
ed with less tolerance than would be expected in a democratic system. 
Nwabueze (1973) noted the ‘systematic act of repression’ that was ap-
plied to the Action Group (AG) party in the opposition front (p. 154). 
Indeed, it not only served to demoralize the opposition but also led to 
large-scale defection, which became known as ‘carpet crossing’ of AG 
members to the Northern People’s Congress and the National Council 
of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) at the federal level. Out of 75 elected 
members of the AG in 1959 only 13 die-hard (ibid.) affiliates remained in 
1963, that is, before the ill-fated 1964 elections.  
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The prime minister eventually withdrew official recognition of oppo-
sition with the justification that ‘a handful of thirteen members could not 
be expected to provide an alternative government’ (Nwabueze 1973: 
154–155, Agi 1986: 19). On 20 July 1963, a motion appeared in parlia-
ment to amend the constitution and enable the preventive detention of 
persons suspected of subversive activities. It took the concerted efforts 
of the press, the Nigerian Bar Association and opposition parties to re-
verse the proposal, but the real intent was not stifled as tension between 
power centralization and decentralization continued (Mackintosch 1966, 
Nwabueze 1973, Dudley 1982). The wilful suppression of opposition 
and political engineering towards a monolithic power structure, added to 
the weakening of the democratically elected government. Hence, the 
structure of the political system began gradually to move away from a 
multiparty setup to a one-party system during the First Republic.  
The recourse to blackmail, nepotism, patronage, electoral rigging and 
political hooliganism evidenced the heightened level of intolerance to 
political opposition. Violent conflicts broke out in different regions be-
tween supporters of the various political parties and their leadership. The 
1962 western region conflicts and confusions triggered others that led to 
the wretched 1964 and 1965 elections at both regional and national lev-
els. These two elections held by the regional and federal governments 
were supposed to produce an uninterrupted change to the second post-
colonial mandate of the First Republic. However, they became the kernel 
of impasse, linked to the loopholes of the colonial institution which the 
1963 republican constitutional reform had ironically sought to correct.  
The reform eliminated the Privy Council, which the Nigerian elite 
considered an undesired inheritance from the English monarch, with its 
governor-general position occupied by an upper political class represen-
tative of the British colonialists. Replacement of the governor-general’s 
office with an indigenous president was intended to afford greater lead-
ership autonomy and confidence to Nigerian leadership than obtainable 
under the previous situation. Broadly speaking, these important institu-
tional changes sought the extension of real sovereignty to the people 
through an autonomous parliament.  
On 15 January 1966, the military intervened in government affairs 
under the allegation of improbity and irresponsibility of civilian politi-
cians. All hope for consolidating the democratic political system disap-
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peared under the various institutional and leadership atrophies that gave 
rise to military rule. 
4.3.2 The Advent of Military Rule (1MR: 1966–1979)  
Nigeria’s initial experience with military rule lasted 13 years (1966–1979). 
It took off with a sternly worded broadcast by the 15 January 1966 coup 
plotters who denounced the lack of moral integrity of civilian rule in Ni-
geria and declared its political institutions null and void with immediate 
effect. Fortune, however, brought General Aguiyi Ironsi to the forefront 
of political power as the first military head of state after he foiled the 15 
January 1966 coup. Through various authoritarian acts he abolished po-
litical parties, interest groups and the institution of parliament, as they 
were perceived able to easily mobilize opposition against the military re-
gime (Dudley 1982). In their place, a military political hierarchy was es-
tablished under the control of a military junta codenamed the Supreme 
Military Council (SMC). This appellation was either repeated or varied 
according to the choice and contextual necessities of subsequent military 
regimes.  
The junta was responsible for all major decisions related to agenda 
control and policy initiatives. Indeed, it combined the role of the execu-
tive and legislative powers, while the bureaucracy and judiciary were 
subordinated to the whims of the military actors and the governance re-
gime, itself driven by decrees, coercion and manipulations. Another 
structural characteristic of the military regimes, starting from the earliest 
one, was the blend of military and civilian personnel. In the case of Iron-
si, both military and civilian advisers were integrated into the highest 
echelon of government.  
Perhaps wrong counsel and timing (precipitated actions) plus lack of 
vision about the intricacy of the unfolding context and insufficient po-
litical tact about the right policy measure at the right time led to the 
abrupt collapse of Aguiyi Ironsi’s government through a countercoup 
organized by another set of young military officers on 29 July 1966. Yet, 
the structural changes introduced by Ironsi in that short period had last-
ing significance. He publicly and unilaterally announced, on 24 May 
1966, through Unification Decree No 34 of 1966, the creation of a uni-
tary system of government. The unitary design was aimed to transform 
the ‘four regions into mere political units’ to be tagged ‘provinces’ and 
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establish ‘a unified Civil Service Commission’ under the ban placed on 
‘political and tribal organizations’ (Graf 1988: 42).  
This forceful unification move was perceived, particularly by the 
northern military elites, as an ethnic plot by southerners, especially those 
of eastern Igbo origin, to dominate the federal power structure and put 
Ironsi at the helm of national government affairs (Muhammadu and Ha-
runa 1979). As the power struggle since colonial rule had centred on who 
accesses state power and controls the distribution of its resources, there 
was little wonder that the Nigerian elite leaders perceived (wrongly or 
rightly) the Igbo move as a systematic attempt to exclude the North 
from federal offices. Ironsi’s action, however, left the political develop-
ment of Nigeria with an enduring paradox. A Nigerian political analyst 
observed that, though subsequent governments overturned the action 
towards a unitary system, power centralization became ‘the cornerstone 
of all military government in practice’ (Nwaolise 2005: 119). Nwaolise 
(ibid.) stressed that the very ‘practices and attitudes’, such as the centrali-
zation of resource control and the weak autonomy accorded the federal 
states of Nigeria, were transplanted into federalism with the consequent 
erosion of its operating principles.  
Also, a particular pattern of ascent to political offices by military per-
sonnel began to take shape and develop gradually following the first two 
military coups. The northern military elite hierarchy, dominated by the 
Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, launched an attack against the coup plotters 
of 15 January 1966, mainly of Igbo extraction. The immediate interest 
appeared more the ‘rebalancing [of] Northern power’ (Muhammadu and 
Haruna 1979: 25–30) than overcoming colonial legacies and ethnic pow-
er imbalance at the national government level. The group of northern 
countercoup plotters emerged as the new power brokers from within the 
military hierarchy.  
The 31-year-old army chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel (later Gen-
eral) Yakubu Gowon, was installed as the new head of state and gov-
ernment. Though a northerner, he hailed not from the powerful Hausa-
Fulani kingmaking caucus and geopolitical zone but from the minority 
Middle Belt of the Jos Plateau dominated by the warrior-like Tiv ethnic 
group. In all, he was accepted by northerners and well liked by fellow 
officers from the Middle Belt. However, with the summary killings of the 
Igbos and the sudden elevation of Gowon to head of state, secession 
loomed within the eastern power bloc. After all negotiations failed be-
 Nigerian Political Systems and Phases since Independence 79 
tween Gowon as Nigeria’s supreme leader and the eastern region’s mili-
tary governor, Chukwuemeka Odimegwu Ojukwu, war broke out be-
tween Biafra and Nigeria in 1967.  
A notable political aspect of Gowon’s administration was the unful-
filled pledge to return Nigeria to democratic rule. Despite the constraints 
posed by the distractions and management of the internal war, and acting 
in concert with the Supreme Military Council and state governors, Gow-
on is remembered as the first military leader to display fervent greed and 
ostentation amid the revolutionary sale of crude oil (see Joseph 1987, 
Nwaolise 1995). Oil revenue rose steadily to outstrip and replace agricul-
tural cash crops as the main source of government revenue during the 
1970s. His nine-point programme to return Nigeria to civil rule was 
transformed instead into a political joke as oil sales exceeded expecta-
tions, while the economic situation deteriorated under the corrupt mili-
tary governors who never heeded calls to liberalize the polity.  
However, Gowon’s government contributed to certain structural 
changes in the Nigerian polity. The four regional divisions (North, East, 
West and Mid-West) were elevated to twelve (12) states in 1967, more 
out of war exigencies than a long-standing popular yearning for local au-
tonomy through boundary adjustments (Nwaolise 1995). Gowon rein-
stated the Federal Executive Council (FEC), under the so-called ‘diarchy’ 
or fusion (see Akinola 2003) of civilian and military personnel appointed 
to the topmost federal executive portfolios. These commissioners, later 
designated ministers, were the only aspect that distanced his regime’s 
structure from Ironsi’s, which was purely a military outfit. A superstruc-
ture of permanent secretaries and political advisers was also created and 
infused into the political system. The structural role of this mixed pattern 
of government was effectively to limit the undesired influence of military 
rule or simply to mask its authoritarian nature to render it less unaccept-
able to the people.  
It is noteworthy that Gowon ran the government for about nine 
months without the FEC and was only backed if not led by the super 
structure of permanent secretaries that advised on practically all political 
and even military matters (Dudley 1982, Osaghae 1999). But while the 
contributions of the secretaries structured the regime, they also rendered 
it monotonous and adverse to change through their incessant and un-
productive debates about the nature of the political system. The same 
superstructure of bureaucratic decision makers, mostly made up of 
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southern intellectual elite, was reported to have cost Gowon the support 
of the North, especially that of the region’s core cultural groups who be-
lieved the influence of the former to be ‘antithetical’ to northern interests 
(Dudley 1982: 98). Again, the unfounded fear of ethno-regional domi-
nance re-emerged with negative effects on the solidity of the political 
system.  
A decrepit economy, corruption, a central government incapable of 
disciplining wayward military governors, loss of faith in the highest ex-
ecutive leader, even by his very ‘constituency’ (the military), and most 
relevantly the lack of progress in the move to democracy combined to 
diminish the regime’s legitimacy. On 29 July 1975, General Yakubu 
Gowon was shut out of office in a bloodless coup while he was on offi-
cial mission abroad. The army officers who toppled Gowon were mainly 
of northern origin. They brought in Brigadier (later General) Muritala 
Ramat Mohammed as the new head of state, government leader and 
commander in chief of the armed forces of Nigeria. Like Gowon, Muri-
tala hailed from the North.  
The new regime adopted Ironsi’s structure of the SMC and FEC, 
which had also been deployed by Gowon, though with certain altera-
tions. Except on invitation, the structure excluded bureaucrats from the 
decision-making hierarchy, and all military governors were withdrawn 
from the SMC and integrated into the new Council of States, thereby 
creating an intermediary power structure between the SMC and FEC. 
The move was to clear the decision-making process of unnecessary in-
terventions by the bureaucrats, and ostensibly to depoliticize the bu-
reaucracy. Also, the intermediary role of the Council of States was de-
signed to reduce the heavy dependence of the SMC on the bureaucracy, 
which had grown very powerful during Gowon’s administration.  
Corrective institutional patterns were also fused into the system to 
discipline errant public servants, especially those that had been involved 
in corrupt practices during the past regime. However, the most impor-
tant step was taken through measures to return Nigeria to civilian rule. A 
constitution drafting committee was established and charged to prepare a 
legal framework to return Nigeria to civil rule and promote its consolida-
tion as a united and peaceful nation. Moreover, local governments were 
reorganized and the number of federated states was increased from 12 to 
19 in a bid to ensure grassroots participation in politics. In short, the 
Mohammed regime moved so swiftly that in the roughly seven months 
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from the end of July 1975 to 13 February 1976, when he was assassi-
nated in an attempted coup by one Lieutenant Colonel B.S. Dimka, he 
achieved what his immediate predecessor had been unable to accomplish 
under 13 years of military rule. However, the ultimate task of effective 
power transfer to civilian government was left to Muritala’s deputy, 
Colonel (later Major) Olusegun Obasanjo.  
Structural changes during the first military regime (1MR: 1966–1979) 
can be summed up as a disorderly amalgamation of centralization and 
decentralization. The period initiated the formal removal of regional 
powers accumulated since colonial rule and the centralization of political 
power at the federal level of government. This was achieved mostly by 
military fiat and neutralization of regional autonomies instituted since 
decolonization. Apart from the centralization of economic resource con-
trol in the federal government and parallel actions of decentralization 
through state creation, the period inaugurated diarchy as a fusionist pat-
tern of government. Although, the participation of bureaucrats varied, 
the period was marked by their growing influence and confusion with 
political roles. It therefore became difficult to discern the structurally 
autonomous role of bureaucrats from the contingent nature of policy-
making and supervision.  
More challenging however was the extent to which special interests 
meddled with bureaucratic and political functions. Dibie (2003), seeking 
to gain some perspective on the military-bureaucrat nexus, concluded 
that ‘the military elite use the public bureaucrat to help the former estab-
lish its legitimacy while the latter look after their own personal and insti-
tutional interests’ (p. 79). In all, the first period of military rule (1MR: 
1966–1979) with its variously composed governments deepened, 
through typical military styles of power wielding (decrees and power per-
sonalization), the structural changes instituted since colonial rule without 
clear impact on the social responsiveness of the political system.  
4.3.3 Changes Through the Presidential System (2CR: 1979–1983) 
The perceived weaknesses of the 1963 republican constitution coupled 
with the subsequent breakdown of the democratically elected govern-
ment (1966) gave rise to a series of military governments. These ended in 
1979 with the introduction of a presidential constitution and government 
system. It was believed within the elite ranks (Ademolokun 1985) that a 
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parliamentary system was not appropriate for the African Nigerian con-
text.9 Traditional patterns of leadership amid the country’s complex so-
cial structures were said to require the powers of an ‘executive president’ 
to harness the diverse groups and interests of Nigerians (Agi 1986: 13–
22, Adebayo 1986/2004: 63–72, Dumoye 2003: 41–55).10 
Consequently, the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) was set 
up on 18 October 1975. Despite the gruesome leadership tussle that led 
to the sudden death of the transitional head of government, Brigadier 
Muritala Mohammed, the CDC eventually submitted its publicly debated 
report to the successor government leadership on 29 August 1979, after 
the ban on political activities was lifted in 1978. The constitution came 
into effect on 1 October 1979, instituting major changes. Unlike under 
the earlier parliamentary system, the new constitution merged the offices 
of the head of state, head of government and commander in chief of the 
armed forces into the presidency. In principle, this meant that the presi-
dent’s authority and that of the subordinate vice president and ministers 
would stem from direct and popular election by the people.  
Apart from the implicit incorporation of popular consent through 
presidential elections and the explicit infusion of the ‘Federal Character’ 
principle in processes of ministerial appointment, the constitution em-
phasised prior scrutiny and confirmation of ministers by the Senate. The 
‘Federal Character’ principle was a historic political invention. Not only 
was it entrenched as a political institution in the constitution but beyond 
its original aim of insuring ‘equity’ and ‘national integration’ (Utume 
1998/2003: 201–210) it increasingly became a political instrument for 
accessing positions of power in the public service (Agbodike 1989/2003: 
177–190). Moreover, as it was not binding on the president to appoint 
only party members into the cabinet, it emerged, at least in principle, as a 
tool for engendering political stability.  
Similarly, the president was empowered to appoint the chief justice of 
the federation limited only by senatorial sanctions. The appointment of 
other Supreme Court justices was also made the prerogative of the presi-
dent, though with senatorial approval required and contingent on the 
advice of the Judicial Service Commission. The 1979 constitution pro-
vided for the creation of a new capital at Abuja and allocated ownership 
and control of the centrally located land to the Federal Government of 
Nigeria (FGN). Measures were established in the constitution to de-
tribalize and de-regionalize political ideas and practices by expanding the 
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range of action and control of political parties over national territory and 
stimulating ‘Federal Character’. Senate membership was fixed at five rep-
resentatives from each state, but the House of Representatives became 
population based (to shore up ethnic integration).  
Moreover, it became obligatory for political parties seeking control 
over government machinery to locate offices in at least two-thirds of all 
the states in the federation. Political parties were not allowed to bear 
emblems (or mottos) with ethnic or tribal reminders or operate by re-
stricting activities to a particular geographical location. Location of head 
offices in the federal capital was made mandatory for all political parties. 
Notably, the 1979 constitution bestowed far-reaching executive powers 
on the president. It clearly stated that such powers ‘shall extend to the 
execution and maintenance of the Constitution, all laws made by the Na-
tional Assembly and all matters with respect to which the National As-
sembly has power to make laws’ (1979 Federal Constitution).11 Apart 
from the faculty to appoint federal ministers and Supreme Court judges, 
presidential prerogatives included the appointment and removal of 
chairpersons and members of key federal commissions and councils, like 
the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) and the National Eco-
nomic Council (NEC), special advisers, directors of government compa-
nies and extension of the prerogative to grant mercy to persons con-
victed of offences even within the military cadre. 
The president was also to exercise significant control over public fi-
nance through the formulation and execution of the decennial National 
Development Plan (NDP) coupled with the preparation and public pres-
entation of yearly budgets (1979 Federal Constitution). In practice, Nige-
ria’s first experiment with a presidential system turned out to be an an-
tithesis of the constitutional treatise to guarantee a less personalized 
pattern of government, or rather a more democratic form of accessing 
and retaining political power and roles. Ademolokun (1985) was critical 
of the contradictions contained in the constitution of 1979. He pointed 
out the constitution’s ‘fundamental contradictions and conflicts between 
the provisions of consensus such as Federal Character and competitive 
features of political and economic institutions and processes in the form 
of multiparty and mixed economic system’ (pp. 19–32).  
Political institutions and powers were abused through such antitheti-
cal means as ethnic politics, patronage, corruption and diversion of na-
tional priorities. About 50 political parties manifested interest in the 1979 
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elections though only five of these were registered. At the federal level, 
the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) had to manage elections 
for 95 senatorial districts (five from each of the nineteen federated 
states) and the 449 constituencies that made up the House of Represen-
tatives (see 1979 Federal Constitution). 
The National Party of Nigeria, reported as the largest, registered a 
landslide victory not necessarily due to its size and the concentrated na-
ture of its membership (in political, business and bureaucratic groups) 
but rather owing to its geographic spread and zoning strategy. Analysts 
commented that the party had apparently assumed a ‘truly national’ char-
acter (Falola et al. 1991/2003) by exhibiting the cross-cutting type of 
membership and representation that Nigerians had been yearning for 
beyond constitutional stipulations and ethnic divides. Moreover, it 
adopted an informal zoning pattern of candidacy for its topmost political 
offices. Its presidential candidate was from the North, with a running 
mate from the East. Its candidate for speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives was from the West and that for senatorial president represented 
the southern minorities of Bendel, Rivers and Cross Rivers. However, 
the other political parties were unable nationally to make any significant 
advance.  
Despite the preparations of FEDECO, ‘irregularities’ were observed, 
such as late arrival of ballot boxes; incomplete or erroneous voters’ lists; 
absence, disappearance or late appearance of polling officers; and elec-
toral rigging with the use of thugs. Some analysts believe that such mal-
practices were not as serious as in past elections in terms of both preva-
lence and their impacts on democratic leadership (Falola et al. 
1991/2003: 157–170). Ojo (1981) added that the expansion of the feder-
ated states from twelve to nineteen, promulgated by the previous military 
regime in 1976, seemed to have improved the autonomy of the minority 
groups, most of which now participated in their separate states. None-
theless, the ethnic voting pattern continued and, as the analyst noted, 
even increased (ibid.: 48). Ultimately, Alhaji Shehu Shagari from the 
North was made the first executive president of Nigeria under the new 
democratic governance arrangements.  
The NPN-led government presided over by Shagari overstretched 
both the formal and informal boundaries of the presidential system 
modelled after the United States of America’s democratic constitution. 
Initially, the informal zoning system and party alliances, coupled with the 
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formalized ‘Federal Character’ principle, which drew from the notion of 
consociational democracy, seems to have worked as expected. Party alli-
ances were similar to but looked more vigorous than those of the First 
Republic. Informal network strategies appeared to have been necessi-
tated by the lack of majority seats for the victorious NPN in the bicam-
eral legislature. The party coalition that emerged between the victorious 
NPN and the NPP political parties reinforced intra-party competition 
throughout Shagari’s first 20 months in office.  
The coalition later broke down mainly because, like the First Repub-
lic, it was based on group convenience and not truly on national interest 
and character. Williams (1999) observed, ‘[T]he formal accord with Dr. 
Nnamdi Azikiwe’s NPP gave the Igbo party a share of key offices and 
promises of favoritism in the allocation of federal projects and in ex-
change for cooperation’ (p. 104). Judging from the lack of solid organiza-
tion and proposals of the other political parties, which understandably 
retreated to the opposition, problems sometimes resonated in political 
bitterness and envy driven by avarice. In the process, altercations and 
mutual distrust and destruction led to the interruption of the alliance and 
hindrance of good democratic governance.  
Ultimately, political praxis became hinged on convenience rather than 
institutional coherence. The ruling parties simply extrapolated from con-
stitutional provisions or they enlarged roles to please sectional instead of 
national interests. Political crafting through alliances, contestation of po-
litical offices and decision-making processes involving inter alia reform 
pacts lost their usual dynamics (driving forces) to patronage exchanges 
and casuistic agreements that were broken at the slightest difficulty. The 
much-touted Shagari government was transformed into a shadow of the 
structural arrangements that preceded its inauguration. State structure 
became bloated under superfluous demands overtly based on ethnic 
leadership patterns and self-serving interests.  
High and mid-level public offices were created to absorb the teaming 
party supporters and cohorts of the government who pledged to conduct 
affairs with the fairness reminiscent of the Federal Character and democ-
ratic principles. Patronage by selective awards of overestimated public 
contracts became the basis for garnering support and nurturing the rul-
ing party. The party itself was swiftly transformed into a perverted block 
of parvenus and dubious aristocrats. Bribery, corruption and burning of 
public buildings to veil fraudulent acts were all displays of the fervent 
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greed of elite leaders cut across the various levels of the state machin-
ery.12 
The relationship with the National Assembly also reflected the greedy 
outlook of government formation. Assembly debates became awash with 
bitterness over political, bureaucratic and technocratic distribution of 
ministerial appointments, which most members considered to be skewed 
in favour of a particular ethnic group. According to Williams; ‘[This] 
controversy paralyzed subsequent proceedings in the National Assembly 
charged with monitoring the selection of federal appointments and en-
suring compliance in resource allocation’ (Williams 1999: 104). In all, the 
state became captured, bloated and too expensive to run.  
Nonetheless, the incumbent won the second national elections, and 
Shagari was returned to the presidency on 1 October 1983, with an 
overwhelming majority – greater than the 1979 outcome. On 31 Decem-
ber 1983, just three months after Shagari was sworn in for the second 
mandate, he was removed from office by a bloodless military coup. Wor-
thy of note but often missed by commentators is that Shagari’s regime 
received the highest ratings for freedom and political equality from the 
Freedom in the World ranking during the period between 1979 and 
1983. Perhaps, this ranking reflects more the institutional inventiveness 
for supporting the political system than the political attitudes and behav-
iour that actually characterized the Shagari led and NPN controlled so-
called democratic government 
4.3.4 Intensified Military Dictatorship (2MR: 1984–1999)  
The unilateral interruption of the 1979 Second Republic constitution (by 
military fiat) opened the way for another succession of military rulers 
that lasted up to July 1999. With a similar pattern but differing styles of 
authoritarian rule, various military regimes either promised or engaged in 
constitutional reforms to re-establish democratic rule. Notable was the 
short-lived but harsh authoritarian regime of the famous duo of Major 
General Muhammed Buhari and Tunde Idiagbon (1983–1984). The Bu-
hari-Idiagbon government initiated and implemented the War Against 
Indiscipline (WAI), consisting of measures to correct perceived deficien-
cies in the political culture of the Nigerian society. 
Social attitudes towards political authority were perceived as perme-
ated by lawlessness, which operated to undermine social stability. A pop-
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ular saying in Nigeria that ‘in a lawless land all offenses are justified’ then 
became a policy issue for the regime. Stringent measures were adopted 
under various decrees, and tribunals were set up to try and jail transgres-
sors. However, the rashness inherent in the measures became unaccept-
able to important segments of society. The suppression of freedom of 
speech through, e.g. the jailing of foremost members of the Nigerian 
media alongside other human rights violations, led the public to distrust 
the real intentions of the government, which broke down in its first year 
of existence. Despite its shortcomings and from a historical perspective, 
most Nigerians recognize the short-lived Buhari-Idiagbon government as 
the one which, after that of Murtala Mohammed (1975), made the most 
significant and positive impact on the public mood and perception of the 
timely necessity of military rule.  
On 26 August 1985, Buhari’s government was overthrown by none 
other than his own Chief of Army, Major General Ibrahim Babaginda, 
who took on the title of president of the government. Under a blend of 
political shrewdness, charisma and Machiavellian style (with timely dos-
ages of soft and harsh policy measures) Babangida introduced the IMF 
loan conditions even after they were rejected through a ‘stage managed’ 
opinion poll (Ihonvbere 1998). The issue that lingered through social 
debate about Babangida’s government is not only the way he played into 
IMF policy exigencies, such as the notorious structural adjustment pro-
gramme (SAP), but also the ambiguities surrounding his attitudes to-
wards political power and policymaking. Some analysts fault him for 
mishandling the state fiscal crisis which originated from the early 1980s, 
thus pre-existing his government (Biersteker and Lewis 1997).13 
However, it was through political and bureaucratic institutional 
changes that Babangida’s government completely dashed public hopes 
for true democratic transition under open participation. In aspects re-
lated to political and office power restructuring, he was more consistent 
in planning and organizing the transition process. Babangida set up a po-
litical bureau to which he appointed individuals from a wide spectrum of 
society, whom he described as ‘men and women of ideas and experience’ 
(cf Olagunju et al. 1999). His thrust was seemingly to clear the transition 
pathways of diversionary pebbles. He created two political parties and 
personally named them the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and National 
Republican Congress (NRC).  
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Babangida wrote the political parties’ manifestoes and personally di-
rected politicians to enlist in specific parties. While a lot of public money 
was being spent building political offices in all the Local Government 
Area (LGA) headquarters, Babangida’s henchmen were busy brutally 
suppressing political opponents. However, things soon began to derail. 
Moreover, the fact that Babangida appeared to enjoy instead of de-
nounce these incidents placed serious doubts on his intentions. Many got 
rich quickly, while drug trafficking and money laundering thrived under 
the watchful and assenting eyes of the uppermost government leader. 
So-called political dissidents were thrown into jail and alleged coup plot-
ters were detained without trial, given a summary judgment of life im-
prisonment or coldly executed.14 
The government also embarked on bureaucratic reforms whose out-
comes ran counter to the expected transition to democracy. There was a 
politicization of bureaucrats with their transformation into opportunistic 
and dependent entities rather than engines for consistent change towards 
democracy. Babaginda replaced the ‘career permanent secretaries’ with 
the unstable offices of ‘directors general’ similar to the ministerial pat-
tern, as these officials could easily be manipulated through politically ori-
ented admissions and dismissals (Ademolokun 1997: 364–372). The 
presidential election was eventually held on 12 June 1993. Its outcome 
was a forgone conclusion that was followed by an astonishing twist in 
political fate supervised by the presidency. With an unsigned press re-
lease, Babangida annulled a widely acclaimed but now worthless presi-
dential election. On 23 June 1993, Babaginda announced his justifica-
tions for cancelling the election and promptly established an interim 
national government. He appointed a personal friend and business ty-
coon Chief E.A. Shonekan, to manage state affairs while he resigned. 
Shonekan’s government was declared illegal by a Lagos High Court in 
November 1993. Consequently, the opportunity emerged for General 
Sanni Abacha, the most senior after Babangida, to take over the helm of 
government affairs.  
 Abacha’s regime was marked by cumulative revolts, especially in La-
gos metropolis, other western states and more broadly in the South in-
cluding the old mid-western and eastern regions. The supporters of Abi-
ola, who hailed from the West and was believed to have won the 12 June 
1993 elections, openly protested against the cancellation of the electoral 
results. Abacha stepped in with military fury and crushed the rebellion 
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wherever it emerged. Government machinery, however, was not only set 
against socially unacceptable conduct, like uprisings, drug trafficking, 
wharf pilfering and airport touts (as these were seriously damaging the 
image of Nigeria and held back an influx of international investment), it 
was also employed against political opposition.  
Many freedom fighters and coup plotters were detained by state 
agents, and most died while in custody. Political parties were proscribed 
and their leaders were either summarily executed or had to flee the coun-
try. One case was the killing of Alfred Rewane, suspected of funding the 
activities of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) whose 
members were sympathetic to Abiola. NADECO was formed by a splin-
ter group from the SDP created by Babangida. This development set a 
clear pattern of pro- and anti-democratic groups in the Nigerian polity. 
Abacha’s relationship with the media, which he perceived as opposed to 
his government, was not cordial and productive. Indeed, he contained 
press freedom to the point that many newspaper houses were closed 
down and journalists were either jailed or publicly flogged for one al-
leged offence or another.  
Abacha appeared prepared to enact any measure and use the state 
machinery to perpetuate personal interests in office. He held Abiola in 
jail and imprisoned many notables such as Retired Major General Oluse-
gun Obasanjo and Major General Yar’adua, who eventually died in 
prison. His regime became the terror of the targeted groups. He exe-
cuted a renowned civil rights activist and group leader of the Ogoni – 
Ken Saro Wiwa – despite global protest. Here, a tussle over revenue al-
location escalated under the sweeping top-down political control with 
the outright use of state machinery to silence groups. The Niger Delta 
crisis remains to this day a symbol of the dysfunctional system based on 
the political ‘scramble’ for resources ‘achieved through lucky accident’ 
(Edylyne 2001, Douglas et al. 2003).15 
Abacha set up a constitutional conference whose major outcome, an-
nounced on 25 April 1995, was unclear about tenure – indeed, it con-
ferred the dictator the sole right to determine his government’s longev-
ity. But eventually, the issue of tenure would depend not on his will but 
on the course of nature. The most tyrannical and human rights flouting 
regime of post-colonial Nigeria came to an abrupt end on 8 June 1998, 
upon the death of its mentor. 
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On 9 June 1998, General Abdulsalam Abubakar ascended to the 
highest seat of government as Nigeria’s new head of state and com-
mander in chief of the armed forces. The new head was serene and 
committed to the transition process. If not thoroughly, he earnestly ac-
complished in roughly one year the task of democratic transformation 
that his immediate predecessor had selfishly ignored. Initially, he opened 
all entry points of participation needed to enhance a wider political con-
test. He granted amnesty to practically all the political detainees and 
those who voluntarily or involuntarily fled the country to avoid political 
persecution under the fury of the previous military leaders – these in-
cluded members of the now defunct NADECO.  
Government machinery was then launched against the perpetrators of 
state terror and those who had used it to accumulate wealth and power 
under the previous regimes. Many were traced and rounded up, and large 
sums of money that had been looted from the treasury were recovered. 
In all, the one-year transition regime officially set the election machinery 
in motion by replacing the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria 
(NECON) with the Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC). The five political parties and functional subsidiaries were dis-
solved; in their place emerged the Alliance for Democracy (AD), the All 
People’s Party (APP) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP).  
Though Abubakar’s role was significant to the transition process, un-
official reports allege that he and his cronies did not resist the temptation 
of plundering the state’s treasury themselves (Aderemi 2004/2005). Like 
the previous militarily arranged transitions, the ‘content’ rather than 
‘process’ of transition appeared more salient on the agenda. Crucial civil 
society inputs or advice were not adequately considered in the constitu-
tional negotiations and approval.16 In the national elections that followed 
those of the local government and federated states, Retired Major Gen-
eral Olusegun Obasanjo won the presidential contest on the PDP plat-
form. He was sworn in on 29 May 1999 as the second executive presi-
dent of a democratically elected government in Nigeria.  
Despite that post-colonial Nigeria had witnessed important structural 
changes, the second period of military rule (2MR: 1984–1999) initiated 
the most extensive structural changes to date, such as the structural ad-
justment programme that combined economic and political reforms dur-
ing the most prolonged government of the period, that of Babangida 
(1985–1993). Before the Babangida government, the military govern-
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ment of Buhari-Idiagbon (1984–1985) sought to deepen the economic 
austerity measures weakly initiated during Shagari’s (1979–1983) gov-
ernment. The duo also tried to introduce radical changes in social struc-
ture, especially value patterns, through the ‘War Against Indiscipline’ 
(WAI), which was supposedly aimed at moving society towards democ-
ratic rule. On the whole, the second period of military rule in Nigeria was 
an anathema to the expected changes in governance regime. Loathsome 
tyranny, sarcasm and selfishness were styles of rule that Nigerians least 
expected after the preceding changes and experiences of bad governance.  
4.3.5 Back to Democratic Rule (3CR: 1999–Present)  
The 1999 constitution, despite its manifest pluralist tone, became the 
inheritance of another military regime. Like the constitution of 1979, the 
relevant provisions of the 1999 document included the separation of 
powers, federalism, a bill of rights, a multiparty system and a secular 
state. Under the principle of the separation of powers, Part II, Article 4, 
Section 1 of the constitution vested legislative powers in the bicameral 
National Assembly composed of the House of Representatives and Sen-
ate. While the latter had 475 elected members based on each state’s pop-
ulation, the former had 108 elected members founded on a multiple of 
three members from each of the 36 states of the federation outside the 
federal capital of Abuja. Section 4, sub-section 2 of the constitution lim-
ited the powers and roles of the National Congress to making laws ‘for 
the peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part 
thereof with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative 
List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule of this Constitution’ (1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria).  
The constitution readopted the presidential system of government. 
The Federal Executive Council (or cabinet) was to be headed by an ex-
ecutive president and assisted by a vice president with an appointed body 
of ministers. According to Section 5, sub-section 1a and 1b of the consti-
tution, the executive powers of the federation ‘shall be vested in the 
President and may, subject to the provisions of any law made by the Na-
tional Assembly, be exercised by him [sic] either directly or through the 
Vice-President and Ministers of the Government of the Federation or 
Officers in the Public Service of the Federation’. The roles expressed in 
the powers of the executive, as clearly stated by the constitution, ‘shall 
extend to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, all laws 
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made by the National Assembly and to all matters with respect to which 
the National Assembly has, for the time being, power to make laws’ 
(1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria).  
Judicial powers were entrusted to federal high courts and supreme 
courts. Judges therein were endowed with autonomous powers to review 
both executive and legislative acts. The appointment of judges by the 
president was subject to confirmation of the legislatures, which were 
charged to ensure that any such appointment be in keeping with consti-
tutional provisions. The federal principle remained in the constitutional 
framework with the three-tier system of government (federal, state and 
local). The 36 states with 768 Local Government Areas (LGAs) and the 
Federal Capital Territory (FCT) made up the federation. Although the 
powers of each lower tier are clearly outlined in the constitution, none of 
the federated states had its own constitution as usually found in federal 
systems. However, the constitution did allow for the Independent Na-
tional Electoral Commission (INEC) charged to register political parties 
under a multiparty system.  
It also provided for a bill of rights which would guarantee a set of civ-
il and political liberties such as the right to life and dignity of the human 
person; personal liberty; fair hearing; private and family life; freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression and the press; 
peaceful assembly and association; freedom of movement; freedom from 
discrimination; and property rights. Certain fundamental objectives and 
directives were also established, to ensure a set of social, cultural and 
economic liberties such as the right to education. However, these were 
not made enforceable like the bill of rights. Ultimately, the constitution 
expressly disallowed the adoption of any religion as state religion; the 
formal constitutional position is for a secular state as opposed to a theo-
cratic one. 
The 1999 elections were conducted amid expectations that they 
would be a first major test of the consistency of the preceding constitu-
tional design. They were meant to demonstrate the adaptability of the 
Nigerian elite after some 40 years of political independence and various 
trials of democratic elections had ended in disrepute. However, the one-
year transition programme and its conduct by the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) were not without grave pitfalls. Wide-
spread electoral rigging and the active presence of political thugs featured 
in the unexpected outcomes that were nonetheless officially sanctioned. 
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The winning party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), had earlier 
adopted a zoning system that allotted the presidential ticket to a south-
westerner and vice presidential candidacy to a northerner (Dan-Musa 
2004: 67–72). In the end, a retired military officer from the south-west 
and former head of state during the 1975–1979 military regime, General 
Olusegun Obsanjo, was elected as the second civilian executive presi-
dent. Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, from the North and one-time officer of the 
uniformed Customs and Exercise Corps became the vice president.  
As was to be expected after the long oppressive and stressful years of 
authoritarian regimes (1984–1999), the advent of democracy in 1999 ex-
acerbated popular clamour for participation in government processes 
and outcomes (Ukiwo 2003). However, the expectation that democratic 
principles would prevail as an alternative to conflict resolution trans-
muted into violent outbreaks of group protests and responses by gov-
ernment agents. The so-called democratically elected leadership of Presi-
dent Obasanjo reacted with unmatched force against popular agitators.17 
What followed were outright violations of human rights through the de-
ployment of state machinery.  
Indeed, the initial crisis of participation that attended the Obasanjo 
regime was not limited to state-society spheres but also to intra-
institutional relationships at the state level. The conflicts between the 
executive and legislature appeared to take a historic turn. Sectional inter-
ests re-emerged as politics were construed to be a matter of resource 
struggle. The use of ethnic, religious and regional differences for political 
ends recurred in the post-1999 context. The centrality of the state’s role 
linked to resource allocation has been subject to a long list of formula 
since colonial rule. Wealth accumulation gained new force while corrup-
tion continued unabated. Accountability relapsed and a skewed social 
distribution of resources propelled organized groups to exert pressure 
against marginalization. The sources of conflict between the executive 
and legislative branch were traced mainly to resource allocation tussles 
(Dunmoye 2003: 47–52).18 
Institutional conflicts were pitched so high that the president was 
constantly threatened with impeachment by the legislature. Ironically, the 
former wittingly turned the scenario against the legislative body, which 
ended up with its speaker impeached over corrupt practices. In all, 
Obasanjo’s government seems to have chosen combating corruption as 
the main plank of government policy. An early government act included 
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the adoption in June 2000 of a bill authorizing an anti-corruption agency 
to investigate corruption charges against any Nigerian, including the 
president, the federated state governors and their deputies. The act gave 
force to the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Commission.  
The second mandate of the Third Republic began on 29 October 
2003 when Obasanjo was returned to office as executive president, head 
of state and commander in chief of the armed forces of Nigeria. None-
theless, the 2003 elections were not spared malpractices. Internal and 
external observers were unanimous on the unfairness of the competition 
and the selective nature of inclusion in the political process. Like the 
1999 elections and despite the multiparty system adopted, the PDP 
seemed practically alone in the struggle. Inclusion in political processes at 
the federal level, and for the presidency in particular, appeared decided at 
the party primaries. Exclusive political resources, like wealth, media, eth-
nic numbers and frequently force, were deployed in a fierce struggle to 
elect candidates whose victory at the polls would be secured more by 
physical coercion than by open competition and persuasion. 
The incumbent’s power and use of state machinery reinforced other 
political resources to guarantee electoral results while boosting party and 
personal interests. Obasanjo’s second mandate was a continuity of the 
previous. He grappled with political consolidation through economic 
reforms and intensification of the fight against corruption. Meanwhile, 
the problem of marginalization continued to plague economic activities 
in the Niger Delta area19 through protests and armed movements for the 
fair distribution of oil resources. The Niger Delta crisis exacerbated as its 
impacts spilled through the national economy, which was largely de-
pendent on oil production and sales in the international market.  
In short, the crisis further weakened government stability through in-
cessant hostilities coupled with destruction and disruption of oil produc-
tion and sales. Laws were enacted to redistribute resources through es-
tablishment of development agencies and percentage increases in 
statutory allocations to the federated states in the area. Nonetheless, cor-
ruption and mismanagement of funds worsened social discontent and 
aggravated depredatory actions against oil pipelines alongside forceful 
disruptions and kidnappings of foreign oil workers.  
Social insecurity spun out of control, threatening the economy and 
polity as Obasanjo handed over power to Shehu Musa Yar’Adua. Again, 
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and, perhaps different from the other occasions, this change in govern-
ment leadership put the current political system of Nigeria to an elastic 
test. Like the past elections, the result of the 2007 elections was fervently 
disputed in court, but once more it was systematically legitimated by the 
state. Yar’Adua’s election was just one in a historic succession of elec-
tions subjected to judicial dispute due to open allegations of electoral 
fraud and violence. But it was nonetheless major in that it kept the fate 
of the third mandate of the Third Republic hanging precariously in a 
court for a long and stressful period of judicial processes.  
Apart from the electoral imbroglio, Yar’Adua faced a range of allega-
tions about the character of his election, which most believed was owed 
to the personality of his immediate predecessor. Much of the mass media 
and observers tagged Yar’Adua’s election as premature and void of any 
particular political agenda. However, many, including the new president, 
held the view that the Nigerian constitution, especially the electoral sys-
tem, needed reform.20 It was in this climate of speculative constitutional 
changes and Yar’Adua’s rapidly developing physical debility that Good-
luck Jonathan stepped in the presidential office from the vice presidential 
position. Subsequent events led to Jonathan’s full assumption of presi-
dential power and roles when Yar’Adua died from acute sickness early in 
2010. 
Apart from structural changes in the patterns of political regimes, the 
Nigerian polity had experienced very significant shifts in its economic 
sources and resources. These resulted in exponential increases in the size 
of government revenue. The growth of oil and gas receipts was de-
scribed by Iladare and Suberu in the following terms: 
Over the years, the Nigerian oil and gas sector has dominated merchandise 
exports. Oil revenue from exports grew from [US] $718 million to $9.4 
billion from 1970 to 1978 but declined dramatically from a high of $25 bil-
lion in 1980 to $4.7 billion in 1986 as a result of the crude oil price col-
lapse. (…) In 2008 total oil export receipts for Nigeria were about $75 bil-
lion, which represents about 98.8 percent of total exports for the year 
(Ildare and Suberu 2010: 3).  
Oil and gas sales provided enormous increases in government reve-
nue and continues to do so up to the present. Moreover, projections of 
future revenues from oil in Nigeria are huge in absolute and relative 
terms. Table 4.3 presents data from the Nigerian Authorities and IMF 
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estimates on recent (2007–2009) and projected (2010–2013) growth in 
revenue from oil exports as a proportion of total revenue. 
Table 4.3  
Share (%) of Oil Revenue in Total Revenue (billions Nigerian naira),  
2007–2013  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total Revenue 2,311 3,029 1,614 2,852 3,739 3,992 4,279  
Oil Revenue 1,767 2,539 1,079 2,193 2,951 3,091 3,230 
Oil Revenue/ 
Total Revenue (%) 75.5 83.8 66.8 77.90 80.0 77.4 75.5 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2011), available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ 
Scr/2011/cr1157.pdf 
 
 
The paradox of the significant changes in the economic fortunes and 
sources of government revenue is that instead of socio-economic devel-
opment, poverty has worsened in the country. Incidence of poverty in 
Nigeria has been on the rise, from 43% in 1985, to 49% in 2002, and 
54% in 2006.21 Ironically this increase in the proportion of the poor in 
the total population occurred amid the oil sale bonanza and accruing 
government revenue. The pertinent point is that structural changes (sig-
nificant reforms in the political regime and shifts in economic resources) 
are generally thought to promote the development of the political sys-
tem, principally through support to the social groups that make up the 
polity. Such strengthening of the political system is said to occur when 
the political system is open to social contestation and participation in 
decision-making processes and outcomes. However, structural changes, 
as observed through time, have been more associated with centralization 
of political power than the decentralization of power in post-colonial 
Nigeria. 
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter accounted for the Nigerian political system’s various shifts 
and trajectories in the post-colonial era. Formally, the Nigerian political 
 Nigerian Political Systems and Phases since Independence 97 
system has ranged from parliamentary democracy and presidential de-
mocracy to authoritarianism under a constitutionally prescribed federal 
structure. In practice, the Nigerian polity has been characterized by the 
creation and recreation by the Nigerian elite of typical forms of govern-
ance systems, political institutions and agencies – such as political parties, 
a presidency, the ‘Federal Character’ principle, electoral commissions and 
many others. Moreover, informal power, with the politicization of au-
tonomous state agencies, especially the bureaucracy, was documented as 
having permeated formal constitutional arrangements since decoloniza-
tion.  
The problem is not the presence of informal power or institutions but 
rather their conversion to personal advantage and the unexpected out-
comes of informal activities on the political system. As one political re-
gime analyst noted, ‘procedural rules are contrasted, (…) not to informal 
ways in which political power is sometimes actually accessed and exer-
cised’ (Munck 1996: 6). Instead, Munck emphasized, procedural rules 
‘are counter-posed to outcomes’ (ibid.). This can be interpreted to imply 
that the responsiveness and responsibility of political actions are funda-
mental to the maintenance of a governance regime. Even more impor-
tant, following Verba’s (2003) view, is not the quantity of institutions and 
agencies (which actually proliferate in the Nigerian polity) but the social 
quality of interest representation.  
In post-colonial Nigeria, the political elite adjusted the Westminster-
oriented independence constitution to accommodate both the prime 
ministerial and presidential offices that rotated between elite persons and 
groups. Military intercession introduced diarchy, with an executive presi-
dency and the application of ‘Federal Character’ in appointments to min-
isterial positions. Government sources of revenue have been magnified 
since the 1970s. While political praxis is observed to have varied signifi-
cantly, regime instability has remained the outcome and messy hallmark 
of the polity since colonial rule. Frequent constitutional changes and in-
stitutional proliferation have been associated with the political elite’s ma-
noeuvres for political power-holding since political independence in 
1960. Military rule unexpectedly lasted longer, and was more painful and 
pernicious than expected and originally promised. 
Political development adepts consider structural changes to be a pri-
mary step towards social development. In the Nigerian context, enor-
mous efforts have been expended in instituting structural changes since 
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the colonial period. Yet, the observed outcome of political regime vola-
tility amid very positive changes in economic resources and size of gov-
ernment revenue transcends mere concern over the political regime’s 
physical durability. Political elite analysts have long recognized the im-
portant role of subjective factors, especially based on elite leadership mo-
tivations, in shaping unexpected outcomes, particularly in contexts where 
institutional instability and fragility prevail (Rustow 1970, O’Donnel and 
Schmitter 1986).  
It follows that the relationship between political office-holders’ social 
backgrounds, their interactions and their character could provide an im-
portant link for understanding the continuities in political offices that 
have derailed and weakened socially meaningful institutional changes. 
Hence, deeper insight into the real composition and attitudes of the po-
litical elite towards government authority can be revealed by examining 
the character of the elite in political executive office, traced to their re-
spective social origins and devices for interacting. In so doing, typical 
patterns of circulation in political executive offices may be uncovered. 
Chapter 5 analyses the association between social background and par-
ticipation of political executive elite in national government offices since 
colonial rule. 
Notes 
 
1 Colonialism is typically justified by the western onus of disseminating civility. 
Despite the autocratic manner reminiscent of military tactics deployed by Lu-
gard to manage the process, other views persist about its reverse effects on 
structural changes during colonial rule and beyond. It was not considered as 
internally efficient as expected or portrayed in literature (see Falola et al. 
1999/2003). Yet, more cogent than the defects of colonial rule are the effects 
prompted by post-colonial rules and rulers vis-à-vis the correction of past 
anomalies.  
2 Before then, and apart from the governor as de facto president, the council was 
exclusively formed by ten ex-officio members of key colonial officers. They 
were the chief secretary, the lieutenant-governors of the northern and southern 
protectorates, the administrator for Lagos colony, the commandant of the Ni-
gerian Regiment, the attorney general, the director of medical and sanitary ser-
vices, the controller of customs, the treasurer, the director of the marine and 
the secretary for native affairs. Historically, these organs evolved to form the 
nucleus of the Nigerian post-colonial ministries.  
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3 The resurgence of tribal chiefs and traders as recognizable lines of continuity 
through the colonial and post-colonial periods is scarcely highlighted in con-
ventional literature (Kilson 1970). However, care is needed to highlight the pe-
culiar reconversion of traditional power and roles for furthering the intentions 
of post-colonial rule and rulers.  
4 The Exclusive List includes matters over which the federal government or the 
federal executive (i.e. the Council of Ministers) has jurisdiction over or controls 
(the army, the police, the postal services, railways, major roads, airports, sea-
ports, mining, banks, customs and excise, immigration and foreign affairs. The 
Concurrent List contains matters over which the Federal Parliament and the Re-
gional Legislatures have authority to make laws. They include universities, pris-
ons, labour, drugs and poisons of which federal laws can prevail in case of con-
flicts. The only aspects in which the regional legislation and executive council 
have utter leeway are schools, hospitals, forestry, local government with native 
authorities and native or customary courts.  
5 The different revolts that were crushed by the various majority-dominated 
federal and regional governments in the minority North and South are exem-
plary, like the latter’s use of population numbers or manipulation of census re-
sults for revenue derivation.  
6 Such role attributes are comparable to the French system which accommo-
dates both a president and prime minister with relative autonomies and inter-
dependencies.  
7 The Privy Council is a selected caucus of highly placed members of society to 
whom cases affecting governments could ultimately be referred to for advice. It 
had the Queen of England in its headship up to 1963.  
8 The various leadership agents from the North acting at the centre since de-
colonization through the post-colonial period have never missed the chance 
offered by numbers and regional cohesion to overstretch the balance in the 
federal structure.  
9 As Ademolokun (1985) reported, the Constitution Drafting Committee 
(CDC) that recommended the presidential system was eventually composed of 
key elite members of Nigerian society, such as politicians, intellectuals and 
business people.  
10 Many political analysts and practitioners in the country identified different 
reasons and produced or portrayed all manner of justifications for the inade-
quacies and choice of an alternative system.  
11 The 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria verging on ‘Powers 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’, Part I, Ch. II, 5 (1) (b).  
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12 These detailed facts and events were mostly taken from major newspapers 
submitted to content analysis and reports that closely monitor and register 
events.  
13 The 1980s began with the fiscal crisis (excess demands on available re-
sources) of the state within a neo-liberal order of minimal but efficient state 
structure taking charge of the international stage. The IMF emerged as an influ-
ential player in the direction of national policies. Change was purportedly based 
on democratization and used the free market to guide political and social rela-
tions. To mark the paradigm shift, the state was expected to gradually withdraw 
(depoliticize) its dirigiste activities from the private sector. It was under this sce-
nario, already evident during Shagari’s time, that Babaginda came in to con-
comitantly execute the structural adjustment programme and democratic 
changes.  
14 Human rights publications at http://www.hrw.org detail the abuses commit-
ted during Babangida’s eight-year rule.  
15 Various accounts about the Niger Delta crisis portray the extent of govern-
ment and international participation in its sustenance with specific impacts on 
the polity including volatilities of democratic processes and consolidation.  
16 The comments and viewpoints on the Nigerian Constitution submitted by 
The Association of Nigerian Scholars for Dialogue to the Constitution Debate Coor-
dinating Committee contained advice such as the formation of a transition 
committee and popular ratification to condition its final product and content.  
17 It is noteworthy that most grievances and pressures had either an ethnic 
spread or religious bias. In particular, the latter became a threat to the secular 
position of the Nigerian state, despite the outright constitutional contradiction. 
For instance, it was observed that the leadership in some of the federated states 
with predominantly Muslim populations demanded the introduction of Sharia 
courts as an alternative to federal courts in their areas of jurisdiction.  
18 The analyst pointed specifically to the acrimony over the termination of the 
Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF), the allowances for members of the legislature, 
the alleged interferences of the executive in legislative affairs, the re-enactment 
or not of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offences Commis-
sion Act of 2000, and budget allocation. 
19 The Niger Delta area is made up of those federated states from where crude 
oil as the mainstay of the Nigerian economy and principal source of govern-
ment revenue is extracted on a daily basis. Certain groups from these states are 
engaged in fights to have their share of oil revenue. However, the issue is more 
one of social inclusiveness or simply voice than a specific demand for revenue.  
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20 Newspaper reports at the time are marked by such comments and demands 
for constitutional review and change. 
21 From Apata (2010) based on 2009 surveys conducted by the Federal Office of 
Statistics (now the National Bureau of Statistics) on poverty and welfare in Nige-
ria. Note that the 1992 figures show an intermittent drop in poverty to 34%. 
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5 
Social Background and Elite 
Circulation in Core Political Executive 
Offices (1951-2007) 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter analyses the link between the social background of the po-
litical executive elite and their degree of participation in government of-
fices at the national level. It is based on documented and classified data 
from the period since colonial rule. Four questions guide the investiga-
tion: (1) What socio-cultural composition patterns (in terms of age, of-
fice tenure, sex, profession and education) can be found in elite circula-
tion in political executive offices under the various political regimes and 
economic resource fortunes since decolonization? (2) What communal 
origins (ethnic, religious and regional) characterize the participation of 
the elite in political executive offices? (3) Is the occupation of political 
executive offices associated with common social background characteris-
tics? (4) What do the findings imply for the level of circulation and com-
position of the elite in political executive offices amid the different po-
litical regimes and with economic resource changes since colonial rule in 
Nigeria?  
5.2 Socio-Cultural Background  
5.2.1 Circularity by Age and Office Tenure  
Figure 5.1 shows that since the initial formation of the core political ex-
ecutive elite in 1951, circulation in core political executive offices has 
been increasingly concentrated in the age cohort between 41 and 50 
years and older. The one exception was during 1MR: 1967–1979. This 
first interlude of military intervention broke the age spiral with its 58.2% 
political executive membership clustered around the more youthful age 
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range of 31 to 40 years. This means that elite circulation in core political 
executive offices has largely been the exclusivity of Nigerians above 40 
years since decolonization. Elite participation by age cohort in core po-
litical executive offices rose steadily and vertically from the second to the 
third age ranking and into the fourth (above 60 years) as regimes alter-
nated. Figure 5.1 portrays a recurrent age cohort that cumulated in the 
current Third Republic, at least, from 1999 up to 2007. 
Figure 5.1 
Age differences (%) of Core Political Executive (1951-2007) 
 
Source: Data collected and classified from various editions of yearbooks and Who’s 
Who in Nigeria and Africa South of the Sahara 
 
 
Regime variations do not seem to have influenced the age structure of 
political office-holders, who increasingly seized opportunities presented 
in past office experiences to consolidate power. Instead of full with-
drawal from political office-holding based on a gradual process of physi-
cal debility as predicted by classic elitists, core political executive mem-
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between 41 and 50 years and gradually further to 60 years and older. The 
need to indigenize political executive power during decolonization and 
the forceful post-independence entrance of young military personnel in-
to the political arena gave the occupancy of core political executive of-
fices a different appearance.  
For instance, during the initial period of military rule (1MR: 1966–
1979), Nigeria produced Africa’s youngest head of state in the person of 
33-year-old General Yakubu Gowon (Nwaolise 1995: 21). Apart from 
the civil war and burgeoning oil revenue, military intervention in politics 
became the major force driving shifts in the age composition of the elite 
in post-colonial political offices. It widened the minimum entry point to 
political executive offices, most especially to military officers. Both be-
fore and after the military regimes, political executive elite incumbents 
sought to retain and consolidate their political power by implicitly resist-
ing its renewal, i.e. the opening of the power structure to other members 
of the civil society and provision of effective guarantees of political 
rights and civil liberties. From the tenure perspective, these findings have 
various implications.  
Elite circulation in political executive offices based on age cohort re-
veals a linear development of the composite character of the power 
structure based on non-economic factors. Firstly, time-based office ten-
ure tends to confirm the findings of cross-national and cross-sectional 
studies (Bienen and Walle 1989: 19–34) about the correlation between 
time in office and political power. Age in relation to office longevity de-
creases instead of increases the risk of losing political office. Political of-
fice-holding and role exercise are significant antecedents of power accu-
mulation. Political executive office occupancy and authority as the right 
to rule are formally used to amass power through effective control and 
selective distribution of state resources. Control over state resources in 
Nigeria has implied consolidation of influence over the other age groups 
and society at large.  
Secondly, and except during the initial phase of military intervention 
in politics, the pattern of political elite circulation based on office tenure 
shows a quantitative increase as political regimes and economic resources 
altered over time. That is, military intervention during Gowon’s nine 
years in government (1966–1975) appears to have implied an increase in 
the size of the core political executive. Discounting failed coups, the 
chief executive elite turned over fifteen times (including one recurrent 
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occupant), which is high for just fifty years of post-colonial history. This 
means that fifteen individuals have rotated in political executive office as 
prime minister, president or head of state and government.  
It also reveals a particular paradox about the temporal distribution of 
the topmost and most disputed political power position in Nigeria. 
Based on the quotient between fifty and fifteen, the average number of 
times, vis-à-vis the general convention of a four-year tenure, that each 
Nigerian chief executive leader spent in political offices was less than 
four years. However, this implies neither shorter office tenures nor vol-
untary acquittal from political office by the elite office-holder. On the 
contrary, in practice, many of the chief executives stayed much longer or 
sought extended office longevity. Actually, the full implication of the dis-
tribution is a concentration rather than dispersal of chief executive posi-
tions as occupied by the Nigerian elite since colonial rule.  
Table 5.1 
Periodic Distribution of Political Executive Office Tenure and First Order 
Cabinet and Junta Memberships by Regime Type (1951-2007) 
Regime Type Period Cumulative Offices 
Yearly  
Average 
0DC 1951-1960 96 11 
1CR 1960-66 107 18 
1MR 1966-79 521 40 
2CR 1979-83 132 33 
2MR 1984-99 698 46.5 
3CR 1999-07 228 32.5 
Total 1782 31 
Source: Classified data from various editions of Who is Who in Nigeria and 
Africa South of the Sahara  
 
 
Reading from Table 5.1, independent of regime type, the yearly aver-
age circularity of membership in the group of core political executive 
office-holders under each leader since decolonization up to 2007 has 
been thirty-one (31) individuals. Up to 2003, no democratic government 
in the forty-three years since political independence and over two fully 
recognized republics lasted up to two mandates of four years each. Also, 
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most interruptions in military or civilian governments were popularly 
acclaimed, that is, welcomed, at least, initially (Ihonvbere 1998). This is 
perhaps a sign of the lack of efficacy of political governance in previous 
civilian governments. Outcomes have been socially insignificant in terms 
of secured political rights and liberties or, more generally, political devel-
opment derived from realistic policies of social participation in decision-
making processes.  
Thirdly, and outside statistical averages, office longevity has been a 
problem of elite circulation in core political executive offices. From the 
shortest stay of less than one year, occupants have spent up to nine years 
in office before being removed by force or nature (death). Cases of vol-
untary withdrawal after power transfer are very rare, so far thrice (with 
one recurrent case): during the military (1975–1979) and civilian (1999–
2007) governments of Olusegun Obasanjo and under the shortest transi-
tional government of Abdulsalam Abdulahi (1998–1999), following the 
sudden death of the arch dictator, Sani Abacha (1993–1998). The out-
come has been elite reproduction that challenges the generational re-
newal of political power as advanced by structural change analysts (In-
glehart and Abrahamson 1995). Schumpeter’s (1919) theoretical propo-
sition – that shifts in economic productivity over time, particularly from 
manorial to industrial production, dictate changes in the nature of the 
elite (from aristocratic landowners to industrialists) – does not seem to 
apply to Nigeria based on political office-power longevity.  
Nigeria experienced a lost ‘golden age’, marked by the revolutionary 
inflow of oil revenue in the 1970s. Ironically, a context of force charac-
terized by military intervention and a robust government treasury served 
only to limit elite circulation in the core political executive offices, rather 
than to usher in real changes in economic productivity. The military 
usurp of power actually preceded the oil revenue upturn, but lamentably 
it deepened political power concentration and regime rigidity even be-
yond authoritarian boundaries. No significant shift occurred in the style 
of representation in the post-autocracy regime of Nigeria. In other 
words, it was the quantity not the quality of representation, as empha-
sized by Verba (2003), that shaped elite circulation in core political ex-
ecutive offices.  
Fourthly, the trend of elite participation by age groups across regimes 
reveals that developmental factors (i.e. maturity, experience and learning) 
have not reduced the impact of power struggle on elite composition in 
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post-colonial Nigeria. No election has been held in Nigeria since inde-
pendence without counter claims of rigging and in most cases attendant 
violence or intimidation of voters (Suberu 2007. The only election (1993) 
said to be freely and fairly conducted was unilaterally annulled by the in-
cumbent chief executive of a particular military government (Diamond et 
al. 1999). Indeed, regime change and leadership succession have often 
been characterized by violence and weak procedural norms. This latter 
feature has conferred excessive and abusive powers on incumbents in-
stead of democratically and substantially regulated processes, e.g. effec-
tive engagement of public accountability.  
Natural processes of physical and mental debility generally imply a di-
rect relation between lower performance and aging. However, the occu-
pancy of the political executive office in Nigeria is observed to have con-
tinually converted time in office to power accumulation and the coercive 
use of such power to maintain political office-holding. Also, physical and 
moral coercion are easily deployed to maintain power and exert authority 
because government revenue has not depended on social tax contribu-
tions since colonial rule (i.e. although state power resources are formally 
constituted, such power is not founded directly on social input in the 
form of revenue from taxes). The point is that as long as power struggle 
is driven by selectively shared economic interests rather than interest in 
public issues (Ihonvbere 1995, Dumoye 2003), elite renewal will continue 
to be restrained by intrigues for power and access to state resources. 
5.2.2 Gender Distribution  
Gender participation reveals a peculiar pattern of power relations in po-
litical executive offices building from the social background of the Nige-
rian elite in the post-colonial period. Figure 5.2 shows that women’s par-
ticipation has been very weak, having varied between zero and 5.7% 
since colonial rule – the 5.7% participation was observed in the most 
recent civilian regime (i.e. in 1999–2007). Thus, women’s voice in politi-
cal executive decision processes (especially under the democratic re-
gimes), has practically translated to exclusion or marginalization of this 
very important societal category. Also, no woman was ever part of a mili-
tary junta’s highly esteemed but exclusive circle, as data revealed. Extra 
fieldwork data show that although the government of Umaru Musa 
Yar’adua (2007–2008) included seven women among the thirty-nine min-
isters (about 18% based on a particular leadership or government, mean-
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ing that the proportion could decline significantly over the current re-
gime period), it remains a far cry from the United Nation’s strong rec-
ommendation of 30% participation of women in government.  
Figure 5.2 
Gender Distribution and Regime Change  
Source: Data collected and classified by the author from various editions of yearbooks and 
Who’s Who in Nigeria and Africa South of the Sahara  
 
 
The issue of women’s participation in politics and governance in the 
Nigerian polity dates back to cultural and administrative biases in the 
pre-colonial and colonial periods. Except in North Nigeria where suf-
frage was effectively extended to women only in 1979, at the start of the 
Second Republic (2CR: 1979–1983), women were allowed to exercise 
their political and civil rights before decolonization (0DC: 1951–1960). 
However, women’s subordinate role in society has hindered their capac-
ity to participate effectively in political activities. Women’s dependence 
on men can be traced back to the patriarchal system that reflects the un-
equal pattern of social and economic relations which has had deep politi-
cal repercussions in the Nigerian system.  
Observers note too that colonialism neither encouraged nor sup-
ported women’s liberation. The stratagem and opportunism of colonial 
education (Mazrui 1978, Woolman 2001, Eno 2004) favoured men can-
didates for government office and learning opportunities. Eno reiterated 
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that the latter processes were usually aimed at producing ‘intermediate 
labor for performing trivial clerical and numerical activities’, increasingly 
pushing women into ‘domestic services’ (Eno 2004: 34). Even women’s 
protests during the colonial period are reported to have had a ‘consulta-
tive’ rather than ‘participatory’ orientation (ibid.). That is, though wom-
en’s interests were not considered as deserving inclusion in political pro-
cesses, they nonetheless struggled to be consulted in the selection of 
participants. Neither did structural changes after colonial rule signifi-
cantly improve women’s voice in political executive office-holding, as 
power continued to be slanted markedly in favour of men (Figure 5.2).  
Despite this adverse historical background, no institutionally estab-
lished and oriented (public or private) organizations have been proac-
tively engaged in women’s empowerment at the political level. Apart 
from government institutions and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), political parties are perhaps most apposite for championing 
women’s liberation. This is mainly because of their political institutional 
nature as instruments for aggregating and channelling diverse interests 
and engaging citizens in political processes. Women’s near invisibility in 
core political executive positions indicates that political parties, which are 
responsible for nominating candidates for elections and making political 
appointments in the executive branch, have lukewarm attitudes towards 
women’s empowerment and effective participation in politics.  
Documented patterns of women’s participation in post-colonial Nige-
ria are nothing less than a mockery of typical open system procedures. 
Studies show that in both civilian and military regimes, but mostly in the 
latter, first lady offices are deployed to garner women’s support for the 
regime (see Mama 1998). Patronage exchanges in the form of selective 
empowerment projects funded by state agents and under the direction of 
the chief political executive are common channels of women’s co-
optation.  
Moreover, inter-ethnic marriages have added a peculiar force to the 
chief executive’s roles and selective social support. Analysts recount that 
most Nigerian chief political executives have converted marriage into a 
tool for consolidating political power rather than liberating women from 
patriarchal constraints (Ibrahim 2003: 35, cf Mama 1995, Okeke 1998). 
In Nigeria, marriage constitutes a powerful cultural bond founded on 
informal power, family ties and ethnic group solidarity. In particular, in-
ter-ethnic bonds of marriage at the elite level reinforce networks that can 
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and do emerge in society as a reservoir of social support for the chief 
political executives involved.  
As long as women’s participation continues to be tied to the conser-
vative man’s cloak or circumscribed by patriarchy as a typical form of 
‘traditional authority’ bounded by personalized power and roles (Bendix 
1962: 330–334, cf Weber 1968), the opportunity structure will continue 
to be skewed in favour of men. The dependent and insignificant nature 
of women’s participation in the Nigerian polity has serious implications 
for both theory and practice. First, political development will remain de-
ficient without significant and effective inclusion of women in politics. 
Second, insufficient political participation by women is a sign of a weak 
political culture.  
In particular, analysts believe that in their most advanced form open 
political systems value the rights to freedom and equality that support 
and institutionalize substantive social inclusion (Welzel and Inglehart 
2008). A lack of women’s participation in political executive processes 
indicates not only the fragility of political institutions in Nigeria, but it 
also implies the closure of opportunities to a significant portion of the 
population. This curbing of opportunities continues in the Nigerian pol-
ity today despite various structural changes explicitly designed to ensure 
otherwise. 
Ineffective participation by women serves also to reinforce elite re-
production because it reduces the efficacy of political executive actions 
outside the support of the female population in Nigeria. The population 
of women in Nigeria can be described as a rich source of political power, 
starting from its numerical strength – as women are almost equal in 
number to men. According to the 2006 census, of Nigeria’s 140 million 
inhabitants, women account for 68.3 million or 49%. In practice, the 
greatly circumscribed participation of women weakens political contesta-
tion. Women’s marginalization from political processes and the circum-
scription of their participation to men’s or spouse’s agency, severely lim-
its the quality of political outcomes under men’s ‘monopoly’ control of 
political processes.  
Although, constitutional barriers to women’s participation have been 
absent from the Nigerian polity since 1979, the institutional pathway to 
effective public contestation that includes women citizens still suffers 
setbacks under an array of obstacles within the opportunity structure. 
For example, violence and fraud have been major features of most elec-
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tions since political independence. Women especially are victimized and 
constrained because of their subordination and weaker status in society. 
Within the patriarchal system that denies women access to valuable re-
sources under weak formal and informal political institutions, elections 
as means of acquiring authority and legitimate right to rule often fail to 
produce responsive and responsible elite leaders. Women’s lack of par-
ticipation in core political executive offices has enhanced the profusion 
of men’s appearances and, importantly, the shaping of political power 
and roles through men’s values and interests. Thus, the relative absence 
of women in the most exalted political executive offices contributes to 
restrict the quality of elite circulation while maintaining quantity through 
common socialization and convenient political settlements among the 
elite hierarchies of men.  
5.2.3 Circularity by Professional and Sectoral Origin  
The professional and sectoral background of those holding core political 
executive offices is a crucial dimension in the investigation of elite par-
ticipation in high offices since colonial rule in Nigeria. An important ana-
lytical basis hereby is the liberal-pluralist view that professional class con-
stitutes the appropriate backdrop for interest representation. Table 5.2 
shows that university teachers, lawyers, bureaucrats, technocrats, busi-
ness persons and military officers rose to prominent positions in core 
political executive offices after decolonization. These professional elite 
groups have dominated the highest echelons of Nigerian politics since 
independence (1960). By contrast, the rate of circularity of the non-
university teachers declined steadily to zero as regimes and resources 
shifted over time. This finding demonstrates that the professional com-
position of the political executive elite in Nigeria has been characterized 
by modernization through educationally inspired change. Table 5.2 re-
veals the typical professional elite background of those participating in 
core political executive offices since colonial rule. 
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Table 5.2 
Cumulative Frequencies of Core Political Elite Circularity  
by Professional Grouping (1960-2007) 
((a) Cumulative numbers of professionals, (b) Aggregated percentage of professionals 
Source: Classified from various editions of the Europa Yearbook (Africa South of the Sahara), the Nigerian Yearbook 
and Who’s Who in Nigeria 
 
 
Observe that the political demand for professionals does not seem to 
have varied much over the different regimes. The overt quest for (good) 
governance and legitimacy since independence seems to have driven a 
demand for bureaucrats, lawyers, technocrats and businesspersons plus a 
good number of university professors. Also, there was an upsurge of mil-
itary elite in the civilian domain in the latest civilian regime (3CR: 1999–
2007). Data reveal that for the first time in a post-colonial civilian regime 
(3CR: 1999–2007), the presence of political executive members with a 
military background was high at 17.5% of the total participants.  
This advance of military politicians into typical civilian spheres of in-
fluence diminishes the prospects of civilian-groomed professionals par-
ticipating in political processes because of the crowding-out (marginaliza-
tion) effects it represents. Although militarily trained cabinet officers may 
be retired, they remain strongly attached to military interests and habits, 
such as the use of force to enhance political authority. For example, 
Obasanjo’s response to the Odi protesters in the Niger Delta region on 
20 November 1999 (see Human Rights Watch 1999, see also Colin 2000) 
was a show of force and brutality akin to military styles of discipline, lit-
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tle tolerant to opposition and averse to negotiation and compromise. 
Despite extensive training abroad, the political civility of the military is 
no less militarized. Indeed, military structure and participation in gov-
ernment processes have not only dishonoured the government’s reputa-
tion in Nigeria but have been disruptive of democratic maturity as well 
(Ihonvbere 1998, Akinrinade 2006).  
Similar experiences of the continued military link with politics led 
Kooning (2001) to state that ‘full democratic consolidation depends on 
the full subordination of security forces under civilian rule’ (pp. 402–
403). The diffused and inordinate use of force inside and outside the 
state or what Kooning (ibid.) calls ‘new violence’ can shrink the state’s 
capacity to protect rights of freedom and equality. Insufficient protection 
of these rights implies institutional fragility and inoperative civil rights 
and political liberties. In practice, institutional weaknesses provoked by 
excessive and repeated recourse to state violence has worked to consoli-
date incumbency votes and to quell protests. It has thus hindered de-
mocratic transition in Nigeria. Consequently, the political competition 
and participation necessary for solidifying the political regime has re-
ceded in favour of an elite-elite struggle for political power and the use 
of state resources to favour incumbency bids.  
Violence, especially if it is widespread in state and society, places 
‘strain on any political system’, warned Dahl (1995: 78–79). The political 
scientist pointed out, ‘[I]t is usually difficult to coerce a large number of 
people, even if not a majority, because the more coercion the lesser the 
chances of the political system’s survival’ (ibid.). The Niger Delta crisis is 
a current and most illustrative case of marginalization, violent forms of 
state-society relationship and the political executive’s constriction of the 
right to freedom and equality of opportunities. The Niger Delta impasse 
can be traced back to the formative period of political power composi-
tion in post-colonial Nigeria, which operated in favour of an ethno-
regional structure of power relations with majority ethnic groups at the 
vanguard (Graf 1988, Osaghae 1998). This historic legacy appears to be 
based more on the self-indulgent character of the elite and their manipu-
lation of political rights than the insurgent acts of ethnic groups simply 
clamouring for fair resource distribution.  
The skewed nature of the federal power structure in Nigeria has long 
implied privileged access to and control of state resources based on dis-
tinctive ethnic markers. Reinforced by the institutionalization of the 
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‘Federal Character’ principle amid structural changes, the skewed power 
structure of Nigeria impinges directly on the institutional capacity of the 
state to protect competition and promote social inclusiveness. Political 
competition has been transformed instead into rivalry and physical com-
bat between the elites. The use of violence has seemingly become a per-
manent feature of elite composition in terms of access to and mainte-
nance of power positions. 
Figure 5.3 portrays the sector of origin of the political executive elite, 
distinguishing the various professions represented (Table 5.2). Sector of 
origin reflects the attempt to capture the multiple activities or profes-
sions that each participant has exercised in particular social spheres be-
fore or upon assuming a key position in central government executive 
offices. The data distribution confirms the growth of the intellectual, 
technocratic, bureaucratic and legal professions. It also shows the grad-
ual disappearance of lower cadre teachers in the political executive. The 
dataset further demonstrates the military infiltration in politics.  
Figure 5.3 
Participation by Sector of Origin and Regime 
Source: Classified data from various editions of Year Books, Who is Who in Nigeria and Africa 
South of the Sahara 
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Interestingly, the sector of origin highlights the constant presence of 
the business elite. Whether dependent on government patronage (Bayart 
1993), self-propelled (Forrest 1994) or interlocked with other activities, 
the cream of the Nigerian business class, from both the mercantile and 
the industrial sub-sectors, appears consistently represented and so has 
been a strong voice in Nigerian politics. Historically, the business elite 
were the most consistent office-holders. Even in the colonial period, 
from about 1922, commercialists and traders were recruited into the co-
lonial executive council to enhance colonial interests (Dudley 1966, Bas-
sey 2009). However, the interests and values of the economic elite ap-
pear to have been fundamentally transformed into political power 
pursuits in the post-colonial period. 
Cohen (1972: 235) observed that social insecurities felt by the emer-
gent Nigerian elite and aspirants to upper class positions occupied by the 
incumbent ‘imported oligarchy’ (carefully selected and topmost colonial 
administrators) significantly marked the attitudes and behaviours of the 
emergent political actors in their struggle for political power. In other 
words, the amassing of political power assumed primacy as the means 
for securing not just wealth but also social and political protection, au-
thority and prestige. The drive for these attributes stemmed from the 
uncertainties about the transition from colonial to post-colonial rule. In 
other words, wealth already accumulated through colonial privileges and 
opportunities was an issue, but along with it was the capture and use of 
political power to defend the former and ensure further accumulation. 
This primary pursuit of political power appears to have been maintained 
up to this day.  
Data about the sector of origin also captures the important category 
of politicians, i.e. participants who, despite other professional back-
ground, have dedicated themselves almost exclusively to political activi-
ties. The sector coded ‘politics’ (Figure 5.3) featured significantly in po-
litical executive office during decolonization (i.e. after basic education 
and legal sectors). After decolonization, Dudley (1966) records that early 
politicians, such as Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo 
from the South and Sir Ahmadu Bello and Alhaji Sir Tafawa Balewa 
from the North, were the first-on-the-scene nationalist leaders who 
stepped into the power vacuum when the British withdrew. However, 
from 1CR, they began to cede their places to other categories such as 
people with an advanced education.  
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The second type of elite to emerge in the political processes linked to 
executive offices, as shown by Dudley (1966), was the professionals and 
business persons. During this period of political executive elite forma-
tion, the federal minister from the business elite circle was Chief Festus 
Okotie-Eboh. As observed in Who’s Who in Nigeria, Okotie-Eboh was 
labour and welfare minister of cabinet rank from 1954 to 1957 before 
rising to the office of minister of finance to replace Alhaji Balewa, who 
was promoted from the finance ministry to prime minister in 1957 by 
the departing British officials. Observers believe that the appointment as 
finance minister of Okotie-Eboh, who was a member of a minority eth-
nic group from the western region (later the Mid-West) and belonged to 
a different political party, owed to his close friendship with Tafawa 
Balewa (Aderemi 2004/2005). Okotie-Eboh’s appointment was perhaps 
an early sign of a ‘friendship-based’ patronage, which grew in kind and 
degree during the later years of the post-colony.  
The business elite appear to have had strong participation in various 
governments across diverse regimes. Most political executives own busi-
nesses in the private sector. Moreover, the marketing boards controlled 
by regional governments were manipulated by political executives and 
political party leaders to finance elections at the federal level (Dudley 
1982) through patronage-based networks. Apart from the participation 
of business owners from the private sector, data also captures the en-
gagement of top-ranking administrators (technocrats) from manufactur-
ing and financial institutions such as banks. In other words, government 
support is wide-ranging and socially powerful but not short of a selective 
and similar elite background that tends to uphold its own special inter-
ests more than public interests.  
The data on sector of origin captures the accentuated nature of par-
ticipation by individuals from common social, economic and political 
sectors. For example, the distribution of the respective data reflects the 
reappearance of the legal class in a pattern notably different from the 
more constant business class participation. Members of the legal elite 
participated more markedly during civilian regimes than in military re-
gimes. The presence of the legal sector during 1CR: 1960–1966 was 
about four times stronger than in 1MR: 1966–1979, although the latter 
lasted much longer. The same pattern, though with lower levels of par-
ticipation, was visible in the subsequent civilian and military regimes.  
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The need for lawyers to deal with constitutional issues mostly in fa-
vour of government actions seems more accentuated during civilian re-
gimes than in autocratic regimes, when matters were mostly adjudicated 
by military fiat. The recruitment of the political executive elite from the 
legal sector not only reinforced the socio-cultural elite dimension of the 
political class supporters of the regime but also underlines the greater 
authority of lawyers in democratic than in authoritarian regimes in the 
Nigerian system. Participation from other sectors of the socio-cultural 
elite, such as the medical profession with the public and private company 
management sectors, has been significant but less so than the participa-
tion of the business and legal elite. 
As shown in Figure 5.3, career politicians were more visible during 
0DC: 1951–1960 and 1CR: 1960–1966 but gradually disappeared after-
wards. This suggests that from the time ‘politicians’ began to be associ-
ated with corruption in Nigeria, political office aspirants began to shift 
their labels to other professions in order to ascend to political executive 
power and roles. Despite the passive nature of socialization of the mili-
tary at the invitation of civilian politicians (Nwaolise 1995), the military 
has not been active in civilian regimes directly or indirectly except in the 
Third Republic. The idea of a political strongman linked to the military 
sector still endures within the Nigerian society. Most retired military per-
sonnel become political ‘godfathers’ or explore the loopholes created in 
the constitution during military regimes to re-emerge, under recycled 
conditions, in political executive processes.  
Except during decolonization, the military sector has been behind all 
the transitions to democracy in Nigeria. It was thus the military that laid 
the foundation for the various constitutional reforms. Military political 
elites determined the scope of liberalization and democratization by dic-
tating the pace and formation of the political parties that contest and 
eventually win elections. This participation explains why post-colonial 
efforts towards openness and inclusiveness have taken turbulent path-
ways and led to weak outcomes. Apart from overstretched periods of 
transition (Inhonvbere 1998, Diamond et al. 1999), poor governance is 
linked with social oppression and selective elite participation in political 
executive offices in ways that encumber public accountability (Bratton 
and Logan 2006, Kifordu 2010).  
Historically, military interests became inextricably linked to those of 
civilian political agents, the business sector and ultimately the oil sector. 
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It was during the early stages of 1MR: 1966–1979 that the regions were 
stripped of their autonomy over resource generation and control 
(Osaghae 1998). Centralization of authority thus became a hallmark of 
the forcefulness of military regimes, ushering in a push-and-pull game 
between centralization and decentralization that has been going on since. 
This ‘tug of war’ has produced immobilism (stifled decision-making pro-
cesses). Symptomatic of this condition are lethargic political institutions 
whose existence and persistence derive from a political class that de-
pends for its survival more on state resources than on the people’s input. 
The current study’s data about professional background and sector of 
origin distinguish the direct participation of the socio-cultural, economic, 
military and political elite categories in the political executive offices.  
This study makes a theoretical and analytical distinction between so-
cial classes that autonomously compete for state power in order to de-
fend their professional or group (association) interests, and the political 
class, which depends on state resources to fulfil its particular interests. 
Therefore, participation of the professional-cum-sector elite in political 
executive offices in Nigeria indicates contradictory roles. Omodia (2010) 
eloquently highlighted this paradox between social class participation and 
a governance system operated by state agents in Nigeria: ‘[I]n a system 
where the masses are deceived at the ethnic level of politics and excluded 
at the class level of politics, the Marxian concept of dictatorship of the 
masses is a model fixed in heaven’ (pp. 129–133). This can be interpreted 
to imply that contrary to the Marxist belief in revolution through revolt 
of the masses, the political class occupants of executive power use ma-
nipulation to divert the attention of the masses away from conscious 
movements towards a significant overturning of the power structure.  
5.2.4 Circularity by Educational Qualifications  
The data about educational qualifications (Figure 5.4) and place of study 
(Figure 5.5) exhibit a pattern similar to that of professional formation 
(see Figure 5.3). In fact, profession tends to follow from education. Since 
decolonization, and as regimes evolved, educational qualifications gradu-
ally progressed in such a way that those with higher educational qualifica-
tions began to displace secondary school, teacher training and vocational 
training certificate holders on the pathway to key political offices. 
Though there were no constitutional limits or legal preconditions for 
participating in political offices, these lower certificate holders gradually 
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disappeared from government. It is likely that the acquisition of higher 
qualifications does not strictly imply the renewals of membership and 
ideas but the consolidation of existing ones and admission of likeminded 
members, i.e. with common attributes (profession, sector of origin and 
communal origins) and interests. 
Figure 5.4 
Participation (%) by Educational Qualification and Regime 
Source: Classified data from various editions of Year Books, Who is Who in Nigeria and Africa 
South of the Sahara 
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During the first period of military rule (1MR: 1966–1979), more 
bachelor’s degree holders were in office (94 out of 521 or 18%) than in 
the second military period (2MR: 1984–1999). In this latter regime, rela-
tive participation by bachelor’s degree holders was half the previous pro-
portion (9.6% or 67 of the 698 participants) (Figure 5.4). Conversely, 
fewer doctorate degree holders participated in the first military period 
(7.1% or 37) compared to the second military period (12.5% or 87). One 
plausible explanation is that as more pressure was exerted on the political 
labour market, recruitment criteria inclined towards higher qualifications. 
It is noteworthy that during the second military regime, more precisely 
from Babangida’s (1985–1993) government, a structural adjustment pro-
gramme was introduced under neo-liberal policy guidelines prescribed by 
World Bank agents. Firstly, it should be recognized that this external 
context and influence emerged mainly because of the vulnerability of the 
political system rather than a scarcity of resources, as Nigeria’s external 
debt was exacerbated by the political mismanagement of oil funds. The 
exigencies of the IMF and World Bank might have prompted the intake 
of highly qualified technocrats observed, from 7.5% in 1MR: 1966–1979 
to 9% in 2MR: 1984–1999.  
During the current civilian regime (3CR: 1999–2007), particularly dur-
ing Obasanjo’s government in which structural reforms were intensified, 
more technocrats and holders of higher qualifications such as doctorate 
degrees were recruited into the cabinet. About 24% held a doctorate de-
gree, while 23% were bachelors, 11% master’s degree holders and 4% 
possessed specialization certificates. As already emphasized, these chang-
es do not necessarily imply the recruitment of fresh elite participants 
with higher credentials. Neither did they translate into any change in val-
ues as the immediate effect of more years of schooling, training and 
higher levels of qualifications.  
The inclination to recruit people with higher qualifications did not 
imply that achievement criteria based on education were eventually pre-
ferred over ascription. Considering the significance of informal power as 
applied in the Nigerian polity through ethnic manipulation and selective 
application of ‘Federal Character’, the true intention of higher educa-
tional qualifications for political recruitment is rendered dubious. More-
over, participants with military training increased, as can be observed in 
Figure 5.5, to about 16% of office-holders during the first two mandates 
of the current civilian regime (1999–2007). Schooling abroad has, since 
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colonial rule, become an important input in the process of recruiting the 
political executive elite; the next subsection deals with elite circulation in 
political executive offices based on such experiences abroad.  
5.2.5 Participation by Place of Study  
It is revealing to observe the environment in which elites received their 
education or training before and during their experience in political of-
fice. A large proportion of Nigerians in core political executive offices 
studied abroad. Only in two periods were similar proportions of the po-
litical executive elite schooled within Nigeria and abroad; this was during 
decolonization (0DC: 1951–1960) and the first civilian government 
(1CR: 1961–1966), which was practically a continuation from the former 
period (Figure 5.5). However, while the proportion of elite participants 
with a school diploma acquired at home fell after decolonization and the 
First Republic government, there has been a steady increase of elite par-
ticipants who obtained a school diploma abroad.  
Figure 5.5 
Participation (%) by Place of Study and Regime  
Source: Classified data from various editions of Year Books, Who is Who in Nigeria and Africa 
South of the Sahara 
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Liberal perspectives on political socialization view formal schooling, 
and especially schooling abroad, as a valuable experience and source of 
attitude formation favourable to democratic change (Diamond et al. 
1988, Diamond and Morlino 2004). The recruitment of individuals who 
received training at foreign universities and other such western institu-
tions is expected to increase elite competition and quality through so-
cialization (Diamond et al. 1988). Historically, as reported by Graf 
(1988), the pioneer elite and nationalist leaders of Nigeria experienced 
different levels of schooling and training abroad. However, if patronage 
exchanges and corruption are observed to permeate elite attitudes (as will 
be shown in the next chapter) then study abroad (especially among elite 
participants in political executive offices) would not appear to have been 
adequately applied to promote political development in the Nigerian pol-
ity.  
 Data on study abroad (Figure 5.5) shows the large number of elite 
participants in military regimes to receive training in foreign institutions 
(more than 90%). This proportion is greater than that of civilian foreign-
educated counterparts in civilian regimes (at or less than 90%). However, 
military training received abroad is at odds with a liberal orientation and 
would be expected to constitute a setback to the transformation of atti-
tudes required for effective governance reforms through openness and 
inclusiveness. Military training is usually based on hierarchic discipline 
and lessons about the use of violence to enforce territorial integrity. This 
is a markedly different curriculum from that of civilian schooling, which 
can be expected to emphasize respect for human rights and equality and 
the use of persuasion, negotiation and compromise to achieve peace and 
progress. Nigeria’s reality confirms this contrast between military training 
received mostly abroad and volatility of political institutions since the 
military intervened and has continually participated in political executive 
offices. This does not mean that oppressive attitudes are limited to mili-
tary executive elites. Indeed, civilian political elites’ excessive use of vio-
lence during elections is at odds with the formal schooling and liberal 
lessons received both at home and abroad since decolonization. 
 Social Background and Elite Circulation in Core Political Executive 123 
5.3 Communal Background  
5.3.1 Circularity by Ethnic Origin and Size  
Analytically, it is difficult to separate the trio of ethnicity, religion and re-
gional origin in Nigerian politics. But as the data about communal ori-
gins are classified by ethnic origin, size of ethnic group, and religious and 
regional background, each aspect will be displayed separately. First, data 
on ethnic origin in Figure 5.6 highlight the disproportionate presence in 
core political executive offices of individuals from the three major ethnic 
groups, Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo, respectively, from the North, 
West and East of Nigeria. Moreover, the pattern of individual or group 
membership in political executive offices appears to be associated with 
the ‘strongman’ (Bratton and de Walle 1997) or chief executive’s ethnic, 
religious and regional background. Despite important structural changes 
aimed at diffusing the symbiotically reinforcing influences of ethnicity 
and regional origin, ethnic morphology – or differences in communal at-
tributes – has continued to play an important role. The chief executive’s 
origin has been significantly linked to that of the cabinet members, even 
during political coalitions that cut across ethnic origin. 
The Hausa-Fulani ethnic group’s leadership has been particularly 
dominant since decolonization. Under the parliamentary system (1960–
1966), the group’s presence soared to 45.8%. The fact that the chief ex-
ecutive hailed from the North appears to have had real and symbolic ef-
fects on recruitment. Firstly, party politics linked to ethnic affiliations 
and voting patterns created platforms for convenient coalitions and first-
order cabinet appointments made by incumbent leaders holding state 
power. Figure 5.6 shows that during the first period of military rule 
(1MR: 1966–1979), the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group topped cabinet ap-
pointments and regional representations, while the Yoruba rose to the 
second position, ahead of the Ibos, who were shut off by the civil war. 
About a decade after the end of the war and with the inauguration of 
Shagari’s civil government (2CR: 1979–1984), the Igbos reassumed the 
second position while the Yoruba receded to the third. Notably, an Igbo 
(Alex Ekwueme) became vice president. However, as the ‘pendulum’ of 
political executive office-holding swung back, members of the Yoruba 
ethnic group again rose to occupy the second position under 2MR: 
1984–1998. 
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The influence of the strongman’s ethnic origin once more became 
manifest when Obasanjo (1999–2007) from the Yoruba ethnic group 
assumed the presidency under a democratic regime. He opened the ‘cab-
inet door’ widely to his kin, through the discretionary executive powers 
of appointment. He used this power so independently and preferentially 
that the proportion of Yoruba participants was on par with that of the 
Hausa-Fulani members. Figure 5.6 shows the semi-circular tendency in 
the period of Obasanjo’s administration (3CR: 1999–2007). Ethnic origin 
and its correlation with recruitment demonstrate the characteristic appli-
cation of status symbols alongside socio-economic attributes, especially 
professional classes. An ethnic analyst noted, ‘ethnicity does not artifi-
cially divert from economic interest and its faithful reflection of those 
interests’, after asserting that ‘ethnic groups and classes rarely overlap 
perfectly because while the former is based on passionate appeals the 
latter derives from economic interests’ (Horowitz 1985: 105–106).  
Figure 5.6 
Participation by Ethnic Origin and Regime (%) 
Source: Classified data from various editions of Year Books, Who is Who in Nigeria and Africa 
South of the Sahara 
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jointly reinforce the instrumentalist use of office power and status sym-
bols (Cohen 1972, Kofele-Kale 1976). This means that the so-called eth-
nic group leaders have real economic interests that they seek to realize. 
In the Nigerian polity, ethnic morphology is combined with class differ-
ences, (reflected, e.g. in education, profession and political party) to en-
hance access to and retention of political power. For example, a man 
from the majority ethnic group and regional power base with a socially 
valued profession (military, technocrat and university professor) is more 
acceptable for first-order ministerial appointment than, say, a woman 
labour leader who is from a minority ethnic group. That is, ethnic ap-
peals can serve class interests under certain circumstances.  
The domination of certain ethnicities in high political offices is often 
justified by population ordering. Yet elite circulation can also be depend-
ent on the personality of the communal agent. Moreover, clientele for-
mation and the preference of the chief political executive for own ethnic 
cohorts may come at the expense of social demands. In the process, 
symbolic roles are substituted for the social roles that the political elite 
ought to play and which should lead to the satisfaction of social de-
mands. That is, roles may come to be played through status symbols that 
fail to yield meaningful social outcomes but are associated with the 
whims and caprices of the ‘strongman’ leader (Dike 1999, Diamond 
2008). The distribution of political executive offices by ethnic origin and 
size of ethnic group enables the elite to intermingle through their com-
mon background and encourages cohesive and conformist elite composi-
tion and interests.  
The Nigerian constitution prohibits the use of ethnic symbols for po-
litical purposes. However, the informal coalitions assumed to cut across 
ethnic lines not only operate to strengthen national networks but also 
develop along ethnic lines and leadership. A pertinent observation is that 
ethnic background, or the derivation of the political elite from a particu-
lar ethnic group, has not implied representation of the interests of that 
ethnic group since colonial rule. Ethnic groups appear to be manipulated 
by ethnic group leaders who seek elected and appointed political offices 
rather than being represented through the effective channelling of social 
interests. It could be suggested that the so-called ethnic violence that 
persists in Nigeria is associated with a lack of social and political devel-
opment, which in turn drives the breaking loose of ‘primordial or com-
munal boundaries [ethnic, religious and regional forces] into the political 
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arena with disastrous outcomes’ (Kukah 2003: 101). For example, the 
current violent and destructive reactions to the 2011 presidential election 
demonstrate the profusion (excesses) of ethnic sentiments and loyalties 
that are likely based on manipulations by the political elite of Nigeria.  
5.3.2 Circularity by Regional Origin 
The linkage between first-order cabinet membership and specific aspects 
of ethnic morphology such as regional identities can be understood 
based on various factors. First, the active presence of representatives of 
the northern region, especially the Hausa-Fulani, in core political execu-
tive offices has been more consistent than that of other ethnic groups. 
Figure 5.7 shows the North’s overwhelming majority representation in 
political executive offices. Shagari’s government tops the list, despite the 
cross-regional alliances during his tenure. Williams (1999) showed that 
cross-cutting ethno-regional, socio-cultural and political coalitions and 
alliances during Shagari’s government raised hopes for the national unity 
and development which have eluded Nigeria since colonial rule. How-
ever, ethnic hegemonic interests not only re-emerged to sideline what-
ever pro-unity intentions existed among the political elites, but they also 
provoked intra- and inter-party squabbles that further cleared the way for 
the political class to reassert its dominance (Williams 1999, Gunther and 
Diamond 2003). In essence, there have been few differences between 
military and civilian regimes as to the typical ethno-regional pattern of 
over-representation of elite leaders. 
Size of the ethnic group has been influential, but it does not simply 
explain the assumed distinctive and conflictive primordial traits in politi-
cal elite circularity. Rather, there are indications of historic ‘cut and mix’ 
leadership initiatives (Smith and Hutchinson 1996). That is, regional elite 
manipulations motivated by religious aims have been instrumental in 
shaping regional control at the centre of political power. Though the in-
troduction of Sharia religious laws in political interactions at the secular 
level has been mostly in northern states (Paden 2008), it has boosted the 
strength of northern leaders in the central government by heightening 
religious cohesiveness and garnering support from Muslims. Also, since 
Uthman dan Fodio’s nineteenth century Fulani jihad, the Hausa-Fulani 
fusion and hegemonic intentions have been observed as transcending the 
religious motivations of strict adherence to the Islamic faith. Fusion and 
regional hegemony have systematically included economic and political 
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interests (Kukah 1993). This mixture clearly depicts the translation of 
communal (ethnic, religious and regional) features to political class inter-
ests, as suggested by Horowitz (1985). 
Figure 5.7 
Participation by Regional Origin and Regime (%)  
Source: Classified data from various editions of Year Books, Who is Who in Nigeria and Africa 
South of the Sahara 
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northern region and entrusted the reputable position of first prime min-
ister of Nigeria to a co-regional confidant Mallam Abubakar T. Balewa 
(Dudley 1982).  
Indeed, the morbid fear of destruction based on mutual distrust 
(Horowitz 1985) among the major ethnic groups has been historically 
orchestrated and used as means to build protective walls and guide the 
interests of each group so as to continually imperil democratic stability. 
This strange attitude and behaviour towards governance generated con-
flict. Even under military rule, such fears never abated. The unilateral 
annulment of the 12 June 1993 elections and the sharp protests it pro-
voked are signs of the morbid fear and mutual distrust of ethnic domina-
tion. The aftermath of the annulment actually took on an interregional 
conflict dimension because a northerner was the incumbent state leader 
and a southerner was implicitly or explicitly denied the chance of form-
ing the next federal cabinet. 
State power at the federal level increasingly nurtured northern politi-
cal and economic ambitions based on typical political styles that were a 
carbon copy of the hitherto institutionalized Native Authority. More-
over, loyalty to the Emir of Sokoto whose ancestry was linked to Uth-
man dan Fodio, the famed jihadist leader of the nineteenth century, was 
practically a sacred tradition there. Conversely, liberal education and in-
dividualistic tendencies – rather than unconditional loyalty to royalties – 
seems to have motivated more selfish than community orientations in 
the southern region (south-west and south-east with their adjacent mi-
norities). Personal interests were usually sustained, sometimes in favour 
of political values. Ethnic chauvinism, discrimination and social mobility 
by ascription or inheritance were more practised than collaboration, 
open competition and inclusion based on merit. The result was two ex-
tremely rooted and opposing values from the regions, converging at the 
national level to consolidate power to the detriment of popular participa-
tion.  
Even when contingent factors, such as war and the oil boom, 
emerged to cement elite unity and settlement in favour of development, 
as foretold by elite settlement analysts (see Burton and Higley 1998), the-
se mostly ended up in furtherance of elite values and interests at the ex-
pense of public preferences. Hence, the regional nature of elite represen-
tation and political power composition of the national executive power 
structure turned out to be a countervailing force (equally strong but with 
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opposite effects) to public choice. Indeed, the northern power bloc his-
torically has had a certain political advantage based on population that 
earned the group the lion’s share (more than 50%) of national wealth, a 
good part of it produced outside northern fringes (see Yin 2009).  
However, real monolithic regional power dominance appears to be 
based more on intentions and unilateral struggles than on real prospects 
of achievement without multilateral opposition. The power balance in 
the Nigerian polity seems to have been carefully maintained over time by 
and for the interests of select political elite members from across re-
gional boundaries. In spite of the high frequency of northern regional 
headship of the political executive power structure (Orji 2008), amid 
fierce intra-elite disputes for political power succession, the Nigerian po-
litical class seems conscious that a regional leader is necessary to guaran-
tee continuity without unwarranted impositions. Nigeria, recalled 
Crowder (1987), has repeatedly headed towards the precipice but never 
gets all the way in. In other words, a regional leadership made up of a 
national elite caucus seems more desirable to the Nigerian elite than a 
regional elite dominance capable of threatening multilateral interests.  
So, the extraordinary elite consensus culture appears to be activated at 
difficult moments, and it is readily deactivated to enable the return to 
business as usual. The political elite consensus stratagem appears to save 
Nigeria from total collapse but does not guarantee the country’s com-
plete evasion of the political abyss. For example, Obasanjo’s candidacy 
and election in 1999 seems to have saved Nigeria from imminent col-
lapse following the 12 June 1993 election debacle. But it did not save the 
country from the acute social strife that remains in evidence today. The 
‘consensus’ presidency under northern concession (Ibelema 2000: 213) 
appeared to have cemented Obasanjo’s succession leading to his re-
ascendance to political power with subsequent changes in the power 
composition that were not far from ethnic political intentions. Northern 
leadership under the aegis of the Hausa-Fulani hegemony and Sokoto 
caliphate has been built on far-reaching historic and cultural relation-
ships. However, continuity in northern leadership (especially during the 
post-colonial period) has received a big boost from military dictator-
ships. In other words, the dynamics of northern dominance since the 
first military regime (1MR: 1966–1979) have been built on the forceful 
power and influence exerted on the federal government structure.  
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Table 5.3 
Ethno-Regional Origin of Chief Political Executives amid Regime Change 
(1960-2007) 
Frequency  
Leadership 
Frequency  
Religious  
Affiliations 
Frequency 
Regime 
Types Ethno-Regional  
Nature  
Major-
ity 
Ethnic  
Size  
(%) N % Mus-lim 
Chris-
tian 
Oth-
ers 
Civil-
ian 
Mili-
tary 
Hausa-Fulani-Majority 
North 
29 8 57.1  8 0  0  3  5 
Yoruba - Majority West 21 3 21.4  0 3  0  2*  1 
Igbo - Majority East  18 2 14.3  0 2  0  1  1 
Minority Combined  32 1**  7.2  0 1  0  0  1 
Total  100 14 100  8 6  0  6  8 
Source: Compiled and classified from Whos’s Who in Nigeria, Africa South of the Sahara and 
Government Gazettes since Independence (1960).  
* One served in both military and civilian regime.  
**As at 2007 when Shehu Musa Yar’Adua was elected as President, only one ruler (Gen Yakubu 
Gowon) from the minority part of the Northern region occupied the chief executive office. 
Subsequently, Goodluck Jonathan became the Niger Delta minority leader who rose from the 
office of the vice-president to succeed Yar’Adua after the latter died of illness in 2010.  
 
 
Table 5.3 shows that 57.1% or eight out of fourteen chief executives, 
including repeated occupancies over different regimes, hail from the 
northern majority. Similarly, six or two-thirds of the nine occupants were 
members of the armed forces of Nigeria. Former military head of state, 
Retired General Y. Gowon was a northerner but from the northern mi-
nority. He was therefore not counted as belonging to the northern ma-
jority by tribal or even religious affiliation. Constitutional changes involv-
ing such sensitive issues as state creation or introduction of Sharia laws 
plus major executive appointments, especially ministerial office place-
ments at the federal level, have directly or indirectly been influenced by 
northern military strongmen. 
Moreover, major political alliances have frequently been sought or 
made with the northern elite group since colonial rule (see Vaughan 
1995, 2005). Northern boundaries have been adjusted and readjusted 
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disproportionately by military leaders with implicit ‘pork barrel’ political 
intentions. ‘Pork barrel’ politics implies the introduction of legislation or 
the taking of political decisions by the incumbent to enhance continuity 
and to legitimate illegal actions that benefit own or sectional interests.  
Yet, northern control at the political executive level is not based 
merely on size. The North also derives its power from a constructive 
appeal to tradition at the micro-level (grassroots) and to political and 
economic interests pursued at the macro-level (national government). In 
this, it quite often challenges the tenets of open competition and inclu-
siveness, especially their role in enhancing democratic changes. Northern 
leadership has historically epitomized the capacity to mobilize communal 
ethno-regional and religious forces to obtain powerful positions in the 
political executive so as to defend economic interests (Kukah 1993). 
Southern leaders are no less self-oriented. That is, self-interest has been a 
pervasive feature of the political class and core political executive elite. It 
has promoted their cohesiveness and persistence since political inde-
pendence.  
5.3.3 Minority Status in First-Order Cabinet Offices 
The historic exclusion of minorities from first-order ministerial ap-
pointments, often directed by the head of state, president and com-
mander in chief of the armed forces, are captured by the data. Table 5.3 
and Figure 5.8 portray the gap between inclusion and exclusion in the 
political processes that really matter for setting agendas at the national 
government level. The struggle for political power, as dominated by the 
majority ethnic group leaders, is perhaps a major source not only of re-
sentments but also of social and political conflict.  
In Figure 5.8, the labels ‘M/North’, ‘M/East’, ‘M/West’ and ‘N/ 
North’ are used to differentiate majority (M) and minority (N) office-
holding categories. The figure confirms the absence of minority partici-
pation in the chief political executive offices, which have been occupied 
fourteen times since decolonization and independence with only one oc-
cupant who hails from the minority part of the historically cohesive 
Northern region. Control, advantage and authority over rewards and val-
ue distribution have been at the core of the struggle to access the top-
most executive positions. In this struggle, ethnic markers have been used 
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to form opinions and trigger feelings that sensibly detour from the na-
tionalist pattern, reminiscent of the colonial and decolonization periods.  
Figure 5.8 
Political Leadership Participation by Ethnic Origin, 
 Region and Time (Years) in Office  
Source: Classified data from various editions of Year Books, Who is Who in Nigeria and Africa 
South of the Sahara 
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nomic and social) and levels (external and internal), ethnic groups be-
came reclusive under the various post-independence leaderships. Al-
though ethno-regional struggle for dominance at the centre preceded 
independence, there were signs of interregional economic and social co-
operation and open competition. It was relatively easier for one region-
ally rooted political party to win seats in another region than it became 
after independence and the revolutionary impact of oil revenues on gov-
ernment coffers since the 1970s. This latter has led political leadership 
attention significantly and ostentatiously away from whatever ideal of 
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national orientation carried over from sentiment upon independence. 
The rhetoric quickly shifted away from national integration to colonial 
legacy constraints.  
Conflict eventually became inevitable, when the masses, particularly 
minority groups, became fully aware of their continued marginalization 
and leaders’ use of legated structures to de jure and de facto expand their 
political power. The Niger Delta crisis can be invoked once more to il-
lustrate a different angle of the nature and impacts of the conflict on na-
tional stability. The Niger Delta impasse dates back to decolonization, 
and consolidation of the belief in a social model based on the capacity of 
the majority ethnic group’s leadership to integrate minority groups into 
the process of development (Nnoli 1978/1995). The Wenninck Com-
mission failed to meet the expectations of the minorities for autonomy 
through political decentralization within the federal structure (Osaghae 
1998). As the political fate of the minorities was deferred to the future 
and constitutional amendments, their fortunes became effectively de-
pendent on the majority ethnic group’s leadership volition.  
The Niger Delta area, inhabited as it is by minority groups, has since 
independence witnessed frequent social crises with untold consequences 
for the polity of Nigeria. Central to the struggle is the demand for inclu-
siveness in political processes and outcomes. Importantly, the response 
by the political executive leadership has been ambivalent, and protests as 
a result have degenerated into armed struggle (Edylyne 2001).  
As Table 5.8 shows, the Hausa-Fulani ethnic fusion in the North tops 
the list of participants in core political executive offices since decoloniza-
tion. The regional circularity of the elite in political executive offices has 
been the outcome of reproduction and alternation, mostly between the 
mainstream ethnic groups. Circularity of ethnic groups in the political 
executive elite class is most visible between the Yoruba and Ibo leader-
ships. These two have quite often ‘locked horns’ to occupy the second 
position in the ethnic hierarchy of the political executive elite. In the pe-
riod under study, ethnic power rivalry has implied the struggle to con-
solidate a vertical order of power formation rather than concern for an 
egalitarian power structure that supports regime openness and inclusive-
ness.  
Executive level representation of minority groups has been under-
mined throughout the various regime changes, each of which witnessed 
significant economic resource transformations based on oil revenue re-
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ceipts. Participation of the various ethnic groups can be understood 
more clearly if we draw on the dominant-dominated dichotomy based on 
the numeric and geographic distribution of the groups. The coincidence 
of ethnicity with regional and religious identities and the capacity of re-
gional leaders to transform these identities into effective power blocs 
helps to explain the persistence of dominant power relations that some-
times collapse into what Salih (2000) has called ‘majoritarian tyranny’ that 
erodes minority rights.  
Policies for curbing inequalities at the regional level, such as the ‘Fed-
eral Character’ principle which was designed to correct skewed admis-
sions in the public service, have been transformed by the ruling elite into 
ethnic resources for political power and domination at the centre. One 
practical implication of this outcome of institutional development has 
been the increased centralization of state power with ethnicity, religion 
and regional origin standing out as political instruments for achieving 
such pursuits. The military regimes presented no significant rupture ex-
cept that they outlawed by decrees the institutions that had guided ethnic 
mandates, but they did not in practice ‘extinguish ethnic rooted regional 
forces’ (Mustapha 2004: 258–259).  
The cabinet setup, as a result, has reflected the character of the high-
est executive leader and the effects of power relations and dominance in 
the polity. Nigerians appear to have been guided by such political sym-
bols as ethnic identity such that any ethnic group may be believed to 
have its own fair or sometimes abusive share of the national wealth. All 
that is needed is an ethnic member in the influential cabinet, either as 
president, vice president or minister. So, as Dike (1999) observed, status 
symbols may be the stimuli for support rather than rejection of a non-
performing political executive.  
A similar analogy applies to the military regime and its leadership. De-
spite the manifest rejection of ethnic approaches to politics, the military 
still deployed ethnicity to feign the aggregation of social demands. As 
noted in Chapter 4, the military leadership at the national level used the 
executive institution and military style discretion to expand the federated 
state structure and dilute ethnic biases in politics. At least in part, such 
expansion either turned into gerrymandering schemes or had little sig-
nificance for political efficacy. That is, apart from any contribution to-
wards keeping Nigeria out of the precipice (see Suberu 2006), military 
leaderships have not effectively changed the power structure. In short, 
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they failed to alter the manipulation of ethno-religious and regional sym-
bols for political and economic purposes. 
5.3.4 Circularity by Religious Background  
Religious affiliations of cabinet members show a prevalence of Christians 
over Muslims (Figure 5.9). However, religion is not strictly associated 
with regional and ethnic differences. Analysts usually portray religion as 
an influential political power resource manifest through the manipulation 
of its inherent ethno-regional symbols in Nigeria. Religion is often con-
sidered, especially in the North, as a uniting force along ethnic lines. 
Again, especially in the North where the majority is of Muslim faith, the 
idea of religious affiliation is sometimes applied to denote an egalitarian 
orientation and unity in opposition to the belief systems and practices of 
southerners.  
Figure 5.9 
Participation by Religious Affiliations and Regime (%) 
Source: Classified data from various editions of Year Books, Who is Who in Nigeria and Africa 
South of the Sahara 
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a similar Muslim background to most northerners, in fact vote for Chris-
tian candidates from the same ethnic group in the West against the 
northern candidates (with which they share common religious origin). 
Moreover, egalitarianism in the North has a special reservation for Mus-
lim women, who are usually less educated than women in the south-west 
Yoruba lands who have greater social leverage (Biennen 1986). The out-
come is the aggravation of obstacles to gender equality and political rep-
resentation of women at both the regional and the national levels, which 
is manifested through women’s weak competitiveness and inclusiveness 
in the political elite stratum. So, education, gender and religion in the 
Nigerian context can be said to be related in a way that impacts elite 
composition according to the tolerance level of the traditional belief sys-
tem in each region. 
A fuller understanding of the practical influence of religion must be 
based on the interaction of the trio of ethnicity, religion and regional ori-
gin. During colonial times and the decolonization period, these three 
jointly served the political elite as a bulwark for opposing colonial impo-
sitions and promoting the liberation movement and for the achievement 
of democracy in Nigeria. As argued by James Coleman (1994), tribal as-
sociations constituted the nodal points of leadership formation and the 
rise to political elite status through tribally supported political parties (pp. 
15–19). Also, Nnoli’s (1995) studies reveal ethnicity as the pivot of the 
nationalist movement that cumulated in independence in 1960.  
Nigeria’s key political executive leaders have engaged religion and re-
gion in the various institutional processes that have marked political 
changes through constitution drafting committees (CDCs), political party 
formation and pressure groups. For instance, ethnic power blocs in 
CDCs have sought to institutionalize non-secular institutions such as 
Sharia courts and processes of dispensing justice based on religious doc-
trines. In so doing, the political elite has deployed ethnicity, religion and 
region to enhance the divisive nature of politics. The important point 
here is that ethnic symbols are exposed to politics more through their 
manipulation by political leadership than through the organic nature of 
identities without politicization. 
It was noted earlier that the kinetic force of political parties and lead-
ership since colonial times and the decolonization period derives from 
ethnic associations which have played a crucial political role. In the ensu-
ing period various leaders have manipulated ethnicity and region as in-
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struments for accessing power through ethnic votes. All of the four ex-
cept one elected executive leader (prime minister and presidents) hailed 
from the majority ethnic North. Meanwhile, six military heads of state, 
or two-thirds, were Hausa-Fulani, save General Y. Gowon who origi-
nated from a minority northern ethnic group. General Ironsi with his 
short-lived tenure and Obasanjo who ascended to the position as stand-
in for General M. Mohammed (who was assassinated 16 February 1976) 
appear atypical in this regard.  
Ultimately, leaders in the various regimes have been observed as using 
ethnicity as the basis for recruitment into the cabinet. For example, dur-
ing Obasanjo’s presidential tenure (1999–2007), more Yoruba members, 
i.e. representatives of his ethnic group, ascended to political executive 
offices. Indeed, a look at the ethnic origins of members of the political 
executive during Obasanjo’s dual mandate (1999–2007) (see Figure 5.6) 
reveal the selective nature of his cabinet appointments. The ethnically 
lopsided appointments occurred despite Obasanjo being accused by his 
own ethnic group members of encamping with a different political party 
(the People’s Democratic Party) than the one supported by his tribe’s 
people and other groups in the South (the Alliance for Democracy). 
Natufe (2000: online) decried Obasanjo’s negligence of his supporters 
(mainly minority groups) in the South who had voted for him en masse. 
It is clear from the data on the regional, ethnic and religious back-
ground of Nigeria’s core political executive since decolonization that 
communal features combined with other power resources are a signifi-
cant means for accessing and retaining political power. However, as this 
pathway to political power is marked by conflictive relations between the 
majority and minority, it is at odds with the institutional pathway to de-
mocratic development. The idea of open competition and inclusion in 
democratic government is not necessarily to eliminate conflict but to 
neutralize the destructive effects of opposition (Bratton and de Walle 
1997). Hence, democratic procedures seek to preserve conflicting ele-
ments. Rather than destruction, the aim is to enhance their mutual de-
velopment.  
The persistence of ethnically based politics through all political re-
gimes experimented with so far in post-colonial Nigeria can be shown to 
be associated with weak elite attitudes towards social demands and de-
mocratic governance. To the extent that leaders are perceived as fraudu-
lent, intoned Kalu (2004), invoking ethnic identity is perceived as the 
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most effective strategy for making demands on the state. A perception of 
leaders as suspect increases the elite’s capacity to manipulate ethnic dif-
ferences to achieve their goals (ibid.). Awa (1999) similarly observed that 
‘the various forms of political chicanery, such as electoral frauds and de-
ceptive speeches that mark the severe departure from democratic gov-
ernment, can hinder the national psyche that becomes accustomed and 
amenable to instability as a way of life’ (pp. 129–142). Ethnic politics 
then generates a vicious circle because it denies state autonomy while 
driving people to look to ethnic patterns of relations as normal, despite 
extant formal structures. The impression of normalcy amid the political 
executive elite’s disrespect for formal procedures encourages business as 
usual, reinforcing the elite leaders’ incentive for fraud and their distortion 
of the demands placed on the political system. 
5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter analysed the circulation and characteristic composition of 
the core political executive elite based on data from running records re-
lated to the socio-cultural and communal backgrounds of the Nigerian 
core political executive. Since colonial rule, and despite many structural 
changes, a recurrent pattern of socio-cultural and communal origins has 
delimited the outlook of the holders of high political offices. Elite recur-
rences implies circulation or reproduction in key political executive of-
fices and roles, such as prime minister, president, vice president, minister 
and junta members, of people with similar personal backgrounds and 
representing comparable groups in society.  
Specific common social class and status symbols were observed to be 
associated with selectivity, exclusivity, inequality, continuity and social 
marginalization in political executive processes amid changes in political 
regime, economic resources and size of government revenue since politi-
cal independence. Data shows that socially important groups and sectors 
like the working class and unionized labour, minorities, students, wom-
en’s groups and peasants are under-represented or suffer outright exclu-
sion from the power structure. The analyses thus revealed the impor-
tance of a variety of resources in promoting elite ascension to political 
executive offices and their retention of power at the national level of 
government.  
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Firstly, common social class background was observed not only as in-
strumental for gaining access to political offices in the national govern-
ment but also as a resource for managing office longevity. Aging and pa-
triarchal patterns of social relationships have been translated into 
instruments for manipulating political office-holding and prolonging of-
fice tenure while making the latter appear more socially acceptable. Simi-
larly, people from certain professional and educational backgrounds have 
featured more prominently and persistently than others in the political 
executive power structure since colonial rule. Apart from the active pres-
ence of members of the military and legal, business and civil service pro-
fessions, university professors have reinforced the bureaucratic and 
technocratic machinery, enhancing continuity in first-order cabinet and 
junta positions. Meanwhile, the traders, farmers, students and trade un-
ion leaders who represent the masses of Nigeria are not represented – 
directly or indirectly.  
Secondly, and contrary to liberal-pluralist expectations, communal 
origin, specified by ethnic, religious and regional resources, constitutes a 
peculiarly common elite feature and has been the basis for developing 
certain political attitudes. The majority ethnic group elites manipulate 
regional and religious symbols, converting these to political resources 
(votes or support) with which to claim political power and roles at the 
national level of government. The conversion of communal symbols to 
political uses, despite regulations to the contrary in the formal institu-
tional realm, reveals the adoption of informal power as a self-serving in-
strument, i.e. for perpetuation of the elite in political executive offices. It 
implies that despite the heterogeneous outlook of the political executive 
elite derived from socio-cultural, traditional, economic, military and po-
litical resources, its composition is the product of recirculation instead of 
renewal. Elite recirculation in political executive offices points more to a 
ruling class than to strategic elite power and a functional role structure. 
Chapter 6 explores the composite character of the core political execu-
tive further through its social networks, which in turn are propelled by 
political party organizations, patronage and corruptive exchanges.  
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6 
Network Foundations of Elite 
Character and Continuity in  
Core Political Executive Offices 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter deepens the analysis of the social mechanisms underlying 
ascendance to and retention of political executive offices by the Nigerian 
elite. The chapter explores how the political elite use informal networks 
to retain political executive power and roles beyond but not necessarily 
above social background connections. It examines the antecedent and 
active role of political parties, which generally are considered crucial 
formal organizations for strengthening democratic institutions. In Nige-
ria, political parties are used to forge the informal networks that support 
power-holding in political executive positions. Here, political parties and 
their leaderships are found to exercise a paradoxical role, as they consti-
tute the backdrop for devising the informal social networks that coordi-
nate the activities and interests of the political class supporters of the 
national government elite. The guiding questions are three: (1) What are 
the historical and dynamic relationships between political parties, party 
leaderships and the informal networks underlying the occupancies of 
political executive offices since colonial rule? (2) How has the conduct of 
the political executive elite affected the political system? (3) What ex-
plains the permanence, i.e. continuity in political executive offices, of 
upper echelon government leaders in the years since colonial rule?  
6.2 Political Parties as Antecedents and Central to Elite 
Networks 
Considering that the Nigerian polity has often been analysed from the 
perspective of ethnic politics, power-sharing or state centrality models, 
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attention here is focused on the social networks that have emerged and 
grown in favour of elite continuity in political executive offices. Socio-
logical theories assert that networks derive from broader society. Net-
works can thus be seen as providing the historically and socially adminis-
tered autonomy and manoeuvrability of the Nigerian political executive 
elite. The elite emerge from their social backgrounds with little coordina-
tion; networks provide the functional dynamics through which diverse 
political actors, institutions, organizations and events cohere and collude 
for particular purposes. Thus, networks serve as the informal fora 
through which temporally and spatially disconnected Nigerian elite lead-
ers stick together to further special interests rather than public interests. 
The emergence and use of social networks for fostering access to and 
retention of political offices in Nigeria can be traced to party organiza-
tions, coalitions, cleavages, patronage and corrupt practices of the Nige-
rian elite. These enable the elite to capitalize on the direct and formal 
link between political parties and state control to informally and selec-
tively allot political and economic advantages through network arrange-
ments. Informality permits the operation of elite networks, regardless of 
political regime type. That is, both civilian and military regimes and rulers 
in Nigeria have resorted to networks to legitimate their rule while en-
hancing special interests. The presidency and organizations such as po-
litical parties, which are linked to the national executive government, the 
wider elite networks and social backgrounds, serve as recruitment agen-
cies for political executive actors. At the same time they deploy formal 
mechanisms such as the constitution to rationalize the role of the presi-
dency in allocating political offices.  
The purpose served by political parties in the wider Nigerian context 
transcends their customary role as formally organized groups which act 
within public institutional frameworks as interest intermediaries between 
state and society. In other words, the parties function as a network to 
accumulate resources and to articulate information between member ac-
tors, enhancing membership cohesion and formulating and effectively 
applying legal and physical sanctions against the masses. This network 
represents the interests of the Nigerian political class. The issue remains 
how and why an undesired political class endures over and above impor-
tant structural changes aimed at enhancing a socially meaningful trans-
formation of the political executive elite.  
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Figure 6.1 shows the different political parties from which elite mem-
bers have accessed political executive offices since decolonization. Even 
under military regimes, political parties appeared as instruments of ma-
nipulation for enhancing continuity and preventing significant changes in 
the power and role composition of the political executive elite. A singu-
larly notable historical fact about the Nigerian political elite class – and 
one that operates in support of its ‘all-round excellence’ and ‘overall su-
periority’, as analytically critiqued by Keller (1966/1991) – is that consti-
tutional reform has without exception been a product of colonial and 
decolonization initiatives or military inventiveness. That is, at no time 
has any crucial constitutional reform been initiated and managed by Ni-
gerian civilians. 
Figure 6.1 
Participation by Political Party Affiliations and Regime (%)  
(1951-2007)  
Source: Classified data from various editions of Year Books, Who is Who in Nigeria and Africa 
South of the Sahara 
 
 
Except the initial changes in the power and role composition of the 
highest executive offices (president and prime minister), acknowledged 
in Chapter 4, civilian politicians have simply and conveniently adapted to 
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ple, increased concentration of power and roles in the office of the pres-
idency has remained so since 1979, when the constitution promulgated 
by the military-led government of Major General Obasanjo came into 
effect. Apart from the power to appoint ministers based on the so-called 
‘Federal Character’ principle and to dismiss any of them for diverse mo-
tives, the presidency has reserved its power to sanction the number and 
operation of political parties through the, again presidentially appointed, 
Independent Electoral Commission.  
The political parties that emerged in the decolonization period pre-
date the 1946 Richardson Constitution, which inaugurated political liber-
alization. During decolonization (0DC: 1951–1960), three major parties 
consolidated their power status along ethnic lines. The National Council 
of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) was founded in 1944 by Herbert Ma-
caulay, with Macaulay as its first leader and Nnamdi Azikiwe as general 
secretary. With the death of Macaulay in 1946, Azikiwe took over the 
party’s leadership (Sklar 1963, Azikiwe 1970/2000, Bassey 2009). The 
NCNC was created from two parties: (1) the Nigerian National Democ-
ratic Party (NNDP), also formed by Macaulay, established on 24 June 
1923 and reclusively based in Lagos and (2) the Nigerian Youth Move-
ment (NYM) founded by professional and educated elites in 1934 (Dud-
ley 1982, Sklar 1963). Sklar (1963) showed that the NYM emerged with a 
relevant political discourse aimed at contradicting the British educational 
policy that tended to favour ‘vocational rather than liberal education’, as 
the group considered the latter more useful for political liberation (pp. 
48–49).  
Unlike the other major parties, the NCNC was not purely ethnically 
based at first, even though its development was eventually marked by 
ethnic and professional schisms before it evolved into an ethnic party, 
mainly of eastern Ibo extraction and leadership. Another political party 
that emerged at this time was ‘Action Group’ (AG), an offshoot of a Yo-
ruba cultural association known as Egbe Omo Oduduwa or ‘Association 
of the Children of Oduduwa’. Dudley (1982) noted that the Action 
Group’s initial platform of ethnic orientation towards politics did not 
receive wide support, i.e. beyond regional articulation, so the party re-
vised its slogan to ‘improving life quality and enhancing inclusive free-
dom’ (p. 47). However, this reversal did not extricate or significantly alter 
the ethnic rooting of the party.  
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The third major and most influential party to appear was the Nigerian 
People’s Congress (NPC), officially founded in 1951 (see Sklar 1963). It 
was an offshoot of two cultural associations: the Jam’iyyar Mutanen 
Arewa (JMA) or ‘Association of the Peoples of the North’ and Jam’iyyar 
Jaman Arewa or ‘Northern Nigerian Congress’. Its foremost leader was 
Ahmadu Bello, the Sultan of Sokoto. Another smaller party, the North-
ern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), was created as a masses-
oriented party by Aminu Kano, who left the NPC after dubbing it ‘pro-
establishment’ (Dudley 1982, see also Omotola 2009). There were other 
smaller parties as well, usually referred to as nanny parities and having 
limited political clout. Dudley (1982) observed that the nanny parties 
functioned as instruments for aggregating local support for the bigger 
parties. The larger parties were so called because their roots, affiliations 
and organization relied on the majority ethnic groupings. Thus, they 
could reckon on a greater followership and organizational resources in-
cluding influential ethnic notables and reputable leaders at the sub-
national and national levels. Nanny parties with ethno-regional and reli-
gious notables thus constituted crucial cross-cutting network nodes.  
6.2.1 Network Orientation of Political Parties Towards State 
Power  
A striking feature of the formation and peculiar evolution of political 
parties in Nigeria has been their capacity to defy formal institutional pre-
rogatives. The parties retained their typical structure and leadership ori-
entation after the failed experiences with multiparty systems in the First 
Republic, or as Dode (2010) put it, the ‘failure of parties in their respon-
sibility to contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria’s first 
Republic’ (p. 191). The political parties that emerged from the various 
institutional changes overtly aimed to achieve organizational autonomy 
vis-à-vis the state, and sub-national groups carried over organizational 
patterns and identities from the undesired past. The similarity with the 
organizations of the past demonstrates the persistence in the Nigerian 
polity of ‘historically developed and utilized exchange opportunities’ that 
permit the ‘exchange relations’ and sharing of ‘valued resources’ de-
scribed by Cook et al. (1983: 277) as characteristic of social networks.  
Analysts unanimously recall and reiterate that the political parties that 
emerged during the Second Republic were ‘reincarnations’ of the old 
ones in the First Republic (Izah 2003: 6, Dode 2010: 191, cf Yaqub 
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2002). That is, while the formation of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) 
took to Action Group foundations and adopted a leadership orientation 
towards the West, the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP) and National Party 
of Nigeria (NPN) emulated their NCNC and NPC origin with central-
ized directives from the East and North, respectively. The current Third 
Republic is governed by the three largest parties – the Alliance for De-
mocracy (AD), the All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP) and the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP). That last political party, the PDP, has won all 
of the general elections since 1999 and its members have featured in 
most political executive offices (Figure 6.1).  
Agbaje and Adejumobi’s (2006) portrayal of the characteristic appear-
ances of the three political parties as carbon copies of the erstwhile par-
ties is worth reproducing fully:  
The PDP turned out to be a party for retired military and police officers, 
buccaneer capitalists, old politicians of the conservative NPN stock and 
former technocrats. The AD is led by remnants of the UPN, who are 
mostly ethnic ideologues and erstwhile pro-democracy activists, all of 
whom make claims to the Obafemi Awolowo political dynasty. The 
ANPP on the other hand, has its origins and support base in the north; it 
relies on ethnic and religious symbols for political support, and has in its 
leadership apologists of the Abacha regime, retired soldiers and religious 
irredentists (Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006: 35). 
The above quotation warrants deeper reflection, particularly regarding 
the implications for elite continuity in political power and roles without 
significant social changes in power and role compositions. First, despite 
constitutional changes and nationally appearing identities and claims, the 
resurgent political parties are not workably disconnected from their past 
bearings, not only in terms of ethnic elite notables but also with respect 
to ethnic and network-based support. Secondly, the old political parties 
metamorphosed only in name, i.e. without significant changes to their 
identities and orientations. Consequently, the entry point to the national 
executive power structure has been disproportionally and continually 
more open to select members of the larger ethnic groups than to others 
in society. This is borne out by the data on political affiliations.  
Most importantly, political parties occupy a central position based on 
their significant role as network nodes interlacing the formal and infor-
mal realms of political power. Political parties serve to integrate, select 
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and co-opt clients through patronage-based allocations of political of-
fices to various party members and benefactors. True to network charac-
teristics, political parties are not just fundamental in the network nodes, 
but they are the resurgent products of a shared past that guarantees elite 
continuity in political executive power and roles. In both civilian and 
military regimes, political parties have been recognized as instrumental 
for manipulating power, co-opting resourceful elite individuals and 
groups and promoting continuity in executive offices. Because the post-
colonial political parties in Nigeria persist (especially those officially and 
continually acclaimed victorious) under elections that have often been 
considered fraudulent, and as no opposition party ever won general elec-
tions, a plausible deduction is that the leading political parties have been 
operating within a frail institutional framework.  
6.2.2 Party Regimes and Patronage-Oriented Leadership 
Networks  
The US power structure and network, as described by Mills (1956/2000), 
draws its strength from the dynamics of the capitalist system. The Nige-
rian power structure, based on its historical and dynamic pattern at the 
national executive level, relies on patronage exchanges. Gunther and Di-
amond (2003) noted that with the expansion of suffrage and under pres-
sure for socio-economic development, political parties sympathetic with 
the local notable parties dissolved into more elaborate patron-client par-
ties. Clientele parties are said to bring together for particular purposes 
notables ranging from traditional leaders to rising professional or eco-
nomic elite individuals or groups spread across geographical, functional 
or personalized circles of support (ibid.).  
In practice, combining the data on the professional (Table 5.2) and 
ethnic (Figure 5.6) composition of the core political executive elite re-
veals an interesting outline. That is, the main political parties in Nigerian 
post-colonial history have aggregated over time the human resources 
necessary for promoting a purposeful power structure which, in the na-
tional political executive sphere, looks after the interests of the political 
class. Hence, a particular paradox besets the highest level of the Nigerian 
power structure. Stated differently, highly rated professionals and ethnic 
notables use socially valued resources to harness state power and roles 
for particularistic purposes. For example, elections have continually been 
rigged in Nigeria since colonial rule, and no opposition party has ever 
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won. Jibril Ibrahim lamented the attitude of the political elite towards 
elections, which are often captured by what he calls ‘moneybags’ that 
operate to ‘exclude ordinary people with character and ideological com-
mitments’ (Ibrahim 2005: 20). Indeed, the repeatedly decried lack of ide-
ological underpinnings of the Nigerian political parties (Omotola 2009) is 
not just inimical to the development of political parties; in fact, it leads 
the parties to play a role contradictory to that commonly expected of 
political parties and leadership in a democratic system. In the Nigerian 
polity, ideological weaknesses reinforce the informal networks that oper-
ate by eroding the foundations of formal political institutions and out-
comes.  
Patronage exchanges are designed to support access to political power 
and its retention, especially within the powerful national executive gov-
ernment through the operation of congress parties. Another contradic-
tory aspect of the institutional use of political power and roles to foster 
particular elite interests is the fact that, from the First Republic onwards, 
state resources have remained the funding source for elite preferences. 
Thus, a close relationship can be established between patronage ex-
changes, power composition and elite leadership continuity in political 
executive offices. As long as the political elite patrons satisfy their clients, 
continuity in power and roles is secured. Dudley (1982) described the 
iniquitous pattern of patronage dealings in terms of the particularistic 
regularities of the motivations and expectations from both sides involved 
in the exchanges:  
For the Nigerian political elite, politics involves not the conciliation of 
competing demands (…) but the extraction of resources which can be 
used to satisfy elite demands and to buy political support. The political re-
lationship is essentially a relation between patrons and clients, in which the 
patron survives only to the extent that he satisfies the demand of his cli-
ents, and clients give their support in so far as the patron delivers the 
goods. The ability to extract, and therefore to deliver, is of course directly 
related to the extent of control over the instrumentalities of government 
(Dudley 1982: 63).  
Patron-client parties that are linked to the personality of powerful in-
dividuals, as typical in Nigeria, are weak organizations which pay little or 
no attention to the programmatic or ideological content of politics (Gun-
ther and Diamond 2003). Gunther and Diamond (ibid.) further noted 
that, unlike most masses-based parties, patron-client parties lack a pro-
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gramme that is either incremental or transformative for all of society. 
This reasoning corroborates Ibrahim’s (2005) observation that elections 
in Nigeria marginalize those with ideological loyalties. The weakness of 
patron-client political institutions attracts political personalities that ana-
lysts refer to as ‘strongmen’ (Bratton and de Walle 1997, Diamond 2008). 
The presence of strongmen in the political class and political executive 
facilitates the distribution of political offices amongst network members, 
while embodying the informal network’s larger potential. A key feature 
of the network is revealed, which is its flexibility, not in terms of social 
inclusiveness but its capacity to extend power and roles for self-serving 
purposes through a limited number of actors spread across regional and 
ethnic boundaries. Put differently, elite networks, served by political in-
stitutions such as the political parties in Nigeria, are associated with co-
optation.  
Amongst other illustrative cases, the ascension to power of Nigeria’s 
current chief executive indicates not only interlocking forms of office-
holding but also selective co-optation. Goodluck Jonathan was the state 
governor of the oil-rich Niger Delta minority zone before he was unex-
pectedly selected as the PDP’s vice presidential candidate for the 2007 
national elections. Worthy of mention is that the historically troubled 
and crisis-torn Niger Delta has in the past destabilized the nation’s wob-
bly political institutions even further. The depredation of oil infrastruc-
ture and kidnapping of foreign oil company employees have provoked 
shortfalls in the mainstay of government revenue (oil proceeds) and, by 
extension, in the patronage sources of leadership support.  
It was in the course of intermittent negotiations between the Nigerian 
government and Niger Delta leaders that Goodluck Jonathan became 
the PDP’s vice presidential candidate (the running mate of Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adua) on the recommendation of the incumbent chief executive 
President Olusegun Obasanjo. This peculiar recruitment process gained 
added significance when President Umaru Yar’Adua took ill and subse-
quently died, resulting in the elevation of Jonathan to the topmost execu-
tive office. It validates Serkeris’ (2010) argument about the need for weak 
leadership agencies to selectively co-opt strong elite clients to support 
the government or political regime. 
A significant aspect of patron-client relationships is that they are 
based on selective exchanges through which the power structure attracts 
and accommodates special interests to sustain oligarchic power. The pa-
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tron-client power structure is therefore evasive of social roles, public 
preferences and political institutions. Patron-client patterns in the Nige-
rian polity represent ‘ambivalent positions towards the more formalized 
structure of the society’ (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 2). Patron-client 
relations operate within informal power spheres and between select 
groups of likeminded people. They therefore divert attention away from 
formal political processes in ways that limit and weaken political interac-
tions while hindering performance at the global (national) level of gov-
ernance. 
Lessons from the neo-patrimonial model provide insights about the 
concentration of political power at the federal government level, espe-
cially in the presidency, as this office is associated with the authority to 
overrule decisions without representation of social interests. According 
to neo-patrimonial analysts, the presidential institution in Africa, includ-
ing Nigeria, uses clientele networks to distribute state resources in the 
form of public sector jobs and social benefits such as licenses, contracts 
and projects (Jackson and Roseberg 1994: 291–322; see also Forrest 
1994: 260–296). The use of state resources by the political elite occu-
pants of government offices in Nigeria is therefore designed to maintain 
patronage networks and to guarantee ‘legitimacy’, ‘stability’ and ‘predict-
ability’, as concluded by Bratton and de Walle (1997: 61–63). 
 Because patron-client networks show the characteristics of selectiv-
ity, i.e. of participants and beneficiaries in an enclosed circle of interac-
tions, they contain certain elements of informal, flexible networks – or 
‘flex nets’ which in Wendel’s (2009) interpretation are elusive in charac-
ter. That is, flex nets, and as applied in Nigeria, attract, coalesce and cen-
tralize elite resources such as organizational capacity and bureaucratic 
information, regarding e.g. the distribution of political offices and the 
award of contract jobs, especially at the political party level. These re-
sources permit interpersonal mingling, avoidance of outsiders, mutual 
sharing of benefits and support for continued terms in political offices. 
Orji (2008) described a linear-like movement of political parties from 
regional, during the First Republic (1963–1966), to national composi-
tions in the Second Republic (1979–1983). However, the cumulatively 
informal and flex net characteristics displayed by the Nigerian elite in 
political circles suggest a non-linear movement to network parties. That 
is, political parties appear to be settling for a self-contained and concen-
trated pattern of association vis-à-vis society at large.  
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6.2.3 Party Coalitions, Cleavages and Continuities Through 
Elections  
The role of political parties as a crucial foothold for ascent to as well as 
retention and transfer of political executive offices in Nigeria cannot be 
fully appreciated without reference to elections, party coalitions and 
cleavages. These have been the offshoot of elite manoeuvres through 
network nodes and interactions. Both elections and appointments to po-
litical executive offices form the means for political parties to express 
their organizational capacities and retain certain types of support. Politi-
cal parties and elections in Nigeria can inform who eventually succeeds 
who and by what means in government – i.e. the extent to which elite 
circulation occurs through electoral institutions and patterns of recruit-
ment into the core political elite. Indeed, political parties provide the in-
stitutional and organizational resources described by the critical elitists 
(Mills 1956/2000, Mann 1991) and new institutionalists (North 1991, 
Moe 2002) as the ‘currency’ for realizing power and interests. Elections 
are used by incumbent elites for self-perpetuation and to facilitate access 
to political offices for likeminded elite counterparts. They also provide a 
means to attenuate risks by bringing likeminded or amiable actors into 
the political establishment.  
Three general elections were held during the decolonization period: in 
1951, 1954 and 1959. The outcomes of these elections revealed the very 
powerful influence of regional parties rooted in the majority ethnic 
groups. These rose to fill key cabinet positions based on coalitions and 
counter-coalitions. The 1951 regional elections produced an experimen-
tal all-parties coalition cabinet without outright winners and losers. In 
contrast, the elections of January 1955 led to a cabinet formed by two 
dominant parties: the NPC, which actually won more seats, and the 
NCNC, which with 23 seats defeated the Action Group with its 18 seats. 
The win enabled the NCNC to nominate ministers for the western re-
gion where the Action Group was rooted.  
On 30 August 1957, a corner was turned in the composition and 
leadership of the national executive when Mallam Abubakar Tafawa 
Balewa became Nigeria’s first prime minister and head of government. 
He was the leader of the Northern People’s Congress in the Federal Par-
liament appointed by the then Governor General, Sir James Robertson. 
In addition to the ‘godfather’ role played by the departing colonial mas-
ters, ethnic morphology arbitrated in favour of Balewa’s vertically inter-
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locking positions. The northern region, where Balewa’s party had its 
roots, had a significantly greater allotment of seats (174 or 54%) than the 
East (73 or 23%) and West (62 or 19%). This advantage greatly boosted 
Balewa’s leadership, enabling him to climb from local representative to 
finance minister and ultimately to prime minister. The ethnic ties be-
tween Tafawa Balewa and Sir Ahmadu Bello who abdicated the national 
premiership for the regional one (Dudley 1982) served to promote the 
cohesiveness of northern elite leaders.  
As Figure 6.1 reveals, the number of NPC representatives in the cabi-
net rose significantly from 33.3% during decolonization to 43.9% under 
the post-independence regime (1CR: 1960–1966). There was then a fall 
in NCNC representation, although the party remained influential be-
cause of its alliance with the NPC, which continued through independ-
ence, and the fact that the NCNC had won a considerable number of 
seats in the West, the heartland of the Action Group (see Sklar 1966). 
 The Action Group’s participation declined further in the First Re-
public government, when the NPC-NCNC coalition pushed the Action 
Group to the opposition camp. Ige (1995) suggested that the coalition 
had a weak moral basis because of the skewed power structure that re-
sulted from exclusion of the Action Group and its many followers, who 
were now forced into the opposition. The issue here is less the alterna-
tive role of opposition that the Action Group found itself in than the 
relationship between government and opposition. As a political idea, and 
in practice, the political opposition is designed to deepen the institution-
alization of democracy through elections and alternated leadership suc-
cessions. Most importantly, the political arrangements between the NPC 
and NCNC portray the outreach of the network that at the national level 
became conveniently circumscribed to inter-regional and inter-ethnic 
political exchanges.  
It could be suggested that instead of falling back to a weaker position, 
the NPC decided to pre-empt an alliance between the Action Group and 
the NCNC by co-opting NCNC elite leaders within the emergent pa-
tronage network (Dudley 1982). A detailed review of accounts in the lit-
erature suggests that the network’s objective included the manipulation 
of policy agendas for its own purposes (Nwabueze 1973, Nwaolise 
1995). The alliance that defined the network, for example, used executive 
power and roles to exercise a firm control over policy agendas, redirect-
ing the voting behaviour of parliamentarians towards the approval of 
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bills mostly sponsored by the political executive and curtailing civil liber-
ties from below (Nwabueze 1973). The political alliances sustained 
through networks since the First Republic have hinged on the co-
optation of party notables, leadership personalities and patronage ex-
changes (Diamond 1993, Gunther and Diamond 2003, Kurfi 2005, 
Vaughan 1995, 2005).  
To start with, the operation of the political parties that has taken part 
in elections since political independence in Nigeria have been hinged less 
on liberal-pluralist precepts than on what Diamond and Gunther (2003) 
referred to as elite and ethnic-based organizations. These organizations, 
according to these analysts, use state resources to perpetuate the interests 
of their founders and special supporters rather than representing ethnic 
group preferences or those of the masses through government authority 
and roles (ibid.). They further showed that congress parties are a special 
brand of ethnic-based party, reliant on party notables and personalities 
across different ethnic groups through which patronage exchanges are 
accomplished (ibid.). Thus, the necessity to attain and maintain political 
executive offices that permit the distribution of state resources through 
patronage networks leads to the formation of congress parties. 
As Kurfi (2005) noted, during the 1951 elections in the North, district 
heads enjoined village heads to handpick ‘notables’ rather than elect per-
sons in the village to represent the party at the district electoral college 
(pp. 2–3). The NPC was the first regional party practically patterned on 
alliances with ‘local elites’, i.e. local notables sharing the traditional and 
religious values of the North (Whitetaker, Jr. 1977). For example, local 
structures based on elite notables allowed the party to seek support di-
rectly from ‘village and district heads, Native Authority (NA) functionar-
ies and the chiefs without [concern] about developing a mass party organ 
to woo the mass’ (Dudley 1966: 358). Hierarchic values of command and 
obedience without debate or contestation (i.e. the free political interac-
tions expected by liberal pluralists) thus served to guarantee the acquies-
cence of the masses while legitimating political executive power and 
leadership roles at the national level of government.  
Moreover, the creation and recreation of convenient party regimes 
contributed to reproduce election results by selecting elite members to 
protect the continuity pattern. Power collusive party regimes in Nigeria 
have usually been the product of manipulations by chief executives and 
their allies seeking self-perpetuation in political offices. Time in office 
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equates with experience in using state resources to buy off the election of 
supporters (Biennen and de Walle 1989). Barely had the alliance between 
the NPC and NCNC waned during the first government mandate of the 
First Republic before the two parties clung to different political coali-
tions most of which involved splinter party groups.  
Failed attempts at ‘consolidation elections’ (i.e. beyond first mandate 
elections), observed Agbaje and Adejumobi (2006), have made open re-
gimes ‘more difficult to manage in Nigeria’ (p. 37). These authors ob-
served that ‘the interests and forces at stake in the consolidation process 
are more diverse, with some of them controlling the election machinery’ 
(ibid.). They cited the failed 1964–65 elections and the 1983–84 general 
elections as evidence of attempts by the ruling party ‘to contrive and 
monopolize the electoral space, engineer grand electoral fraud, as well as 
hatch a deliberate plot to move the process towards a one party domi-
nant democratic order that favours the latter’ (ibid.). This scenario pre-
vailed in the 1983 elections, during which ‘the NPN which hitherto con-
trolled seven of the nineteen states wanted to expand its dominion from 
seven to twelve states through electoral fraud’ (ibid.). Traditional rulers 
played a leading role in the ample coalitions that for the first time im-
plied a wider network of individuals and groups. 
6.2.4 Role of Traditional Rulers in Elections and Elite Continuities  
Despite the fact that traditional rulers were deprived of political authority 
in the post-colonial period, they have continued informally to play an 
active role in the networks that shape winning political parties. They are 
not just network members; they also influence the direction taken by 
elections and appointments to political executive offices. Vaughan doc-
umented the initiation in the first military regime period (1MR: 1966–
1979) of a network-oriented campaign to consolidate power before the 
1978–79 general elections by northern traditional rulers during the cele-
bration of the fortieth anniversary of Sir Abubakar III as Sultan of Soko-
to and Sarkin Musulmi, Muslim leader of northern Nigeria. The joint oc-
casion was reported as having triggered a national movement and 
alliance between the emirs and influential northern civil servants and 
businesspersons. That alliance produced the NPN party, which became 
the most extensive nationally, for the first time permeating all regional 
and ethnic boundaries to co-opt ‘southern allies from Igbo, Yoruba, Edo 
and Efik minority groups’ (Vaughan 2005: 125).  
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Most importantly, the network twice backed the election as executive 
president of Alhaji Shehu Shagari (in 1979 and 1983) (from the northern 
region) with as vice president Alex Ekwueme (a business tycoon from 
the eastern region), and it was also central in the appointment to cabinet 
positions of various individuals, many of whom were selected by tradi-
tional chiefs (see Vaughan 1995, 2005). On the other hand, Vaughan 
(2005) noted, traditional rulers awarded chieftaincy titles to leading po-
litical executives. Shagari himself took on the title of ‘turaken’ in the Sul-
tan’s court. This chain of mutual exchanges also conferred the informal 
role of government advisers to the emirs. In other words, while patron-
age exchanges in Nigeria perhaps changed their face and outreach, the 
political goal of power accumulation through elections that reproduced 
an unaccountable cadre of executive elite leaders remained the same.  
At the height of a military style campaign to install a two-party system 
and extend office-holding through a rather façade-like civilian regime, 
Ibrahim Babangida, a northerner who was the first to assume the title of 
military president of Nigeria (1985–1993), was noted as having adopted a 
chieftaincy title in the eastern Igbo zone (Adjaiye and Misawa 2006). 
Similarly, Adjaiye and Misawa (2006: 5) reported that both President 
Obasanjo and Vice President Atiku (1999–2007) held chieftaincy titles 
and exercised ‘significant influence’ over social groups and those others 
who accept or simply respect the authority of honorary chieftains. The 
presidential aspirant of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) party in 1999, 
Olu Falae, who was a bureaucrat and former federal minister also held a 
chieftaincy title which he often highlighted during his failed bid to pre-
side over the nation’s highest executive position.  
The participation of traditional institutions in the post-colonial Nige-
rian polity demonstrates not simply the power brokerage role by tradi-
tional rulers, but also the influence that traditional chiefs have exercised 
on the composition of the political executive and the political system 
through informal network systems. Firstly, the use of chiefs and chief-
taincy titles for electoral and political purposes has characterized both 
civilian and military regimes. Despite coercive removals, deprivation and 
weakening of chieftaincy rights following colonial rule, traditional titles 
were increasingly assumed by civilian and military rulers (Adjaye and Mu-
sava 2006). In so doing, these rulers appropriated the deeper and local-
ized contacts of the traditional power-holders to accumulate power, roles 
and support at the formal level of political office-holding.  
 Network Foundations of Core Political Executive Offices 155 
Secondly, and because traditional rulers advised elites on recruitment 
into political executive offices, new elite members tended to have his-
torical ties with informal powers at the traditional level. As such, they 
usually represented not only their interests as these converged with those 
of the political class but also the interests of their traditional rule men-
tors.  
Thirdly, the assumption of traditional titles by occupants of key po-
litical executive offices implies office ‘interlocking’ and role interchange-
ability, reinforcing the power and continuity of traditional leaders’ influ-
ence on formal political offices. Interchangeability of roles enhances the 
informal (flex) network characteristic of elite interactions. That is, elite 
network members can assume political executive office from a particular 
elite background, e.g. in the military, as a bureaucrat or professor, and at 
the same time hold a chieftaincy title. Overlapping roles boost the poten-
tial of the network to create, recreate and alter e.g. elite admission criteria 
and to use rules for particular purposes without significant social chal-
lenge. This enhances elusiveness, i.e. avoidance of accountability.  
6.2.5 Ruling Parties’ Fixation on Political Power and Continuity  
Similar to the situation in past civilian and even military regimes, the rul-
ing party in the current Third Republic (1999–2007) has built on past 
experiences, patronage-based networks and cross-cutting political articu-
lations realized through intra-party cohesion and schism. Since 1999, the 
PDP has remained the ruling party (Agbaje 2006). Figure 6.1 confirms 
the superior hold on executive power and roles of PDP members, who 
have featured prominently in political executive offices since 1999. Al-
though the PDP has not relied on inter-party coalitions to win elections, 
its internal organization and electoral scheming has remained the by-
product of broad intra-party coalitions, cleavages, manipulation and of-
fice interlocking.  
Thus, the PDP by itself constitutes a large network of political per-
sonalities and organizations whose origins cut across similar ethno-
regional, religious and professional groups that are coordinated and con-
trolled by the presidency. Often, the chief government executive stands 
as party chairperson, implying a horizontal type of office interlocking 
that supports power concentration and continuity in political executive 
offices. It is on record that former President Retired General Olu 
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Obasanjo not only exhausted the eight-year constitutionally permitted 
mandate but also sought to extend his term of office through a third 
mandate that was overtly rejected by the National Assembly. 
The PDP’s internal organization, especially the form and outcome of 
its primary elections, is illustrative of personalization of power and ‘god-
father’ politics. The process combines patronage exchanges with alli-
ances, cleavages and presidential impositions propelled by a historical 
and dynamic clientele network reliant on state resources and strongman 
leadership for its survival. To start with, the 1999 post-military regime 
election of Obasanjo as the nation’s second executive president derived 
from an informal consensus scheme that re-inaugurated the so-called 
‘presidential zoning system’. Moreover, PDP primaries since 1999 have 
been characterized by notorious network processes from which only 
candidates favoured and patronized by the chief executive emerge victo-
rious.  
The most frequently noted example of high-handed manipulation of 
intra-party elections occurred during the December 2006 PDP primaries 
from which Yar’Adua emerged as the presidential candidate with Good-
luck Jonathan as his running mate. Analyses of the primaries reveal that 
President Obasanjo schemed hard to confirm the candidacy of 
Yar’Adua, allegedly using powerful government machineries such as the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to vilify disfa-
voured candidates. According to newspapers and research reports, many 
candidates for the primaries in the network mysteriously withdrew their 
candidacies as the EFCC levelled on them one accusation or another 
(Alifa 2008, Menas 2006). As Menas (2006) reports, leaders such as Riv-
ers State Governor Peter Odili, who nonetheless opted to support 
Yar’Adua’s challenger (former national security adviser Aliyu Moham-
med Gusau) and his supporters, faced the wrath of the EFCC.  
In short, intra-party primaries demonstrate the interplay between in-
formal power-holders and formal institutional authority-holders in the 
Nigerian polity. Firstly, intra-party primaries were designed to appoint 
selected, co-opted and unrepresentative national executive elite members 
willing to operate in support of powerful government patrons. Secondly, 
intra-party primaries since 1999 have displayed the converging nature of 
the social networks that have backed political executive office-holding 
since the post-colonial period. The network’s range in the First Republic 
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was primarily sub-national, due to its highly circumscribed ethno-
regional identity and membership.  
During the Second Republic, despite the fact that the winning politi-
cal alliance was limited to two major parties, party identities and mem-
berships assumed a more national than ethno-regional scope. Thus, for 
the first time a much broader national network of elite members 
emerged to represent the political class. In the Third Republic, the extant 
network has been broadly composed of a single ruling party. Further-
more, no opposition party has ever won elections. Despite expansion of 
the number of contending parties, the network remains cohesive and 
inflexible. 
6.3 Political Executive Elite Attitudes Towards the 
Political System  
6.3.1 Commitment to Political Accountability  
The liberal-pluralist idea of political accountability is based on coherent 
elite values and interests being maintained in correspondence with social 
preferences and, by extension, the political system. Such coherence re-
quires an open and inclusive governance regime as well as, and above all, 
adaptation and adoption of attitudes and behaviours, especially by politi-
cal executives, to institutional and public scrutiny. The expectation is that 
structural and institutional changes will redirect the attitudes of political 
executive office-holders towards public choices. Put differently, selfish 
orientations, such as patronage, corruption and rent-seeking in state of-
fice, which may emerge to weaken the response capacity of office-
holders, will be subjected to institutional constraints. Social measures 
such as formal education are encouraged, as they are expected to pro-
mote enlightenment and tolerance of opposition groups, which are 
needed to maintain the ideals and operatives of equality and accountabil-
ity.  
Chapter 5 observed that members of the political executive elite share 
inter alia a common educational background through graduate and post-
graduate schooling experiences and qualifications acquired at home and 
abroad. So far the current chapter has focused on the role of political 
parties and their respective leaderships in the formation and character of 
core political institutions and the elite leadership itself. The clear point 
has been that patronage exchanges typify the relationship between politi-
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cal parties, executive level state institutions and members of society. Pa-
tronage exchanges in the Nigerian polity operate side by side with cor-
rupt practices. Jointly they impinge on any prospect for accountability in 
the political system. Similar to patronage exchanges, corruption involves 
the practice of exchanging public services for private gains. These ex-
changes derive from informal power relations within government agen-
cies, influenced by private interests.  
Critical elite analysts emphasize the role of the political elite’s special 
interests in collusion with the power of economic agents which the elites 
require to curtail the social agents’ capacity for converting de jure (for-
mal) political rights and liberty into realistic freedom (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2008). The Nigerian polity has witnessed a pattern of power 
concentration among a few elite individuals and groups resorting to the 
centralization of political authority in the federal government. Central-
ized political authority has served to maintain firm control over the dis-
tribution of state resources through informal means such as patronage 
and corruption. Thus, despite structural changes, inter alia including a 
widening of political rights and civil liberties since colonial times, elite 
collusion continues to be a major linchpin of political executive elite 
power. This collusion has depredated state coffers, especially through 
corrupt practices, hindered the institutionalization of political liberties 
and civil rights and provoked social instability.  
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 show that at least since 2000 corruption has 
emerged as a social and political problem in the Nigerian public service. 
The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (TI-CPI) 
scores Nigeria between 5 and 0, a range that indicates countries with the 
most corrupt public sector. Between 5 (representing the borderline) and 
the maximum index value of 10 are the least corrupt countries. Because 
corruption in Nigeria operates through informal relationships between 
similar individuals with common interests mainly realized with the use of 
state resources, it can be considered an aspect of the elite’s attitude to-
wards political power retention. Dishonest social interactions motivated 
by financial gain and power retention aims are selective, exclusive and 
serve to evade the institutional oversight characteristic of accountability. 
Such interactions promote the occupancy of political offices for self-
enrichment at the expense of social development. Corruption thus weak-
ens the very basis of horizontal accountability, i.e. that of civil society-
level inquiry. 
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Table 6.1  
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and Nigeria’s Scores, 2000–2008 
Year CPI Actual Country 
Position (Nigeria)* 
Last Country M 
Position (Other)**  
Margin for Nigeria 
(Last – Actual)*** 
2000 1.2 90 90 0 
2001 1.0 90 91 1 
2002 1.6 101 102 1 
2003 1.4 132 133 1 
2004 1.6 144 145 1 
2005 1.9 152 158 6 
2006 2.2 142 163 21 
2007 2.2 147 179 32 
2008 2.7 121 180 59 
Source: Compiled from yearly reports of Transparency International at www.tranparency.org 
*Indicates Nigeria’s CPI ranking amongst the surveyed countries. **Shows the last country’s 
CPI ranking amongst the surveyed countries. ***Demonstrates the difference between the last 
ranked country and Nigeria’s position – note that significant marginal increases occurred as 
more countries were added  
 
 
Corruption has a pervasive effect on political accountability because it 
reduces the social orientation of policies. Such reduction occurs, e.g. by 
diverting away (for particular purposes) public investments in education, 
which are needed to enlighten citizens and shore up voters’ capacity to 
holdback errant political leaders. In Nigeria, corruption impinges in vari-
ous ways on the political elite’s moral force and the capacity of citizens 
to assign responsibilities and act on such assignments. Firstly, it dimin-
ishes the political executives’ ability to formally protect voting rights and 
enhance service delivery as a typical function of the agency of the politi-
cal leadership. For example, national security institutions, such as the 
police, considered crucial to regime consolidation through law enforce-
ment and realization of public policies to protect the poor (Alemika 
2003), become either too permissive or too selective in service delivery. 
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Figure 6.2 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Positions of Nigeria since 2000 
Source: compiled from yearly reports of Transparency International at www.transparency.org 
Obs: last column on ‘margin’ calculated by author. Note that significant marginal increases 
occurred as more countries were added. 
 
 
The two extremes (permissiveness and selectivity) constrain the pub-
lic’s chance to protest against exclusion or to seek justice in courts. A 
report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) about Nigerian police operations 
since the inception of the current civilian regime in 1999 denounced the 
degradation, torture and assassination of suspects in ways reminiscent of 
the military regime period (HRW 2005). The Nigerian police is said to be 
under-resourced, with its staff numbering about 325,000 set against an 
overall population of over 140 million. Moreover, many of the nation’s 
police force resides in densely populated urban areas where they are ex-
posed to bribery (Hills 2008). However, the problem of police culture 
goes beyond issues of understaffing, under-resourcing and the colonial 
legacy, to include a weak orientation towards public security. The Nige-
rian police are considered to represent the ruling elite more than the Ni-
gerian people (ibid.). Little or nothing can be expected in terms of a co-
herent police culture geared towards protecting electoral and post-
electoral rights without adaptation of the political culture of the elite oc-
cupants of executive government positions to standards of social con-
sent and a moral sense of responsibility (as the CPI indicates, Table 6.1).  
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In practically all elections since independence, citizens were denied 
basic rights to autonomous choice. Strongmen, financial ‘godfathers’ and 
street thugs have taken control of electoral processes and outcomes 
(Olarinmoye 2008, Diamond 2008). Predatory elite formation has tram-
pled on human rights and hindered property rights. Deficiencies in 
property rights discourage current and potential investors at home and 
abroad. Negative outcomes such as abused rights and closed opportuni-
ties are observable in the Nigerian polity and also pre-empt good gov-
ernance during and after elections.  
6.3.2 Commitment to Political Rights and Civil Liberties  
In practically all Nigerian political regimes since independence, formal or 
informal arrangements, or a combination of both, have been emphasized 
and used to fill appointed political offices. For example, achievement 
criteria have been combined with ascription in the form of a quota sys-
tem and ‘Federal Character’ to compose the cabinet in different govern-
ments (see Orji 2008). Consequently, class and status symbols have been 
blended to determine which individuals would be included as members 
of the core political executive. The institutionalization of ascription crite-
ria in the post-colonial Nigerian polity was in theory intended to rein-
force openness and social inclusiveness in decisive political processes 
through implementation of the consociational approach to democracy 
(see Lipjhart 1977, 1991). In practice, the outcome emphasized by elite 
and political system analysts has been the quality rather than quantity of 
elite composition (Prewitt and Stone 1976, Verba 2003, Zinnecker 2009) 
in key political executive offices. Moreover, the point is not whether ine-
quality is inherent or historical in Nigerian society, but the extent to 
which the different recruitment criteria (achievement or ascription or a 
combination of these) have contributed to attenuate the heinous effects 
of inequality on the polity and improve the quality of the political sys-
tem.Liberal-pluralist thinking asserts equality as a basic principle of par-
ticipation in political processes, the idea being that inequalities will be 
counteracted through the opening of ‘participatory opportunities’ 
(Cromptom 1998: 6). Insight into how the openings of social opportuni-
ties are engineered as circumstances (political regimes and economic re-
sources) change is crucial for understanding the real condition of Nige-
ria’s political system. To Verba (2003), ‘the political systems’ potential to 
turn weaker or stronger depends less on who participates in terms of the 
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amount than the representation of interests’ (pp. 663–679). Thus, quanti-
tative changes in representation are less important than the dual proc-
esses of cross-cutting social participation and substantive representation 
of interests based on equal weighting of preferences. The operation of 
equal preferences involves the ‘meta-activities and processes’ of the state 
and requires from the ‘national executive’ the activation of pertinent po-
litical institutions for ‘protecting human rights’ (Hyden et al. 2004: 12–
19) and, by extension, the political system (Verba 2003).  
As discussed in Chapter 5 and in the preceding sections of the current 
chapter, institutions such as political parties and the executive branch 
(which essentially includes the presidency and cabinet) have been histori-
cally dominated by individuals and groups with similar characteristics in 
Nigeria. This domination has implied the opening of opportunities, such 
as the right to participate in political processes and outcomes, to few in-
dividuals or groups. Opportunities in the polity have thus been restricted 
for others or, as the critical elitists identify them, the masses. Regime dy-
namics in Nigeria, especially under the observed alternation between au-
thoritarian (military) and democratic rules, have implied tension more 
than substantive guarantees of political rights and civil liberties. In par-
ticular, the fact that major aspects of these political regimes have played 
out within the coercive framework of military rule has left in place op-
pressive patterns of conducting state business in Nigeria.  
Political regimes, as Munck (1996) recognized, are characterized by 
both procedural and operational patterns that complement each other in 
terms of processes and the expected outcomes of the system. A political 
system is affected not only by the nature of the rules governing political 
conduct (including that of the elites). The political system is also, and 
very importantly, shaped by how rules are managed (Fishman 1990, Hy-
den et al. 2004) to produce the expected outcomes, e.g. in terms of ade-
quately guaranteed rights of participation. This is especially valid when 
the political system is called ‘democracy’.  
Freedom House data (Figure 6.2) on regime trajectories and out-
comes in Nigeria since 1972 may not reveal all of the relevant features 
and operations of the various governance regimes. However, in the ab-
sence of more meaningful indicators, the Freedom House data provide 
the basis of this study’s measured levels of regime openness and social 
participation based on respect for political rights and liberties. Between 
1972 and 1978, the Nigerian political system was graded ‘partially free’ 
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with political rights rated between 5 and 6 and civil liberties scoring be-
tween 3 and 4 points. Freedom House is said to neither assume positions 
nor stipulate policies or political strategies that should be followed. Be-
tween 1972 and 1978 in Nigeria, the political regime was dictatorial un-
der various military governments. As the analysis in this study is not fo-
cused on the political systems themselves but on the constraining factors 
of those systems, the Freedom House indicators can be interpreted as 
portraying a political regime offering limited political rights and social 
mobility during this time. 
Figure 6.2 
Freedom House Rating of Democracy in Nigeria (1972-2008)  
Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw/FIWAllScores.xls  
 
 
The curtailed character of the 1972–1978 political regime, as indicated 
by the Freedom House data, corroborates Gill’s (2000) assertion that the 
‘ruling authorities’ under ‘limited’ or ‘partial’ liberalization does not nec-
essarily relinquish control but only make convenient concessions to cer-
tain groups or persons while maintaining the right to intervene and re-
verse unfavourable outcomes (p. 48). Gill (ibid.) used the concept of 
‘limited liberalization’ to make distinctions about democratization, as the 
total opening of the polity and inclusion with tolerance of opposition 
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groups. In fact, the Nigerian system seems to be lacking in democratiza-
tion. In the 1970s post-civil war context, particularly during the second 
half of the decade (during Obasanjo’s first headship of the Nigerian 
state), there was little opening of the polity before the Second Republic 
was officially inaugurated on 1 October 1979. Moreover, even the proc-
esses guiding that transition, such as the Constitution Drafting Commit-
tee; have been described as elite dominated (Ademolokun 1985).  
Despite the fact that this period witnessed the intervention of the mil-
itary elite in politics and despite the coercive nature of political attitudes 
and behaviour, a certain measure of public mobilization was allowed 
with guided participation, even though the system remained closed in 
terms of political contestation and tolerance to opposition. One conces-
sion was the expansion of the number of federated states, designed to 
diffuse power and promote grassroots governance. The recourse to in-
corporation or co-optation was a product of experience, as the short-
lived military government of Aguiyi Ironsi (1966) had been criticized for 
paying insufficient attention to grassroots contacts either through tradi-
tional rulers or civilian politicians (Ige 1995). Subsequent rulers resorted 
to incorporation or co-optation to enhance grassroots contacts and ac-
quiescence with the purpose of legitimating the regime’s proposals and 
actions. For example, Gowon’s government (1966–1975) called upon 
regionally acclaimed politicians who had served in the defunct First Re-
public (1963–1966) to assume cabinet positions (Nwaolise 1995).  
With the reintroduction of democratic rule (1979–1983), Freedom 
House scores improved considerably: the score for political rights rose to 
2 and that for civil liberties to 3, and the political regime was character-
ized as ‘free’. This ranking implies that political contestation and partici-
pation were (overtly) encouraged. The Freedom House evaluation, how-
ever, failed to note the rampant rent-seeking, patronage and corruptive 
exchanges. These errant practices vigorously re-emerged and increasingly 
came to characterize political attitudes and behaviour towards the exer-
cise of state authority. Apart from the role of devious or wilful political 
games, the political elite deployed coalitions to avoid social inclusion and 
the equitable distribution of state resources. The coalitions strengthened 
the informal networks used by the elite to exclude outsider participation. 
When Shagari’s government was overthrown in December 1983, the rea-
sons given by the coup plotters related to ineptitude, nepotism and cor-
ruption (Joseph 1995).  
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According to political system analysts, especially those concerned 
about ‘effective democracy’, rampant coercive and corruptive practices 
erode various qualities of plural democracy, such as the workings of so-
cial group autonomy and the inclusiveness that produces the qualitative 
representation of interests (Wetzel and Inglehart 2008). Notwithstand-
ing, political and financial corruption remained common in Nigeria. 
Consistent lack of tolerance for autonomous and inoffensive political 
activities reflected government restrictions on civil liberties. Such restric-
tions translated into highly oppressive military tactics such as the Odi 
Village Massacre of 1999 that generated terror among the local popula-
tion because ‘a group of youths were reported to have abducted six po-
licemen and eventually killed them’ (Chijoke 2009: 53). Such military tac-
tics are known to lead to strategies of intimidation, often followed by 
violence aimed at instilling fear and forcing compliance.  
In the process, political rights are grossly violated instead of pre-
served. Dahl’s association of widespread violence in the state and society 
with ‘strain on any political system’ (1995: 78–79) applies to the Nigerian 
system based on the trampling of political liberties such as freedom of 
expression and social voice and demonstrated in the Odi Massacre. Al-
though Nigeria repeatedly holds elections and popular votes (presumably 
implying indirect participation and interest representation in govern-
ment), these lack legitimacy, despite government recognition of their 
outcomes. In fact, elections characterized by violence, rigging and ‘god-
father’ politics serve only to further undermine social trust.  
The repeated evaluation of political regimes as ‘partially free’ has rein-
forced a trendy but unclear pattern of hybridism, analytically defined as 
combining authoritarian and democratic elements (see Zinnecker 2009). 
There has been particular mention and speculation about the uncertain-
ties surrounding the current development direction of democracy in Ni-
geria (Diamond 2004). The observed complexities and elusiveness of the 
Nigerian system tend to deter bold approaches and scrutiny. Moreover, 
there is the tendency to qualify the African experience of democracy (in-
cluding Nigeria’s) as distinct or following a typical but as yet undefined 
form (Udogu 1997). The greater puzzle is perhaps the large swings in 
government systems since independence in Nigeria, as these have been 
marked not only by ambiguities but also confusing adjectives such as ‘di-
archy’ (Akinnola 1996), ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Diamond 2002, 
Levinstky and Way 2006) and other less clear labels. From the initial de-
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mocratic experience (1960–1966) many rough paths were trailed to attain 
the Freedom House status of ‘free’ regime (1979–1983). However, in-
stead of continuity along the democratic path, the system suffered a radi-
cal retreat from liberalization and participation. Repression was reas-
serted with varying levels of military dictatorship before returning to 
constitutional government in the current Third Republic.  
Instabilities and disrespect of political rights and civil liberties has 
clearly imperilled the initially foreseen advance of democracy towards 
respect for basic rights and liberties. The failure to extend rights in sub-
stantive terms to the masses and the use of violence to maintain exclu-
sion and generate social instability has certainly hindered the workings of 
the political system. A political system can be derailed when leaders 
adopt duality, establishing freedom and equality for some and denying 
them to others (Dahl 1971). The Niger Delta crisis, although con-
founded with resource struggle (see Douglas et al. 2003: 1–11), has an 
undertone of historically negated rights (Osaghae 1998), inequality and 
lack of voice – or simply denial of social choice. The preferences of citi-
zens, defined ‘as the political ordering of values and interests’, go unful-
filled. Based on the high incidence of change in political regime and the 
obvious social instability in post-colonial Nigeria, a significant connec-
tion appears to exist between the characteristics of the core political ex-
ecutive and weak responses to social demands, such as for political rights 
and civil liberties.  
6.4 Basis of Continuity in Political Executive Power and 
Roles 
Since colonial rule, elite continuity in political executive power and roles 
has operated through the recirculation in political offices of individuals 
and groups with similar background characteristics. This section exam-
ines the association between elite recurrence in political executive offices 
and background similarity. Firstly, the mere fact that members of the po-
litical executive elite of Nigeria stem from a similar background (sex, age 
cohort, profession, majority ethnic origin and political party affinity), as 
observed, does not necessarily explain power and role continuities in the 
polity. Secondly, as a critical elite analyst insisted, the essence of political 
elite composition does not simply derive from competition but also from 
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‘changes in values’ (Lane 1997: 855–874) manifested over time and 
space.  
Put differently, the cumulative pursuit of political and economic pow-
er has represented the motivation for the elite to continually ‘cling’ to 
political executive offices since colonial rule. The elite’s pursuit of high 
political offices is not only implicit in the historical composition of the 
upper echelons of government but also is reflected in the volatilities of 
coalitions, alliances and political institutions operated mainly by the po-
litical class. Instead of expected changes in ideas or values, the character-
istic composition of the political executive has been associated with typi-
cal attitudes and behaviour (rent-seeking, patronage, corruption, 
coercion, ‘godfather’ politics and trampling of rights of freedom and 
equality) aimed at maintaining the status quo.  
It is not always convenient to place political and economic interests in 
different boxes, that is, to separate political interests from economic 
ones. However, an analytical distinction is conceivable based on the atti-
tudes and behaviour most exhibited by the Nigerian political elite to-
wards political office-holding and, by extension, the political system. Da-
ta and literature analysis points to the existence of a self-interested, self-
serving and self-restorative elite composition whose concerns converge 
first and foremost at the uppermost point of political power. These elite 
attributes in Nigeria are mirrored in the power structure of the political 
executive sphere of government. In other words, elite preferences since 
colonial rule have assumed a timeless pattern of special interests realized 
by using state resources and placing a premium on political power as the 
foremost objective.  
Cohen’s (1972) affirmations about the pursuit of political power as a 
means of sustaining acquired privileges and allaying fears of social inse-
curity sheds further light on the accumulation of political power as a 
causal factor. This analyst demonstrated that social and material insecuri-
ties rather than resource scarcity have induced a permanent quest for 
political power among three segments of the upper class: (1) the colo-
nially privileged wealthy class, (2) educated affluent professionals and (3) 
wealth-seekers (ibid.). Apart from representing an overriding and con-
stant means for securing economic power and thwarting social mobility, 
political interests became conducive to a recurrent elite hold on political 
executive offices.  
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Similarly, Graf’s (1988) allusion to a common awareness and affinity 
of interests amongst Nigerian political elites supports the association 
made by Cohen (1972) between elite ambitions and political power ac-
cumulation in the executive government sphere. Graf (1988) also 
showed elites’ initial preference for political power as providing a basis 
for achieving financial power. Moreover, this supporting view asserts 
state power in Nigeria as an ultimate elite pursuit through which all other 
interests are fulfilled. Graf (ibid.) highlighted the common awareness of 
the Nigerian political elite as manifesting through the ‘muted idea that 
mutual service’ or ‘utility to each other’ is required and that ‘self-
enriching must be carried on, through the political machinery, to the det-
riment of the broad majority’ (p. 20). Thus, the inability to break away 
from the colonial past, if not disinterest in doing so, plus the avid quest 
for political power as a means to maintain economic wealth and social 
prestige, has reproduced the dual pronged cohesive forces of self-
enrichment and mutual benefit.  
Cohen’s (1972) insecurity thesis and Graf’s (1988) notion of common 
awareness highlight, respectively, the psychological and political factors 
that support the claim about the invalidity of Marxist and liberal-pluralist 
assumptions in Nigeria. Insecurity and the phobia of group domination 
(Horowitz 1985, see also Orji 2008) define the psychological factors that, 
in turn, drive political attitudes and behaviour such as patronage, corrup-
tive practices and nepotism by the political executive elite. These forms 
of elite interactions and actions towards political objects serve to secure 
material accumulation, to enhance prestige and to promote continuity in 
political executive offices. Weber’s (1968) insight that relative class and 
status positions can define political affiliations, such as membership in 
political parties, which can be used to improve life chances under state 
power, applies in the Nigeria case.  
It follows from the above empirical analysis that the dual goals of 
power and wealth accumulation are achieved through the manipulation 
of socio-cultural symbols, patronage and convenient political party re-
gimes. This latter set serves as a mechanism for articulating the social 
networks that support political executive office-holding. The facile ma-
nipulation of ethnic symbols occurs mainly through communal socializa-
tion. Informal interactive mechanisms are reinforced by formal educa-
tion and bureaucratic organizations that serve a recurrent power 
structure while rendering the masses acquiescent. Elite recurrence in po-
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litical executive offices cumulates in a socially unresponsive and irre-
sponsible upper government composition. The usurpation of political 
and economic power and the associated prestige represents the common 
interest attribute of the Nigerian political elite, which continuously works 
to obtain and retain political executive might.  
Political power assumes precedence over economic interest, because 
the acquisition of the latter depends primarily on the former: ascent to 
and retention of state power to control the distribution of public re-
sources. Unlike the linear Marxist approach to power inequality, which is 
based on disparity among economic classes, and distinct from the liberal-
pluralist postulations about social class autonomies founded on educa-
tional and professional differentiation, in Nigeria access to and retention 
of political and economic power depends on social factors such as eth-
no-regional background, religion, education and profession with network 
dynamics. Through political party organizations, patronage exchanges 
and coercion, the elite convert different and valued social backgrounds 
into network functions for supporting office-holding and securing the 
narrow interests of the political class. Above all, the vested interests of 
the political class play a fundamental part in political power and role con-
tinuities.  
6.5 Conclusion  
The mutual interests of the Nigerian political class that supports political 
executive elite office-holders have been served more by contingent situa-
tions and choices than by formal processes. According to O’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986), mutual benefit as a function of ‘social preferences’ is 
fundamental to elite agreements on political power allocation in specific 
situations with ‘uncertain outcomes’ (p. 59). By either natural means or 
manipulation, the Nigerian political class’ choice to retain political power 
through mutual agreement has been demonstrated in various situations 
of uncertainty – such as the post-colonial transition (1951–1960), the 
first military coup (1966), civil war (1967–1970), the sharing of power 
and state revenues, especially the revolutionary oil revenues (early 1970s), 
the annulment of presidential elections leading to social upheaval (1993) 
and a series of transition imbroglios. Yet, elite mutual agreement, in the 
case of Nigeria, is marked by a particular paradox. Instead of societal 
preferences, i.e. contrary to O’Donnell and Schmitter’s (1986) assertion, 
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elite mutual agreement has often emerged as the function of selective 
social (i.e. the political class) preferences. 
Very recent examples illustrate the way the Nigerian political class has 
seized opportunities arising from prevailing circumstances to make deci-
sive agreements about continuity in political power and roles at the ex-
ecutive government level. Tensions between ethno-regional political ac-
tors have been escalating amid street bombings and ethnic clashes. 
Central to these episodes is the forthcoming presidential elections 
scheduled for early 2011. Many fear that an ethno-regional conflict could 
develop and lead into civil war. Goodluck Jonathan, who was elevated in 
2010 from the vice presidency to the chief executive position, is report-
edly taking part in the election on the ruling party’s platform. Certain 
northern elite leaders have been aggrieved that Jonathan’s candidacy will 
deny the North its zoning chance to continue the headship of the presi-
dency which Yar’Adua (also of the North) was unable to complete due 
to natural causes – illness and death.  
Not so surprisingly, i.e. in business as usual, the incumbent Jonathan 
from the minority zone won the PDP primary elections as the presiden-
tial candidate. Tom Burgis, a Financial Times editor, reported the out-
come of the elections, noting the following: 
 That Mr. Jonathan has been able to consolidate after his ascension from 
the vice presidency is partly an indication that fierce claims of ethnic loy-
alty can be jumped by the political class’s determination to maintain con-
trol (Burgis 2011: online).  
Burgis further quoted Nasir el-Rufai, a former federal minister and 
reputed reformer, as saying, ‘Nigerian elites have far more in common to 
protect than there are ethnic and religious differences. They can do all 
this senseless brinkmanship, but at [the] last minute they will make a 
deal’ (ibid.). Such situations define a peculiar form of political interac-
tions by political actors, with various implications. Firstly, intra- and in-
ter-party coalitions and alliances remain instrumental for enacting power-
wielding agreements. Secondly, and most importantly, stifled growth of 
the political system has been the cost of maintaining the special and lofty 
interests of the political class supporters of those who hold political ex-
ecutive offices.  
Thus, and unless the strong sense of common interest – similar to an 
‘iron cast union’ – is weakened, the Nigerian political class will continue 
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to capitalize on situations of turbulence, overlook their differences and 
insist on wielding political power to the detriment of true reform and 
consequently social development. 
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7 Conclusions 
 
 
7.1 Outline of the Research Framework 
This study centred on the core executive elite of the Nigerian polity, 
which since independence has been plagued by instability in governance 
regimes. The various chapters examined the recruitment, composition 
and character of holders of upper echelon positions in the federal gov-
ernment. A key question was how the historical and dynamic composi-
tion of the core political executive elite has affected the political system 
of Nigeria, considering the major political transformations recorded in 
the post-colonial period. The study’s main objective was to analyse the 
composition of the core political executive elite, its periodic circulation 
and its typical characteristics as political regimes and economic resources 
changed over time. To guide the empirical analysis, four specific objec-
tives were formulated.  
The first specific objective entailed accounting for the major changes 
in the political system since decolonization, based on relevant constitu-
tional and institutional sources. Thus, the study began by seeking to de-
scribe the historical aspects of regime changes in Nigeria as a prelude to 
understanding the setting in which the political elite emerged and has 
operated with lasting effects on the political system. The second objec-
tive was to analyse the social background of members of the core politi-
cal executive elite. This involved using specific features, such as social 
class and communal origins, to ascertain the composition of the elite in 
key political executive offices as government regimes and economic re-
sources changed over time. The third objective was to examine the com-
posite nature of the core political executive elite based on social network 
characteristics. The fourth and final specific objective introduced an ex-
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planatory component into the analysis, in an attempt to clarify elite con-
tinuities in political executive offices.  
The study demonstrated elite continuity in political executive power 
and roles despite structural modifications in the form of changes in po-
litical regimes and economic resources since independence. It further 
argued that historically entrenched social dysfunction and self-serving 
interests rather than public service interests have driven the elite’s en-
deavour to gain and retain political power. The observed patterns of po-
litical elite composition, character and circulation have significantly cur-
tailed the democratic tenets of open contestation, cooperation, 
participation and consistency in observance of the rule of law. In particu-
lar, respect for political liberties and civil rights, has been seriously con-
strained by the elite’s historically entrenched and dynamically persistent 
special interests. The interests served are the common ones shared by 
the political class to which the core political elite at the national level is 
mostly responsible.  
A critical elite theoretical and analytical framework was employed for 
analysing elite circulation, composition and character in political execu-
tive offices in post-colonial Nigeria. This approach challenged the ade-
quacy of the Marxist and liberal-pluralist perspectives for understanding 
elite composition and its extended impact on the operation of the politi-
cal system in Nigeria. The Marxist-oriented idea that the characteristics 
and composition of the elite in political offices derive uniquely from 
their relation to economic property overlooks the variety of socio-
cultural, communal and political resources from which social networks 
are deployed as part of an enduring power structure. In Nigeria, the rul-
ing power structure is able to endure beyond the threshold at which 
Marxists believe a radical change in the extant social system is inevitable 
and will lead to the inauguration of socialism, which is to say, a classless 
society.  
At the other extreme, the liberal-pluralist assumption of power dis-
persal in open systems neglects the emergence, development and persis-
tence of status symbols and elite attitudes that obstruct structural chang-
es aimed at transforming the power structure by rendering it more 
egalitarian. In particular, this study questioned the validity of the view of 
the elite usually applied by liberal pluralists, who highlight the impor-
tance of a heterogeneous elite formation opposed to the continuity of 
the ruling class. The latter elite formation is believed to derive its power 
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from birthright, such as accumulated wealth and a shared tradition of 
attendance at ‘ivy league’ colleges and other similarly reputable elite edu-
cational institutions.  
The current study was inspired by the influential scholarly position 
promulgated mainly by critical elite theorists. These scholars challenge 
the radical or, as Mills (1956/2000) coined it, ‘overloaded’ assumptions 
of Marxist scholars and the simplicity (minimalism) of the pluralists’ pos-
tulations about power dispersal based on autonomous social groups act-
ing in concert with a neutral state. The analytical framework adopted in 
this study drew significantly from power elite assumptions. Power elite 
proponents assume a rigid power structure with an integrated elite hier-
archy that socializes the elite even under circumstances of structural 
change. 
However, the framework applied here represents an adapted and im-
proved version of the triumvirate power elite classification. Instead of 
simply following the economic, military and political power elite classifi-
cation developed by Mills (1956/2000), this study advanced a quintupli-
cate power elite framework for analysing the Nigerian case. The Nigerian 
elite occupants of government executive offices were assumed to derive 
their power resources not necessarily from economic factors (as the 
Marxists would claim) or autonomous groups (as per the liberal-
pluralists) but from a variety of historically and dynamically formed so-
cial backgrounds and network pacts. This theoretical advance is based on 
the typical nature of the Nigerian polity interweaved with the communal 
(mainly ethnic) and civic identities used (and sometimes abused) by the 
elite to harness political power and seek legitimacy.  
Different from the triumvirate elite power structure, the Nigerian po-
litical executive membership and permanence was assumed to be linked 
to a network of elite and sub-elite types that integrates the political class. 
This elite typology was understood as deriving from the varied pattern of 
social class and communal status backgrounds of Nigeria. As the product 
of historical and dynamic forces acting from different and uncoordinated 
social backgrounds, the Nigerian quintuplicate elite configuration relies 
on a social network to achieve its interests. This network is comprised of 
the traditional, socio-cultural, military, economic and political elites. Al-
so, leading ethno-regionally based political parties and leadership person-
alities are associated with the emergence and development of the social 
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network through which political actors ascend to and retain political ex-
ecutive offices over time and space.  
7.2 Findings 
7.2.1 Similar Social Background  
A major finding of the research is that amid changing circumstances 
since decolonization, there has been a great deal of continuity in power 
and roles of the core political elite in Nigeria. In other words, as ob-
served from the social background of the core political executive since 
independence, there has been no major shift in high political office-
holders’ characteristics. Participation in key political executive offices has 
been limited to individuals and groups of similar social class and status 
background, most notably, men of a similar age group. Extended stays in 
political offices, i.e. the office longevity often claimed by the political ex-
ecutives to consolidate proclaimed social policies, were not observed to 
be a factor limiting the fierce and sometimes bloody disputes over politi-
cal succession since colonial rule.  
Perhaps surprisingly, continued occupancies of political executive of-
fices have not had a cathartic effect – i.e. they have not alleviated the 
disorderly pattern of access to and retention of political executive power 
and roles. By extension, continuity in political executive power and roles 
has not halted or significantly attenuated the tensions, fierce struggles 
and bloody disputes for political power that continue to hinder social 
participation, opposition and the strengthening of the political system. 
This study empirically examined the role of communal factors such as 
ethnicity, religion and regional origin in circulation of the political elite in 
office. The data confirmed the earlier assertion about a skewed and con-
formist elite outlook with unequal access to power resources at the cen-
tral, federal level of government. The Nigerian political elite has been 
historically retrograde, with ethno-regional oligarchic tendencies. 
Achievement criteria especially that related to high educational qualifica-
tions and professional standards are blended with ascription attributes 
operated through such devices as the ‘Federal Character’ principle, in-
formal networks and durable patron-client relationships. Manipulated 
ethnic orientation towards political objectives has tended to define the 
power balance in favour of majority ethnic leadership.  
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Analysis of ethno-regional distribution and ethnic morphology (struc-
ture, size and resources) showed that the majority ethnic group leaders in 
each region were disproportionately represented in political executive 
offices. Based on regional attributes, the northern region has historically 
dominated the political process in terms of its relatively high influence 
on values and the distribution of rewards. More northern leaders have 
been chief executive, especially under military regimes. Indeed, northern 
elite leaders have appropriated most of the instruments of military re-
gimes to centralize power and distribute social resources in ways that 
have generated ‘ethnic’ conflicts (Suberu 2007: 452). The implication is 
that minority ethnic groups and their leaderships are either relegated to 
second order and least influential cabinet positions or, more often, mar-
ginalized in the mainstream political power establishment.  
Findings about recruitment patterns confirm the unequal ethnic influ-
ence in political elite circulation. Data on ethnic, regional and religious 
identities show that recruitment is significantly associated with the ethnic 
origin of the incumbent chief executive’s power and authority. Power 
retention is most clearly visible in the North, mainly because this region’s 
elite leaders have most frequently occupied the chief executive position. 
Also following the ethnic morphology pattern of access to and mainte-
nance of state power, the Hausa-Fulani ethnic fusion has dominated po-
litical executive offices since colonial rule. Northern influence has been 
clearer than that of the other regions, not only at the presidential level 
but also at the level of the most important ministerial portfolios, such as 
finance and central banking, planning and petroleum plus the position of 
chief economic adviser.  
The ethnic pecking order (hierarchic leadership pattern based on eth-
nic affinity, appeal and support) associated with ethno-regional lineage 
was reconfirmed during Obasanjo’s (1999–2007) recent government. 
Data showed that while the participation of northerners in first-order 
cabinet positions declined, inclusion of Yorubas increased during 
Obasanjo’s civilian government. Data on religious affiliation (see Figure 
5.9) shows a fairly even distribution of Christian and Muslim members 
of the national government. So, contrary to Weberian expectations of 
the reduced importance of ethnic emotional appeals as a result of mod-
ernization, Nigeria’s ethnic Who’s Who remains significant, at least in the 
occupancy of political executive offices.  
 Conclusions 177 
7.2.2 Interactive Devices Ensure Political Executive Continuities  
The analysis of the Nigerian elite’s use of political parties to perpetuate a 
self-serving power network reveals not only cohesiveness but also the 
dynamic character of the core political executive elite. Data about affilia-
tions to political parties and participation in political executive offices 
show that access to and retention of political executive power and roles 
are mostly shared among the members of the majority ethno-regionally 
based political parties. That is, elite participation in political executive 
offices through political party affiliation has been linearly and hierarchi-
cally based on ethnic morphology and network interactions. In particu-
lar, considering that no opposition party has ever won elections since 
colonial rule, it follows that the emergence and development of informal 
networks hinge on winning parties whose identities and memberships 
can be traced back to the structure and leadership of the majority ethnic 
groups. Moreover, the ethnic patterns of political party identities and 
memberships since colonial rule indicate that a self-serving elite network 
in Nigeria is associated with the resources and personalities of particular 
political parties and their leadership.  
Elite dynamics were thus found to operate by harnessing informal 
network resources to formal institutions, such as political parties and the 
presidency. The powers and roles of this latter are converted through 
patronage, co-optation and corruption to protect special interests and 
avoid answerability. The historical trailing of political party formations to 
ethno-regional morphology revealed how the Nigerian political elite capi-
talize on informal-formal institutions to enact influential social networks. 
These latter are used for linking likeminded allies and social actors who 
support the continued membership of select individuals in political ex-
ecutive offices. Before the change to the presidential system in 1979, po-
litical alliances were observed only at the sub-national level between two 
ethno-regional parties. The 1979 constitution obliged political parties by 
law to establish offices in at least two-thirds of the states and local gov-
ernment units. Parties were also prohibited from using ethnic insignias 
for campaign purposes. Without losing their ethnic roots and identities, 
the historically winning parties sought to diffuse their memberships 
through broader, nationally reaching alliances that culminated in social 
networks. Three deductions can be made in relation to the alliances and 
cleavages that shaped these nationally integrated networks. 
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 Firstly, elite power networks are associated more with quantitative 
changes than with qualitative changes in the composition of the political 
executive elite. Social support then increasingly became hinged on in-
formal social networks. That is, admission to political executive offices 
was made more selective by dynamic modes of patronage (cross-cutting 
and selective distribution of second-order cabinet positions and passive 
approval by the chief executive of ‘godfather’ politics) with the co-
optation of key social leaders and manipulation of political processes 
without significant renewals in composition.  
Secondly, the formation of political alliances in post-colonial Nigeria 
was initially (i.e. during the independence government, 1960–1965) ob-
served as the sequel of electoral outcomes. However, from the second 
general election (1965) and the aborted second mandate of the First Re-
public (1966), the Nigerian political elite increasingly capitalized on past 
experiences to engage in intra- or inter-party alliances before elections. 
The interesting point derives not simply from the temporal differences 
of political alliances but from their purposive contents. Although the 
post-electoral intra-party and sub-national alliances indulged in patronage 
exchanges (see Dudley 1982), they were also inclined to ensure a stable 
and viable executive government. Balewa was the prime minister and co-
leader of the NPC who initiated and led the bi-party alliance (1960–1965) 
between his party and NCNC. Though Balewa’s indifferent attitude to-
wards serious policy matters has been the subject of criticism, he is said 
to have been chiefly concerned with government stability as a basis for 
sustaining national unity (Adebayo 1986/2004).  
Yet, despite the fact that pre-electoral alliances were more nationally 
integrative and cohesive, the ambitions of their elite founders were less 
about winning elections than about securing access to the state power 
that was so vital for ensuring continuous and centralized control over the 
distribution of public resources through the political executive. All pre-
electoral alliances after 1965 either disintegrated or contributed to the 
disintegration of the political regime. The 1965 pre-electoral alliances 
were so strangely enacted between ideologically and organizationally op-
posing parties that they provoked social and political turmoil which 
broke down the regime in 1966. The 1978–79 pre-electoral alliance that 
eventually won the election broke down before the first mandate ended. 
The 1982–83 pre-electoral alliance that won the general elections sur-
vived no more than three months after the government’s inauguration, 
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by which time both the presiding government and the alliance had col-
lapsed. A closer look at these alliances shows a precarious overlap of 
vested interests and the usual government functions.  
Thirdly, the military learnt from analogous past experiences to use po-
litical parties and convert its resources into informal network potentials 
for securing office longevity and controlling the helms of government. 
Ibrahim Babangida (1985–1993) was the first military ruler to use and 
abuse political party instruments in a failed attempt to inaugurate an in-
ter-regime (military to civilian) extension of office-holding. Babangida’s 
nationally enacted Political Bureau (Diamond et al. 1999) was a forerun-
ner of the network aimed to support a centrally controlled two-party sys-
tem. Faced with severe social resistance, Babangida’s government failed, 
but the military regime continued. The network that Babangida left be-
hind facilitated Abacha’s (1993–1998) self-appointment and establish-
ment as another brand of military dictatorship. This one sought to ex-
plore the resources of political parties to promote continuity in political 
executive power and roles.  
Ken Saro Wiwa was an Ogoni activist who defied the nefarious and 
extensive military-led network alliances of the powerful Nigerian political 
class. He was sentenced to the maximum penalty of death for daring to 
challenge the operatives of the network linked to Abacha’s government. 
The conclusion is that, independent of regime type, the proliferation of 
political institutions has been a handy tool for incumbent political execu-
tives. Political institutions have burgeoned without provoking changes in 
the composition of the political executive elite and their capacity to de-
liver public services.  
The political executive elite have converted formal institutional 
frameworks into instruments for activating and sponsoring informal 
networks through patron-client arrangements. Apart from contributing 
to legitimate government conduct, patronage-based networks energize 
the continuities in political executive power by similar self-serving indi-
viduals and groups. That is, the manipulation of political parties for pri-
vate purposes based on network nodes, patronage exchanges and other 
practices has historically characterized the occupancy of political execu-
tive offices.  
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7.2.3 Dysfunctional Elite Composition Inhibits True Regime 
Change  
An important conclusion on the relationship between the character of 
the core political executive elite and the political system is that despite 
myriad institutional changes and crises no significant regime change has 
in fact occurred since colonial rule. This finding invalidates, in the Nige-
rian case, the arguments of regime change theorists who associate severe 
social crisis with renewals in elite composition and political regime 
change. The argument of Burton and Higley (1998) that internal crises 
are linked to renewals in elite composition and regime change has no 
clear application in post-colonial Nigeria. There have been abrupt, brutal 
and momentous crises in the Nigerian polity. Yet the political system, as 
demonstrated in this study with the use of literature sources and Free-
dom House data on political rights and civil liberties, shows no signifi-
cant change. Based on the character of the core political executive elite, 
no noticeable changes have occurred from a closed regime (such as co-
lonial and military rule) to an open regime (especially democratic). 
 Apart from the colonial rule legacy and rapid rise of government rev-
enue, Nigeria has been beset by abrupt and brutal experiences such as 
the civil war, horrendous military dictatorships and a post-election an-
nulment debacle that provoked mass turmoil. None of these crises or 
their combined effects led to the regime change that might have been 
expected or to the removal of the country’s powerful political executive 
elites. On the contrary, the political executive elite, closely supported by 
the political class, has continued to develop devices for adjusting to 
structural changes without necessarily boosting the operation of the po-
litical system. The persistence of selective government support, to the 
detriment of social voice in politics, has thus assumed an iniquitous and 
contradictory pattern in Nigeria.  
Elite selectivity and continuity in political executive offices contradict 
the seminal wisdom of engaging ‘the loyalty of new groups to the system’ 
by ‘comparatively’ permitting their access or ‘incorporating’ their inter-
ests in legitimate political institutions (Lipset 1959: 88). The absence of 
new groups and the marginalization of important segments of Nigerian 
society (minorities, women, students, farmers, labour unions and labour 
leaders) inhibit the ‘responsiveness of the government to the preferences 
of its citizens, considered as political equals’ (Dahl 1971). Ironically, 
rights to freedom and equality variously appear in the so-called ‘democ-
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ratic’ constitutions of Nigeria promulgated in 1960 and 1979 and in the 
current 1999 document.  
The patterns observed in the circulation, composition and character 
of the political executive demonstrates the frailty of elite attitudes and 
behaviour towards formal office-holding in the national executive 
sphere. If, as according to Ake (1975), political attitudes and behaviour 
derive from constant interactions between actors in ways that affect the 
political structure, the interactive weaknesses observed in the Nigerian 
case have likely had negative implications for the political system. That 
is, the dominance of certain attitudes (rent-seeking, patronage, corrup-
tion, coercion, manipulation of ethnic symbols and ‘godfather’ politics) 
among the political executive elite is at variance with the essence of good 
political governance – openness, inclusiveness, responsiveness and re-
sponsibility.  
7.2.4 Special Interests Underlie Power and Role Continuities  
The findings of this study reveal that common social background, in-
formally selective networks and shared attitudes are important factors in 
explaining the composition and continuity of political executive offices. 
The typical attitudes (rent-seeking, patronage, corruption, coercion, eth-
nic and godfather politics) that were found to characterize the composi-
tion of the political executive elite imply bad public choices. That is, the 
socially unrepresentative elite preferences that manifest at the executive 
office level substantially restrict political liberties and civil rights. These 
preferences were analysed here in terms of the vested interests that tend 
to dominate the attitudes and behaviour of those charged with the public 
responsibility to initiate, supervise and deliver policies in post-colonial 
Nigeria.  
Preferences of the core political executive elite have historically re-
sponded more to the necessities, anxieties and avarice of the Nigerian 
political class than to the legitimate demands of the Nigerian masses. 
The undermining of public preferences stems from the insecurity and 
‘phobia’ overtly and continually felt by the post-colonial Nigerian elite. 
In response, the elite has resorted to socially wilful attitudes and prac-
tices such as rent-seeking, patronage exchanges, corruption, manipula-
tion and co-optation of select members of society to maintain political 
executive power. The pertinent conclusion is that, contrary to the liberal-
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pluralist expectation that the ‘contents’ of particular group or categorical 
‘interests’ change over time relative to the ‘contending’ groups’ positions 
(Hindes 1986: 114), both the positions and interests embodied by the 
Nigerian political executive elite and its political class supporters have 
been historically unresponsive to change.  
7.3 Theoretical Implications of Findings  
This research sought to contribute to understanding about the lack of 
circulation within the uppermost influential positions of the Nigerian 
polity – the core political executives. Consequently, it became pertinent 
to expose the invalidity of two generally propounded theoretical posi-
tions about the motivations of elite circulation and transformations in 
the political executive power structure with varied outcomes for the po-
litical regime. Firstly, Marxist assumptions about the causal link between 
economic power and political power did not prove helpful for under-
standing the realities of the Nigerian polity. Marxist assumptions lead to 
scepticism about the possibility of social circulation in political executive 
offices other than that directly emanating from the productive class. 
Marxists do not believe in gradual processes of reform such as structural 
changes and elite transformation but, rather, in abrupt and profound al-
terations in the social system mainly through revolution leading to a 
classless society.  
The political executive elite of post-colonial Nigeria share common 
characteristics. They derive their support from harnessing different types 
of elite (socio-cultural, economic, military, traditional and political) to 
cross-cutting networks. The core political elite have built their support 
base on a patronage-driven network sustained by state revenues. In post-
colonial Nigeria, both cash crops and unprecedented revenues from the 
sale of oil in international markets have served as sources of rents for the 
survival of the political class. However, political power has been a con-
stant pursuit of the political class and a primary source of group cohe-
sion aimed at assuaging the perceived insecurity and ‘phobia’ over social 
group deprivation and self-destruction. Instead of a Marxist-based 
dominant economic class, a political class usurper and controller of state 
resources for actualizing self-interests is more applicable in the Nigerian 
case. Paradoxical is that state resources have been used to co-opt like-
minded group elite leaders and to organize political power and roles 
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based on institutional proliferation without meaningful or radical (in a 
Marxian sense) social change. In other words, institutional dynamics 
have failed to provoke positive social change capable of correcting the 
dominant system.  
The second theoretical proposition hinges on the liberal-pluralist view 
that political power will be dispersed over autonomous groups with a 
neutral state as arbiter of last resort. The liberal pluralists argue that 
structural change will transform the power structure by rendering it more 
amenable to social penetration and socially desired outcomes. The find-
ings of this study at first seem to confirm the liberal-pluralist view of 
heterogeneity of elite social background, which would permit public de-
bate and compromise (Dahl 1971, Keller 1963/1991). However, and 
more importantly, the major challenge to liberal pluralism in Nigeria is 
the parasitical oligarchic power structure that feeds on state resources 
instead of responding to social demand and being sustained on social 
support.  
Political power in Nigeria circulates among a small number of indi-
viduals and groups that survive by their utilization of state resources. 
This dependency defines an oligarchic tangle that has beset the Nigerian 
polity since political independence. The oligarchic tangle of the Nigerian 
polity persists despite an array of structural changes and varied elite so-
cial backgrounds. This interpretation is at variance with liberal-pluralist 
assumptions about elite transformation based on structural changes and 
a plurality of elite backgrounds. While the recurrence of a particular elite 
background and interests in political executive offices seriously limits the 
validity of liberal-pluralist and Marxist assumptions, it corroborates the 
advanced critical elite theories that provided the main foundation for this 
study. In particular, the recurrence of a common elite background and 
the realization of special interests using state resources – and at variance 
with the preferences of the wider Nigerian society – undercuts the prem-
ise of state neutrality advanced by the liberal pluralists. It can be safely 
suggested that the absence of a workable neutral state and the presence 
of a heavy-handed state is in Nigeria linked to state capture instead of 
state perpetuation.  
The critical elite theories depart from Hunter’s (1951) power structure 
and Mills’ (1956/2000) power elite model, which presuppose a tightly 
connected elite circle. Elite connection is said to build up in the power 
structure through common backgrounds and social networks that oper-
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ate under enlarged institutions responsible for making important deci-
sions that affect ordinary people’s lives (Hunter 1951, Mills 1956/2000, 
Domhoff 1986, Mann 1992, Scott 2008, Moore et al. 2002, Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2008). Mills (1956/2000) suggested that a triumvirate 
made up of the economic, military and political segments, circulates con-
tinually and composes the power structure. Further expansions of the 
critical elite theories depict a broad inclusion of major elite groups as 
consistent with pluralist models of power. However, social inclusion re-
curs through networks that Higley et al. (1991) portray as ‘shifting, in-
formal and mainly invisible central power circles which afford the leaders 
of different organizations, institutional sectors and camps of opinions 
relatively easy, safe access to one another’ (Higley et al. 1991: 50). In Ni-
geria, a relatively easy-cum-safe mutual access to the power structure im-
plies the foreclosure of participation in political processes and outcomes 
to the majority of Nigerians.  
As observed in the analysis, social networks in Nigeria permit the fac-
ile interaction amongst various elite groups in constant collusions linked 
to organizational and institutional resources used for supporting access 
to and retention of political executive offices. An implication of the elu-
sive networks that integrate the activities of the political class and politi-
cal executive elite is that real power tends to repose less in the formal 
state realm than, as respectively suggested by Serrat (2009) and Wendel 
(2009), in decentralized power centres and in unaccountable elite groups.  
This study thus gives rise to three major theoretical conclusions. First, 
no particular elite type firmly dominates the Nigerian power structure, 
especially at the influential political executive level. The military elite 
have ruled the Nigerian polity for about two-thirds of the post-colonial 
period. However, the military often rely on civilian elites, ranging from 
traditional elites to techno-bureaucratic elites, business elites and political 
elites. Incorporation of these groups has served to boost the military’s 
legitimacy in the ‘strange nest’ of political power. Similarly, civilian re-
gimes and rulers have variously incorporated or co-opted different elite 
categories, including military personnel, in their respective governments. 
Ethno-regional elites, especially those, such as the Hausa-Fulani, from 
the populous and cohesive Northern region may have had hegemonic 
intentions that never moved beyond trials which were often challenged 
by others. The point is that the Nigerian political class and political ex-
ecutive elite derive from and form a relatively cohesive group of various 
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elite and sub-elite types acting from an informal background while using 
formal state power to further their interests. In other words, they all 
share this common background and special interests.  
Second, liberal-pluralist theory has limited validity in the case of Nige-
ria. As revealed by the data on the composition of the supposedly key 
state representatives at the political executive level, the state since colo-
nial rule has been embedded in a cohesive social network through which 
the political class usurpers capture state resources for their own benefit.  
Third, elite ascension to political executive power and their retention 
of these roles depend less on economic factors as espoused by Marxists 
than on non-economic factors as postulated by pluralists. However, both 
of these theories’ understandings about a cohesive and embedded politi-
cal power structure qualify the core political executive elite of Nigeria as 
a ruling class rather than as heterogeneously strategic elite. Because the 
power of the Nigerian elite has relied on state resources, the elite form a 
powerful political class with an oligarchic or ruling class pattern, as 
shown by Keller in Beyond the Ruling Class (1963/1991). The composi-
tion of the Nigerian political executive elite is more the outcome of a 
selectively quantitative and likeminded pattern of group circulation rather 
than a result of qualitative social representation. Thus it has yet to move 
beyond the ruling class predicament.  
The higher education and distinctive schooling background found es-
pecially within the ranks of the Nigerian elite have become the basis of 
an informal (flex) network, which acts as a self-serving tool rather than a 
social formula for opening up the power structure. If formal education 
has contributed to social dysfunction in post-colonial Nigeria, there is a 
need to look more deeply into the oligarchic pattern of power-holding in 
the country to discern its relationship with the control of information for 
development purposes. Similarly, this study offers a caveat to the recent 
calls for revitalizing civil society through such agencies of empowerment 
as formal education and non-governmental organizations. Any action in 
this direction must assume a holistic outlook. In a resource-rich but pov-
erty stricken country like Nigeria, it can no longer be overlooked that the 
elite are still very powerful and adept in regenerating their old ways of 
doing political business outside of good governance criteria.  
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7.4 Policy Implications of Findings  
One finding of this research relates to the lack of socially meaningful 
elite circulation into and out of political executive offices, coupled with 
typical elite practices that have come to symbolize the very power struc-
ture itself. This deficiency has implied reproduction of political power 
instead of its renewal, especially at the topmost executive level at which 
key socially relevant decisions are made. Lack of elite circulation in po-
litical executive offices is associated with recurrent office-holding and 
allocation of state roles based on similarity of social backgrounds and 
interests. Moreover, insufficient elite circulation in high political execu-
tive offices in post-colonial Nigeria has occurred in tandem with the 
marginalization of important social groups. One of the most notable 
groups excluded from political executive processes are Nigeria’s minori-
ties.  
Exclusion of minorities from the national executive power structure 
has led to the acute and ongoing crisis in the Niger Delta minority zone 
and to intermittent ethnic clashes elsewhere. A large portion of govern-
ment revenue is in fact derived from government controlled production 
and sale of petroleum from the Niger Delta. On the basis of critical elite 
analysis, the transformation of the power structure is a sine qua non for 
averting socially undesired disorder like that which is commonplace in 
this region. Critical elitists note that transformation of a power structure 
is brought about primarily by periodic changes in leadership power and 
roles, considered ‘[as] key to an entirely new theory of the “ruling class”’ 
(Prewitt and Stone 1993: 134–135).  
Necessary transformations in the power structure go beyond just 
‘change of guard’ recommendations tabled through politicized cabinet 
reshuffles or informal crisis-vulnerable power rotation formula, which in 
Nigeria have employed patronage-based co-optation to ensure the selec-
tive inclusion of likeminded elite individuals and groups. Change in the 
power structure requires renewal not just by the physical replacement of 
individuals or groups, but, most importantly, by regeneration of beliefs 
and ideas about values and interests. Such ideas should be amenable to 
coherent policy actions guided by equity principles in the distribution of 
outcomes.  
Elite leadership critiques emphasize the need for political institutions 
to produce and reproduce the beliefs that consistently structure attitudes 
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and behaviour in the polity (Galbrath 1974, Dudley 1982, Verba 2003, 
Wetzel and Abrahamson 2008). Lamentably, the Nigerian case demon-
strates a contrary view. Practices such as rent-seeking, selective patron-
age exchanges, corruption, excessive use of force, and ethnic and ‘godfa-
ther’ politics have eroded institutional values and socially founded 
preferences. Therefore, Galbraith’s (1974) incisive wisdom that ‘the 
emancipation of belief is the most fundamental of the tasks of reform 
and the one on which all else depends’ (p. 223) is very relevant for Nige-
ria. Expected institutional and organizational changes cannot effectively 
take root in the Nigerian polity without true emancipation from the so-
called ‘colonial legacy’, ethnic bigotry and rapacious elite attitudes to-
wards the management of public resources and their replacement with 
socially productive reforms.  
More specifically, it is a systemic oversight to emphasize transforma-
tion in the composition and character of the political executive elite 
without reflecting on the extended implications for the political system. 
Substantive guarantees of political rights and civil liberties are still absent 
or deficient in Nigeria, despite the various alternations in the nation’s 
political system, including the current rejoinder of the democratic ex-
periment since 1999. Freedom House data on the Nigerian polity and 
information from other related sources reveal shortfalls in democratic 
governance. Governance management is less a role fulfilled by the peo-
ple, than a formal occupation and effective exercise of political offices by 
elite leaders representing specific segments of society. Recent surveys 
show that though Nigerians have historically and continually supported 
democracy, they are ‘most critical of the government of the day’, hence 
‘democracy remains fragile and suffers a growing deficit of popular con-
fidence’ (Afrobarometer 2006, 2009: online).  
The analyses and findings of this study point to the persistent prob-
lem of the incomplete and inconclusive regime changes that since colo-
nial rule have played a large role in deficiencies in the circulation, com-
position and character of the key drivers of change – the core political 
executive elite. Incomplete regime change can undercut government ca-
pacity to assist the poor and underprivileged (Davenport 2000). Effective 
policy measures that secure rights to freedom and equality are therefore 
urgently needed in Nigeria. The institution of the presidency has histori-
cally implied bloated executive powers (Graf 1988) with guaranteed ac-
cess to patronage resources used to amass political power at the expense 
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of the masses. The occupancy of political offices should be rendered 
more accountable to the people instead of to the vested, special interests 
of the political class.  
Political inclusiveness, as Verba (2003) clarified, should be under-
stood and applied not merely in terms of quantity but, more importantly, 
in terms of the quality of interest representation by office-holders. Spe-
cifically, the operation and efficacy of the current ‘Federal Character’ 
principle for recruiting political executive officers since 1979 requires 
objective appraisal and adaptation. More important than making swift or 
‘quick-fix’ (reactive and unstable)1 informal elite accords for partaking in 
the highly valued political executive offices, elites should focus on the 
social development and stability of Nigeria. However, the path to devel-
opment requires a holistic outlook. As one critical elite analyst recog-
nized, ‘a significant measure of consensus and normative harmony may 
be necessary among the ruling group [as the Nigerian case suggests], but 
it is the absence of consensus among the lower classes which keeps them 
compliant’ (Mann 1982: 391). Therefore, appropriate and objective pro-
grammes of mass education and empowerment plus conscious and co-
herent measures of social inclusiveness in key political decision-making 
processes are necessary in Nigeria to embolden the political conscious-
ness of the people towards changes that can lead to social development. 
Note 
 
1 Reaction marked by a quick and unreliable response to certain demands. In poli-
tics, for example, such response to social demands lacks stability, i.e. while imply-
ing a palliative social effect; it turns out mostly in favor of its initiators. It is there-
fore elitist. 
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